Conflict diamonds and the Angolan Civil War (1992–2002)

Abstract

In the early 1990s several rebel groups turned to natural resource extraction to pay for war. A key form of this is rebel diamond production, commonly referred to as conflict diamonds, which is widely perceived as being highly beneficial to insurgent organisations. Yet in the Angolan Civil War (1992–2002), the use of conflict diamonds by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) resulted in a decisive insurgent defeat. How can this outcome be explained? Offering a nuanced understanding of how conflict diamonds affect civil war, this article shows that although diamonds generated considerable revenue for UNITA, they were not an effective method for them to take on the Angolan government. This was for two reasons: internally, the rebels greatly struggled to convert their diamond proceeds into sufficient goods and services; and externally, it left the group highly vulnerable to international countermeasures in the form of United Nations Security Council sanctions. Natural resource extraction may therefore not be as useful to rebel groups as is frequently believed.

Keywords:

• Civil war
• conflict diamonds
• insurgency
• Angola
• UNITA

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the University of Manchester President’s Doctoral Scholarship. The author would like to thank James Pattison, Roger Mac Ginty, Vladimir Rauta and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.

Notes

Notes

1 Examples include the civil wars in Afghanistan (poppies), Cambodia (timber), Angola (diamonds), Sierra Leone (diamonds) and Colombia (cocaine).

2 Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare; and Westad, Global Cold War.

3 See, for instance, Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla’s Best Friend”; Le Billon, “Angola’s Political Economy of War”; and Orogun, “Blood Diamonds.”

4 See Bieri, From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process.

5 See eg Dietrich and Cilliers, Angola’s War Economy; and Hodges, Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State.

6 Another influential conflict is the Sierra Leonean Civil War (1991–2002).

7 On UNITA leadership and organisation, see Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi. On the Angolan government’s kleptocracy, see Dietrich and Cilliers, Angola’s War Economy.

8 Three key studies in this field are Ross, “What Do We Know”; “How Do Natural Resources Influence”; and “Closer Look at Oil.”

9 Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies; and Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla’s Best Friend.”

10 Campbell, Blood Diamonds.

11 Smillie, Blood on the Stone, 174.

12 Bruffaerts, “Diamantine Struggle.”

13 Le Billon, “Fatal Transactions.”

14 eg The New York Times Upfront, “Diamonds and War,” May 8, 2000, p. 16; and The Observer, “Diamonds: Africa’s Deadly Wealth,” May 14, 2000, p. 17.

15 eg Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla’s Best Friend”; Ndumbe and Cole, “Illicit Diamond Trade,” 52; and Olsson “Diamonds Are a Rebel’s Best Friend.” See also Le Billon, “Diamond Wars?” An important exception to this near consensus in the literature is Weinstein, who argues that rebel groups relying on natural resource extraction attract violent, opportunistic and non-productive recruits. See Weinstein, “Resources and the Information Problem”; Inside Rebellion.

16 See eg Orogun, “Blood Diamonds.”

17 eg Le Billon, Fuelling War.

18 Le Billon, “Political Ecology of War,” 569–70.

19 Le Billon, “Geopolitical Economy of ‘Resource Wars,’” 9.

20 Auty, Resource Abundance and Economic Development.

21 Olsson, “Diamonds Are a Rebel’s Best Friend.”

22 These are the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) in the First Liberian Civil War (1989–1997) and the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL) in the First Congo War (1996–1997).

23 Scholtz, SADF in the Border War; Stockwell, In Search of Enemies; and Scott, Deciding to Intervene, Chap. 5.

24 Weigert, Angola: A Modern Military History, Chap. 4.

25 The New York Times, “Tally in Angola Leads to Runoff,” October 18, 1992, p. A7.

26 The New York Times, “Widespread Attacks by UNITA Rebels in Angola Are Reported,” October 31, 1992, p. A3.

27 Hare, Angola’s Last Best Chance for Peace, 18; and The Washington Post, “Angola’s Dual Reign of Terror,” March 23, 1993, p. A1.

28 The New York Times, “Rebels in Angola Suffer a Setback,” November 4, 1992, p. A12.

29 Malaquias, Rebels and Robbers, 105–6.

30 Dietrich, “Inventory of Formal Diamond Mining,” 144. On page 282 Dietrich notes that UNITA may have engaged in some kimberlite mining near Mavinga, but this was not confirmed.

31 UNSC, S/2000/486, 17; Le Billon, “Angola’s Political Economy of War,” 67; Smillie, Blood on the Stone, 66; and Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, 541–2.

32 Quoted in The Observer, “Lust for Diamonds Undermines Hope for Angola Peace,” September 17, 1995, p. 20.

33 UNSC, S/2002/1119, 26.

34 It was not their only source of income. For instance, UNITA also collected ‘taxes’ on goods (such as mining equipment) that entered UNITA-controlled territory. This earned the group as much as $5 million per month. UNSC, S/2000/203, 36.

35 UNSC, S/2002/486, 15, 39; S/2000/203, 27; and Sherman, “Profit vs. Peace,” 707–10.

36 Smillie, Blood on the Stone, 67; and UNSC, S/2000/203, 28.

37 Smillie, Blood on the Stone, 70; and UNSC, S/2000/203, 28.

38 Smillie, Blood on the Stone, 73–4.

39 Global Witness, A Rough Trade, 4.

40 Dietrich, “Inventory of Formal Diamond Mining,” 148.

41 There are no figures available on the monetary value of South African support, but the appropriation for the US assistance programme in the late 1980s was around $40 million per annum. Scott, Deciding to Intervene, 137–8, 43–4.

42 UNSC, S/2002/486, 17.

43 UNSC, S/2000/203, 10–1.

44 Farah and Braun, Merchant of Death, 152–3.

45 UNSC, S/2000/203, 19–20.

46 Ibid., 18.

47 Malaquias, Rebels and Robbers, 109; and The Guardian, “UNITA Strikes Falter as Savimbi Flees,” January 11, 1993, p. 9.

48 The Guardian, “Disciplined UNITA Ready to Fight On,” January 25, 1993, p. 6.

49 The Washington Post, “Key Angolan City Falls to Rebels,” March 9, 1993, p. A14; Human Rights Watch, Angola: Arms Trade and Violations, 21; and Brittain, Death of Dignity, 69.

50 Quoted in The New York Times, “Angolan Rebels Rebound, within Reach of a Victory,” April 13, 1993, p. A1.

51 The Irish Times, “UNITA Forces Seize Oil Town of Soyo,” January 22, 1993, p. 9.

52 Venter, War Dog, 353–81; and Barlow, Executive Outcomes: Against all Odds, Chap. 8.

53 UNITA forces later retook the town, only to lose control of it again. The Guardian, “UNITA Rebels Retake Oil Town,” May 26, 1993, p. 8; and Weigert, Angola: A Modern Military History, 119–20.

54 UNSC, S/2000/203, 10, 31.

55 Los Angeles Times, “Diamond Fever in Angola,” March 13, 1996, p. A1.

56 See eg The Guardian, “UNITA ‘Sells De Beers Illegal Diamonds,’” March 4, 1993, p. 12; and UNSC, S/2000/1225, 44–5.

57 It needs to be emphasised here that this strictly refers to the pre-2000 situation. As will be discussed below, international regulation has greatly increased in the new millennium, not least as a result of the establishment of the KPCS.

58 UNSC, S/2000/203, 17.

59 USNC, “Resolution 864,” New York: United Nations, 1993.

60 Bromley and Griffiths, “End-User Certificates.”

61 Prior to the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, which came into force in 2014, the international trade in weapons was largely seen as a state prerogative and therefore internationally only loosely enforced. See Erickson, Dangerous Trade, Chap. 3.

62 UNSC, S/2000/203, 16.

63 Ibid., 12–6.

64 Ibid., 15.

65 Frynas and Wood, “Oil & War in Angola,” 595. Although diamonds appreciated more than oil did between 1992 and 2002, the relative price difference was not large enough to have a meaningful impact on the course of the war.

66 Hodges, Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State; and Malaquias, “Making War.”

67 Beck, The Normality of Civil War, 107; The Observer, “Democracy in Tatters,” January 9, 1994, p. E38; and The Guardian, “Death Haunts a City Shattered by Battle,” April 17, 1993, p. 11.

68 Vines, Peace Postponed, 6.

69 Pearce, Political Identity and Conflict, 134.

70 Ibid., 141.

71 The New York Times, “UNITA Says It Accepts Peace Accords with Angola,” October 7, 1993, p. A5. The UN tried to mediate peace talks before this time as well, but this came to nothing due to UNITA intransigence. See Anstee, Orphan of the Cold War, Chap. 21 and 22.

72 Hooper, Bloodsong!; and Barlow, Executive Outcomes, Chap. 14.

73 Venter, War Dog, 397; and Barlow, Executive Outcomes, Chap. 18.

74 Venter, War Dog, 440.

75 Hare, Angola’s Last Best Chance for Peace, 61; and Wright, Destruction of a Nation, 191.

76 Human Rights Watch, Angola: Arms Trade and Violations, 22.

77 UNSC, S/1994/1441.

78 The New York Times, “Angolan Government and Rebels Sign Treaty to End 19-Year War,” November 21, 1994, p. A1.

79 UNSC, S/2000/1225, 40–1.

80 South China Morning Post, “Air Crash Linked to Gems Row,” December 21, 1995, p. 11.

81 The Washington Post, “Zaire Reportedly Selling Arms to Angolan Ex-Rebels,” March 21, 1997, p. A1.

82 Global Witness, A Rough Trade, 4, 11; and The Washington Post, “Zaire Reportedly Selling.”

83 Tamm, “Origins of Transnational Alliances.”

84 UNSC, S/2000/203, 12–6.

85 Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace,” 566.

86 Global Witness, A Rough Trade, 12.

87 Vines and Oruitemeka, “Bullets to Ballots,” 246.

88 Wall Street Journal, “Angolan Demobilisation Raises Red Flag,” October 1, 1997, p. A16.

89 UNSC, S/2000/1225, 42; and Weigert, Angola: A Modern Military History, 133.

90 The Guardian, “Rebels Bid for Total Conquest of Angola,” March 30, 1999, p. 15; and “UNSC S/2000/1225,” 8.

91 UNSC, “Resolution 864.”

92 UNSC, “Resolution 1118,” New York: United Nations, 1997; and UNSC, “Resolution 1127,” New York: United Nations, 1997.

93 UNSC, “Resolution 1173,” New York: United Nations, 1998.

94 UNSC, S/2000/203.

95 UNSC, S/2002/1119, 26.

96 The Daily Telegraph, “De Beers Ban on Gem Sales Hits UNITA,” October 8, 1999, p. 16; and UNSC, S/2000/203, 32.

97 UNSC, S/2000/203, 22.

98 Weigert, Angola: A Modern Military History, 145.

99 Alcides Sakala quoted in Vines, “Monitoring UN Sanctions in Africa,” 253.

100 Anonymous UNITA member quoted in Médecins Sans Frontières, Angola: Sacrifice of a People, 91.

101 UNSC, S/2000/203, 14; and S/2000/1225, 8.

102 The Guardian, “Rebels Lose Former HQ to Angolan Army,” December 28, 1999, p. 10.

103 The Guardian, “UNITA’s Surprise Offensive Deepens Refugee Crisis,” April 28, 2000, p. 19.

104 UNSC, S/2001/966, 10–1.

105 The New York Times, “Angola Says Soldiers Have Killed Savimbi, Longtime Rebel Leader,” February 23, 2002, p. A1.

106 Quoted in The Washington Post, “Angolan Rebels’ Hit-and-Run Strategy,” November 20, 2000, p. A16.

107 Richard Ryan, quoted in The Observer, “UNITA to Die with Savimbi,” February 24, 2002, p. 21.

108 The Guardian, “Angolan Rebel Leader Savimbi Killed,” February 23, 2002, p. 1; and Weigert, Angola: A Modern Military History, 169, 72.

109 The Guardian, “Angola Signs Ceasefire with UNITA,” April 5, 2002, p. 16; and UNSC, S/2002/483.

110 Griffiths, “The End of the War,” 25.

111 The author thanks an anonymous reviewer for raising this possible counterargument.

112 See Taber, The War of the Flea.

113 Cortright and Lopez, The Sanctions Decade; Hufbauer et al., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered; and Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions.”

114 Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa; and Hirsch, Sierra Leone.

115 Do et al., How Much Oil.

Additional information

Notes on contributor

Quint Hoekstra is a PhD candidate in the Department of Politics, University of Manchester.