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Abstract
The relevance of workers’ mobilisations in the 2011 Arab uprisings and – more recently – in the Algerian movement for democracy and social justice has encouraged a renewed interest in labour–state relations in the region. This article presents a class-based perspective on labour institutions, taking Morocco as a case study. In contrast to institution-based approaches, this research argues that it is problematic to treat the trade unions as analytical proxies for the working class, because this heuristic move conceals how class struggles – from below and from above – can transcend and transform labour institutions. The article proposes a framework to study labour–state relations, highlighting the relative autonomy of union officials from workers and vice versa. In this way, it shows how, in the neoliberal phase, the Moroccan state increased inducements to the unions while decreasing those to the workers and maintaining significant constraints on workplace organising. To use a simplified formulation, the regime included the unions to exclude the workers. In such a context of low union representativeness, the dangers of reducing the working class to the trade unions emerge clearly.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank all the participants in the research, who generously gave up some of their time and attention for this project. In particular, Ismaïl Manouzi and Abdallah Lefnatsa provided me with crucial help in the collection of research materials. I also thank my PhD supervisor, Nicola Pratt, for her crucial support. Finally, I would like to acknowledge Jack Copley, Francesco De Lellis, Gianni Del Panta, Ferruccio Gambino, Gennaro Gervasio, Daniela Pioppi, Devi Sacchetto, Rossana Tufaro and Alice Vianello for their feedback on this article.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 See Fine and Saad-Filho, “Thirteen Things You Need to Know.”
2 When applicable, labour-based political parties are added to the equation.
3 Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy.
4 Collier, Paths toward Democracy.
5 See Beinin and Lockman, Workers on the Nile; Brenner, Brenner, and Winslow, Rebel Rank and File.
6 See Alexander, “Between Accommodation and Confrontation”; Benallegue, “Mouvement syndical en Algérie”; Benamrouche, Grèves et conflits politiques en Algérie; Branine et al., “Employee Relations in Algeria.”
7 See Belaïd, “Observations sur les conflits du travail”; Ben Hamida, Capitalisme et syndicalisme en Tunisie (1924–1956); Hamzaoui, Pratiques syndicales et pouvoir politique; Khiari, Reclassements et recompositions; Kraiem, La classe ouvrière tunisienne; Sraieb, Le mouvement ouvrier maghrébin.
8 Alexander, “Between Accommodation and Confrontation”; Bellin, Stalled Democracy; Liauzu, Salariat et mouvement ouvrier.
9 Ayache, Mouvement syndical au Maroc; Catusse, “Les métamorphoses de la question syndicale au Maroc”; Forst, “Labor and Traditional Politics in Morocco”; Moore, Politics in North Africa.
10 Abouhani, “Mouvements syndicaux, émeutes urbaines”; Ben Seddik, “La grève régulatrice de rapports sociaux,” Syndicalisme et politique; Benhlal, “Syndicat comme enjeu politique”; Bouharrou, Le système marocain de relations professionnelles; Menouni, Syndicalisme ouvrier au Maroc.
11 Ben Seddik, Syndicalisme et politique au Maroc.
12 Bellin, Stalled Democracy, 147–9.
13 Ibid., 89–120.
14 Ibid., 136.
15 Ibid., 140.
16 See Beinin, Workers and Thieves; Feltrin, “Between the Hammer and the Anvil”; Yousfi, Trade Unions and Arab Revolutions.
17 While this thèse d’état was published in 2014, the vast majority of it was conceived and written before 2011.
18 Hamzaoui, Pratiques syndicales et pouvoir politique, 6. Translated from French by the author.
19 Ibid., 10. Translated from French by the author.
20 The statement that something is in someone’s interest, as opposed to actually expressed preferences, is not an empirical description but a political proposition and, when acknowledged as such, it is understood as an attempt to persuade and not as an accusation of 'false consciousness'. Thus, while there must be a relationship between preferences and interests for claims about the latter to be credible, the two are distinct.
21 For a more in-depth discussion of class and class interests, see Feltrin, “Between the Hammer and the Anvil,” 55–63.
22 Clarke, “Class Struggle and the Working Class,” 56.
23 For a discussion of the convergences of interests between secure and precarious workers, see also Wright, “Is the Precariat a Class?”
24 Hyman, Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction; Hyman, “Politics of Workplace Trade Unionism.”
25 Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study.
26 Darlington and Upchurch, “Reappraisal of the Rank-and-File.”
27 Camfield, “What Is Trade Union Bureaucracy?”
28 Hyman, Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction, 68 (italics in the original).
29 Collier and Collier, “Inducements versus Constraints,” 968.
30 Ibid., 969 (my italics).
31 Ibid., 980.
32 See Monjib, La monarchie marocaine.
33 See Benjelloun, Amra’ ennuzeat.
34 See Benjelloun, “Lettre de Omar Benjelloun.”
35 Monjib, La monarchie marocaine, 288–9.
36 See Bazwi, L’UMT: Entre le rêve et la réalité.
37 Vermeren, Maroc de Mohammed VI, 278–9.
38 It is likely that Mahjoub Ben Seddik had suspected the shady practices of his Vice SG. After all, Ben Seddik had himself turned some real estate assets of the UMT into his personal property (Al-Massae, February 23, 2012).
39 Benhlal, “Syndicat comme enjeu politique,” 237.
40 CDT, El-Kunfederaliyya Eddimuqratiyya Lil-Shoghl, 38.
41 See Abouhani, “Mouvements syndicaux, émeutes urbaines.”
42 The pretext for the conviction was that, in an interview to El País published on 11 March 1992, Amaoui had denounced pervasive corruption and called the ministers ‘a gang of thieves’. However, the CDT leaders claim that the real reason was another interview, published in February 1992 by Hourriyat Al-Mowaten, in which the trade unionist opined that the King should ‘reign but not rule’.
43 See Catusse, “Les métamorphoses de la question syndicale au Maroc.”
44 However, as the 1996 declaration was only partially implemented, on 29 October 1997 the CDT and the UGTM carried out another general strike demanding its application.
45 In the 1990s, Mounasser was the main figure in the drive to organise the Agadir fishermen, who worked under extremely precarious and hard conditions. Yet, on 27 May 1997, Mounasser disappeared, and four days later his tied-up body was found in the waters of the Agadir Port. The responsibility for the assassination was never legally proved, but Mounasser’s family and comrades hold that the involvement of the police is self-evident. See also the documentary Mounasser: Marin, syndicaliste et militant ouvrier révolutionnaire by Miriam Atif, Omar Radi, and Souad Guennoun (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=42wEcIZ7C2c&t=38s).
46 The term ‘semi-authoritarian’ is not meant to understate the limits on political and civil rights enforced by the regime, or to suggest that Morocco entered a phase of ‘democratic transition’. It merely indicates a difference of degree in authoritarianism relative to the post-independence phase.
47 HCP, “Activité, emploi et chômage 2010.”
48 HCP, “Activité, emploi et chômage 1999”; HCP, “Activité, emploi et chômage 2010.”
49 HCP, “Activité, emploi et chômage 2010.”
50 See also El Said and Harrigan, “Economic Reform, Social Welfare,” 110.
51 In Marxist economics, the relative wage refers to the share of wages vs the share of profits in the GDP.
52 See Catusse, Les temps des entrepreneurs?, 83–125.
53 Calculated by the author based on HCP data.
54 Calculated by the author based on HCP data.
55 Royaume du Maroc, “50 ans de développement.”
56 Royaume du Maroc, “Politiques sociales au Maroc.”
57 See Catusse, “Un fragile État social.”
58 Boudahrain, La sécurité sociale au Maghreb, 124.
59 Ibid., 212.
60 CNSS, Régime de sécurité sociale, 10.
61 The Assurance Maladie Obligatoire is funded by social security contributions while the Régime d’Assistance Médicale is funded through the state budget to cover those who do not have sufficient contributions. The former was activated in 2005 and the latter in 2011.
62 HCP, “Activité, emploi et chômage 2010.”
63 See Catusse, “Un fragile État social.”
64 CDT, Dialogue social au Maroc. Translated from French by the author.
65 All interviews were conducted in French and translated by the author.
66 See Feltrin, “Labour and Democracy in the Maghreb.”
67 Article 9 of the Labour Code protects union freedoms in the workplace and forbids anti-union discrimination. Article 36 confirms that union membership and activism are not valid motivations for dismissals and disciplinary measures.
68 Workers’ delegates should be present in all firms employing 10 or more employees (Art. 430), and they have the right to discuss individual grievances with the employer and summon the Labour Inspection if such grievances cannot be resolved (Art. 432 and 460).
69 In 2010, only 6% of the employed population worked in firms with 50 or more employees. See HCP, “Activité, emploi et chômage 2010.”
70 The most frequent violations reported are wage arrears, the non-payment of social security contributions, forced and unpaid overtime, lack of paid holidays, disregard of health and safety norms, lack of due process concerning work accidents, irregularities in dismissals, and violations of union freedoms and the right to strike.
71 Conseil Économique et Social, “Prévention et résolution amiable.” Translated from French by the author.
72 European Commission, “Social Dialogue in Morocco.”
73 HCP, “Activité, emploi et chômage, troisième trimestre 2015.”
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Lorenzo Feltrin
Lorenzo Feltrin is a Researcher in the Sociology Department of the University of Warwick. He received a PhD in Politics and International Studies from the University of Warwick in January 2019. His thesis investigates the role of the trade unions in the 2011 Arab uprisings in Morocco and Tunisia. He is interested in labour, social movements and political ecology. His work combines historical sociology with industrial relations and political economy.