Hezbollah and the framing of resistance

Abstract

Hezbollah is a holistic network whose social, political, military and cultural dimensions are all parts of a discourse of resistance. Conducting a qualitative frame analysis of speeches by Hezbollah’s General Secretary Nasrallah, supported by interviews with Hezbollah leadership privy to its ideology, this study analyses the construction of muqawama (resistance). It argues that resistance is a complex social phenomenon, which can be manifested, for example, in the differences in how resistance is framed in varying contexts, often addressing different audiences. However, three unifying themes emerged from the frame analysis: diversity of resistance, normalisation of resistance and social dimensions of resistance.

Keywords:

• Hezbollah
• muqawama
• resistance
• framing
• frame analysis

Introduction

Hezbollah describes itself as an organisation of resistance – the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon. Hollander and Einwohner argue that a resistance organisation carries out social action in some kind of oppositional relationship to power.¹ With the help of a frame analysis of speeches by Hezbollah’s General Secretary Nasrallah and interviews with high-ranking Hezbollah members privy to its ideology, this study analyses the construction of muqawama (resistance). It argues that resistance is a complex social phenomenon, which can be manifested, for example, in the differences in how resistance is framed in varying contexts, often addressing different target audiences. However, despite these differences, three common themes emerged from the analysis, creating frame alignment: diversity of resistance, normalisation of resistance and social dimensions of resistance.

The rise of Islamic revivalist movements in general and of Hezbollah in particular has been tied not only to increasing Westernisation and Arab defeats by Israel, but also to unbalanced socio-economic development and political oppression.² As Mabon argues, ‘domestic conditions for the Shi’a of Lebanon were increasingly precarious, facing discrimination and marginalization from a range of actors and struggling for their survival amidst pressure from Sunni and Maronite communities, Palestinian refugees and Israeli forces’.³ Indeed, the literature on Hezbollah’s identity in Lebanese politics has shifted from treating it as a proxy for Iranian and even Syrian interests in Lebanon to perceiving it as a local expression of chronic Shiite marginalisation in Lebanon.⁴

In addition to being economically and politically marginalised, the Shia community was growing faster than other Lebanese communities.⁵ In effect, in the 1960s, Lebanon witnessed the beginnings of an active clerical movement among Shia Muslims. It was centred on clerics such as Imam Mussa al-Sadr, who led the Amal militia and founded the Movement of the Oppressed, Harakat al-Mahrumin, with the aim of alleviating the socio-economic plight of Shia Muslims in southern Lebanon, the eastern Bekaa Valley and the southern suburbs of Beirut.⁶ These Lebanese Islamists divided their allegiance among various organisations. However, al-Sadr’s mysterious disappearance during a visit to Libya in 1978 crucially affected the future of Shia mobilisation. Worall argues that ‘the manner of his disappearance, so interconnected with Shi’a theology [ie the idea of the hidden imam] led to something of an awakening among the Shi’a’.⁷ While such an elevation of al-Sadr’s status provided a new mobilising force, in his position as the leader of Amal he could not be fully replaced by his secular successor, Nabih Berri.⁸ According to Naim Qassem, the deputy secretary general of Hezbollah, around the time of the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, several actors started to believe that the existing organisational frameworks did not ‘serve their aspirations and goals’.⁹ Revolutionary Iran would become an invaluable source of both ideological and financial resources, which, combined with the local grievances of the Lebanese Shia population, laid the necessary groundwork, only waiting for a trigger to be fully mobilised.

‘The pre-eminent factor’ for Hezbollah’s birth was the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.¹⁰ Efforts to establish a new unified organisation gave rise to the so-called Manifesto of the Nine, emphasising the need to resist Israeli occupation under the leadership of the jurist-theologian, which would prove to be a potent ideological asset unifying the movement and mobilising Iranian resources in support of its goals. According to Qassem, this manifesto was approved by Imam Khomeini, and the new Lebanese resistance organisation that would now take shape was called Hezbollah – the Party of God.¹¹ However, Hezbollah did not officially declare its existence before issuing its founding manifesto on 16 February 1985.

The distinction between oppressors (mustabkbirin) and oppressed (mustad’afin) and the guardianship of the jurist-theologian (wilayat al-faqih), a concept enunciated by Khomeini and supported by some Shia jurists, would be central to Hezbollah’s political ideology.¹² In the founding manifesto, Hezbollah claimed that it ‘abide[s] by the orders of a single, wise and just command represented by the guardianship of the jurisprudent … currently embodied in the supreme Ayatullah Ruhallah al-Musawi al-Khumayni’.¹³ Qassem further explained that ‘Khomeini ordered the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to support Lebanon’s confrontation with Israel … and training camps were established in Western Bekaa district’.¹⁴ Although Hezbollah would, in a broader sense, seek to resist a wide array of oppressors, such as the United States, which was seen as the ‘first root of vice’,¹⁵ Qassem argued that military opposition to Israel would be the focal point of Hezbollah’s resistance identity: ‘the resistance against Israel has been the core of our belief’ and ‘the central rationale of Hizbullah’s existence’.¹⁶ During the following years, Hezbollah – together with, for example, communists, Palestinian guerrillas and Amal – took part in Lebanese military operations against Israeli forces and their ally, the South Lebanon Army.

Some 10 years after its founding, Hezbollah decided to take part in democratic elections in Lebanon. In its 1992 parliamentary election platform, Hezbollah specifically argued that the movement was Lebanese, with local goals.¹⁷ Resistance now required not only ‘supporting the fighters, backing up their ways of jihad’, but also founding ‘programs that develop the capabilities to defend our populace and erect a withstanding resistance society (mujtama’ al-muqawama)’.¹⁸ While the Taif Accords that were signed in 1989 and formally ended the Lebanese Civil War called for the disarmament of all militias, Hezbollah was allowed to keep its arms as a resistance force. Moreover, although Israel unilaterally withdrew its troops from Lebanon on 25 July 2000, which was widely perceived as a victory for armed resistance, Qassem argued that ‘it continues to occupy land near the border including the Shebaa Farms, and Kfar Shouba Hills, which has justified the need for continued resistance’.¹⁹ Hezbollah’s secretary general, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, also held that ‘even if we disregard the issue of the Shebaa Farms, the weapons of the resistance will still be justified by the ongoing Israeli threat to Lebanon’.²⁰ Resistance was now turning into a long-term project not merely focussing on its military aspects. According to El Houri, it ‘became about the reconstruction and protection of the country’.²¹ Moreover, Hezbollah’s 2004 election platform spoke of ‘consolidating the resistance society’, for example by erecting monuments, protecting youth from immorality and vice, ridding society of social problems and caring for oppressed families.²²

Five years later, Hezbollah’s 2009 manifesto focussed instead on an international framing of resistance, presenting it as a universal human tendency to resist oppression:

We look with great interest and appreciation at the liberalization, independence and dominance rejection experiences of Latin American countries. We see vast grounds for overlap between the endeavors of these countries and the resistance movement of our region … our motto [is] ‘Unity of the Oppressed’.²³

According to the manifesto, resistance also aimed at ‘upholding the basic human values of righteousness, justice and freedom’.²⁴

However, on 6 May 2015, Nasrallah, announced in a televised speech a new direction for Hezbollah, which would militarily intervene in the Syrian civil war in the Qalamoun Mountains, to ‘face and defeat terrorists’.²⁵ Syria had been an important link between Hezbollah and Iran and, according to Qassem, ‘supported the Hizbullah-led resistance in Lebanon’,²⁶ creating a strategic need for Hezbollah to protect its ally in Damascus. Entering the Syrian civil war and taking on the enemies of the Syrian government opened yet another dimension for Hezbollah as a resistance movement, framed as protecting Lebanon from the threat of religious extremists such as the Islamic State (IS).

Some scholars fear that such transformations conceal Hezbollah’s true intentions of establishing an Islamic state.²⁷ Others believe that Hezbollah’s ideology and goals have truly adapted to changing circumstances throughout its existence.²⁸ For example, Alagha holds that ‘Hizbullah changes as circumstances change’.²⁹ However, according to Saouli, war making against Israel, which has driven Hezbollah since its birth, ‘explains better the Islamist movement’s socialization in Lebanon and the region than speculation about Hezbollah’s goals’.³⁰ Thus, despite the widespread tendency to focus on either its military capabilities or its political transformation, Saouli argues that the separation between politics and violence is ‘analytically irrelevant’.³¹ Instead, Harb and Leenders³² and El Houri³³ see Hezbollah as a holistic network whose social, political, military and cultural dimensions are all parts of a discourse of resistance. Hezbollah’s different social activities have been well described by, for example, Norton³⁴ and Worall, Mabon and Clubb.³⁵ Part of this broad view on resistance is also ‘resistance art’,³⁶ contributing to mobilisation by dealing with political and social issues as well as justice, sacrifice, and patriotism. Through its holistic approach, Hezbollah has transformed the typical Shia victimisation into meaningful values of, for example, justice and solidarity, self-esteem and a sense of pride.³⁷ Thus, resistance is also a continuous project of political identity formation.³⁸

This holistic approach has also been argued to characterise other resistance organisations, such as Hamas. Khalid Mishal, former head of Hamas’s Political Bureau, held that resistance is conducted not only by military force but also through political and social activities.³⁹ While Roy argues that social service activities sponsored by Hamas emphasise not political violence but rather community development,⁴⁰ Dunning analysed how Hamas maintains popular support through its multiple resistance narratives, arguing that that Hamas interprets and then reinterprets concepts depending on the prevailing conditions in the occupied Palestinian territories.⁴¹ Similarly, Koss claims that resistance constitutes both Hezbollah’s and Hamas’s core norm, linked to their actions that aim to preserve their power and to their conceptions of political order.⁴² This study builds on the insight that Hezbollah is a holistic network whose social, political, military and cultural dimensions are all parts of a discourse of resistance. The empirical question for this study is: what are the frames that Hezbollah uses for constructing resistance?

Resistance is a complex social phenomenon that is constructed in the actors’ everyday practices. As Sadiki argues, it is ‘a way of thinking, being, and acting, and an ever-widening site of holistic struggle in which the AK-47 is not, in the scheme of resistance, more important than piety, charity, schooling, propaganda or music’.⁴³ It is also a discursive journey involving (e)merging ideas, meanings, problems and solutions that change when encountering new material and immaterial circumstances. For example, Mabon writes that Hezbollah was able to appeal to the local Shia population by using the traditional Karbala narrative, telling the story of the martyrdom of Hussain bin Ali by the Umayyad army in 680. While this Shia history became a prominent part of a narrative of muqawama, it ‘would also find traction at a global level, overcoming sectarian divisions’.⁴⁴ This complexity can be manifested in the differences in how resistance is framed in different contexts, often addressing varying audiences. While this study focuses on the construction of resistance through various frames in public speeches – supported by interviews with those who are privy to Hezbollah’s official ideology – a more complete analysis of the concept would also require analysing grassroots actors involved in the process.

Framing and mobilisation

The frame concept is borrowed from Goffman and denotes ‘schemata of interpretation’ that enable individuals ‘to locate, perceive, identify, and label’⁴⁵ events in their lives and in the world at large. Frames often perform a transformative function by reconstituting the way in which some objects of attention are seen – for example, by transforming routine grievances into injustices or mobilising grievances.⁴⁶ Thus, according to Kuypers, framing is the process whereby communicators act – consciously or not – to construct a particular point of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be viewed in a particular manner, with some facts made more or less noticeable (even ignored) than others’.⁴⁷ Kuypers further argued that ‘when highlighting some aspect of reality over other aspects, frames act to define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies’.⁴⁸ In doing so, frames are important for mobilising people and other resources. Indeed, resource mobilisation theory stresses not only material resources but also the ideological frames that ‘justify and motivate collective action’.⁴⁹

Much of the literature has focussed on individual recruitment to social movements⁵⁰ and the production of collective action frames – that is, ways of understanding that ‘inspire and legitimate movement activity’.⁵¹ For example, Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford identify four frame alignment processes by which social movements seek to align their ways of understanding with those of potential recruits: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension and frame transformation.⁵² However, public speeches that often seek to address and mobilise several different target audiences are likely to frame key concepts, such as resistance, in varying ways. Variations in how Hezbollah frames resistance, which is vital for motivating people in different contexts, have not been thoroughly explored.

Inspirational speeches are one of the foremost methods of mobilising people through framing, but public speeches often seek to address and mobilise several different target audiences and are therefore likely to use various framing strategies, highlighting different aspects of the reality. However, it is also possible that although the framings of the concept may differ when addressing different audiences, the speeches seek to align them. Snow et al. referred to frame alignment as ‘the linkage of individual and SMO [ie social movement organisation] interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary’.⁵³ In addition to identifying resistance frames used in Nasrallah’s speeches, supported by interviews with high-ranking Hezbollah members privy to its ideology, this study also analyses their congruence and complementarity by identifying unifying themes.

Method

The primary empirical material in this study consists of public speeches by Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s general secretary, delivered between 2015 and 2018. Forty-eight available speeches, translated from Arabic to English by the Al-Ahed News, were retrieved from the Al-Ahed News website.⁵⁴ El Houri analysed Nasrallah’s speeches to study how resistance strategies are part of a hegemonic discourse that aims to articulate a people, arguing that ‘Nasrallah’s speeches represent the compass of Hezbollah’s political discourse. They summarize the party’s internal decisions and explain them to the public. His speeches are the verbal translation of the party’s strategic and political decisions’.⁵⁵ Similarly, Harb argues that they are framed as media events that seek to enhance the party’s image as supporting the oppressed against the oppressors.⁵⁶ However, as Gunning argued about Hamas, much of the research into complex social movements would benefit from more fieldwork and interviews.⁵⁷ Therefore, the analysis of the construction of resistance through various frames in public speeches is supported by interviews with those who are privy to its official ideology.

Three members of the organisation who are knowledgeable about its current ideology were interviewed in Beirut in March 2017. Sayyed Ammar Al Mousawi heads Hezbollah’s Department of Foreign Relations and is responsible for contacts with foreign states. Sheik Khalil Rezik also heads the Department of Foreign Relations and is responsible for contacts with nongovernmental groups in other countries. The third respondent was a sheikh who wished to remain anonymous. These interviews were conducted in Arabic and English in Dahiya, southern Beirut, and each lasted about one hour. The interview questions focussed on the nature of resistance.

The contents of Nasrallah’s speeches from 2015 to 2018 were first subjected to a qualitative frame analysis to understand how resistance is framed. Frames define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments and suggest remedies.⁵⁸ While it is clear that Hezbollah identifies the Israeli occupation of Lebanese soil, and even of Palestinian soil, as the main problem and the cause of resistance,⁵⁹ this study also sought to identify frames concerning Hezbollah’s moral judgments and remedies. Scholars employ different methodological approaches to frame analysis. Wimmer and Dominick argue that frame analysis can be conducted as a form of qualitative content analysis.⁶⁰ In this study, to identify relevant frames, Nasrallah’s speeches were decontextualised by identifying and coding meaningful units, focussing on sections dealing with the framing of resistance. After the coding process, different themes dealing with ‘moral judgments’ and ‘remedies’⁶¹ were identified. The analysis was supported by the interview data. Under each theme, congruence and complementarity of frames were qualitatively analysed to assess frame alignment.⁶²

Hezbollah’s frames

Nasrallah used the concept of resistance frequently in his speeches, sometimes generically but often embedded and contextualised in some specific time and place. Many of the speeches referred to current events and justified policies, such as Hezbollah’s military involvement in Syria, or provided a historical perspective on military resistance. A possible reason for the variation in the framing of resistance in public speeches is that social movements have various target audiences that are addressed in public speeches. According to Azani,⁶³ target audiences can be divided into three groups based on their attitude: those who support the movement and its actions (supporters), those who oppose it (opponents), and those who avoid taking a stand (bystanders). In Nasrallah’s speeches, there is also regional variation in the target audiences, as they, in addition to the party’s members and supporters, also consist of the general Lebanese public and the wider region of the Middle East. However, speeches can address several target audiences at the same time, which makes classification difficult. For example, when speaking at a local event, Nasrallah can also address a wider Lebanese and even an international context. Instead of classifying entire speeches, the analysis focuses on finding frames that form common themes. Moreover, although the frames often differ depending the target audience, they are complementary, creating frame alignment through the common themes. Three themes dealing with ‘moral judgments’ and ‘remedies’ emerged from the speeches addressing different target audiences: diversity of resistance, normalisation of resistance and social dimensions of resistance. The analysis is supported by the interview data.

Diversity of resistance

Nasrallah’s speeches are not only the political beacon of Hezbollah, but they also seek to mobilise people in different arenas. Therefore, while much of the content in his speeches focussed on military resistance to remedy the identified problem of Israeli occupation, different acts could be framed as resistance, depending on the target audience. For example, resistance could be supported ‘on the political, moral, material, financial, and arms level’.⁶⁴ In addressing various target audiences and framing various acts as resistance, the speeches often referred to current events, such as the 2018 elections in Lebanon, when Nasrallah, addressing the party’s supporters, described voting in elections as resistance: ‘You are the people who embrace, support and back the resistance. You support it in the elections’.⁶⁵ Moreover, moral judgements relating to the need to engage in various forms of resistance were often expressed as a religious duty. For example, in a speech aimed at university students, he argued that resistance is

a religious responsibility on the first hand as well as a historical and moral responsibility on all Muslims around the world – on their scholars, intellectuals, journalists, professors, university students, and common people. Every Muslim man and woman, everyone who can say a word, everyone who can write a phrase, everyone who has a social communication network and can express his stance.⁶⁶

While he did not mention women’s agency in general to remedy the identified problem, he offered practical examples of resistance by women, such as the Palestinian girl Ahd Tamimi, with a ‘courageous, brave attitude. This girl who slaps “Israeli” soldiers and faces them. She stands in court while her mother and father tell her to be steadfast, strong and courageous and firm’.⁶⁷ However, when addressing the supporters of the party, Nasrallah mostly assigned women a symbolic position in the resistance and focussed on their non-violent forms of action. In a speech delivered at the memorial service of Hajja Um Imad Mughniyeh, the mother of Imad Mughniyeh, one of the founders of Hezbollah, Nasrallah called her ‘one of the symbols of our resistance’.⁶⁸ In the same speech, Nasrallah also used her example to stress at least three practical roles that women can have in the resistance movement. The first is the pivotal role women have in raising their children:

She did not only give us an exceptional leader through birth, but also through education and the upbringing of this figure. I know and all those who have lived with Hajj Imad know this fact very well. Um Imad had a great influence in building his personality.⁶⁹

Nasrallah also mentioned the role women can play in supporting the families of the martyrs: ‘Not only did she visit the homes of the martyrs who were martyred fighting the terrorists and Takfiris in Syria, she also acted retroactively. She also visited the families of the martyrs who were martyred many years before the martyrdom of Hajj Imad’.⁷⁰ Moreover, Nasrallah used Um Imad as an example of how women can influence perceptions of resistance through media: ‘I can say here that she was fighting with us and in an advanced position in the battle of moral warfare, the psychological warfare and the media warfare’.⁷¹ He described such determination in the war of ideas as pivotal in the resistance movement, as the ‘psychological war on us gets bigger’.⁷² Such frames and narratives of resistance are also manifest in Lara Deeb’s field study of Shia women in the southern suburbs of Beirut where, ‘in addition to their household and employment duties, pious Shi’i women are contributing to what they conceptualize as the continuing “development” of their community – in both the material and the spiritual senses’.⁷³ More importantly, in doing so, women play a key role in ‘linking piety and political activism together’.⁷⁴

The interviews confirmed the religious foundation of the diversity of resistance to remedy the identified problem. The anonymous sheikh argued that while resistance arises from and is lived in people’s daily lives, ‘aqidah [religious creed] is required for muqawama’. Sheik Khalil Rezik also stressed that ‘all militaries must first have the right way of thinking and religious beliefs, so they grow up in a resistance society before they become soldiers’. The relevance of religious creed was stressed by the importance of understanding the different levels of resistance. In agreement with the deputy secretary of Hezbollah, Naim Qassem,⁷⁵ the anonymous sheikh explained that an individual’s inner struggle – jihad – is the foundation of all resistance at the individual level:

Jihad al-nafs is the highest level of participating in resistance, to fight the devil so that you can become a good person. It is the foundation of all resistance. Only after jihad al-nafs has made you a stable person can you engage in other forms of resistance. Jihad al-nafs is an activity common to all people, irrespective of religion …. According to Islam, warfare is the lowest level of resistance. In 2006 we only had a couple of thousand soldiers and it was to a great extent thanks to the support from the others that we won – those who work with resistance in other ways.

This echoes Sadiki’s argument that muqawama comprises a ‘normative imaginary for enacting emancipation at various levels, beginning with inner self-transformation’.⁷⁶ As it is possible to speak of different levels of resistance, several different forms can be identified, often arising from the individual’s particular position in society, such that all of society’s resources can be mobilised. Echoing Nasrallah, the anonymous sheik continued, ‘You can participate in the resistance by speaking. Everyone can participate in resistance from their own position and conditions. The basic idea of muqawama is the same for all, but how you work with it varies’. Sayyed Ammar Al Mousawi also stressed that there are different ways of working with resistance: ‘Politics, using weapons, not accepting what the enemy has done, and not forgiving the aggression. Muqawama is not only military activity. It involves politics, social relations, and the family – teaching children about faith and the idea of resistance’.

Sheikh Khalil Rezik argued that all these different forms together give rise to a culture of resistance: ‘There are different forms and places of resistance, for example, economic, political, news reporting, ways of thinking, and social action. All this creates a culture of resistance, as different ways of resisting hang together’. Not only do these forms give rise to a culture of resistance, but they also become expressions of it, defining individual agency within the broader social framework, when ‘all aspects of the entire society are imbued with resistance – universities, hospitals, everyday work – everything can be about participating in resistance’. This diversity or culture of resistance is ultimately the social foundation of military resistance.

In sum, the resistance frames were different when addressing different target audiences in varying contexts. When addressing Shia women who support Hezbollah in the context of Dahiya, the framing of resistance sought to reconcile women’s activity and piety. When addressing potential supporters of Hezbollah, the context could be the Lebanese parliamentary elections, where voting was framed as essential to supporting resistance. Speeches targeting university students in the university context would provide a more global frame of a religious duty to act. Thus, the frames expressed not only different types of activity but also duties. However, this diversity of resistance, expressed in terms of many remedies, served as an overarching theme creating frame alignment when addressing different audiences and advocating different acts of resistance. While Nasrallah’s speeches sought to inspire and mobilise with the help of concrete examples from individuals engaged in resistance, framing different acts as resistance depending on the target audience, the interviews further clarified the religious foundation of the culture of resistance and how it is expressed differently in various contexts, starting with the inner struggle and continuing with other outward expressions.

Normalisation of resistance

Mabon argues that ‘context is increasingly important, serving as a frame providing grievance, culture and ideas’.⁷⁷ However, in his speeches, Nasrallah frequently sought to normalise resistance, which functioned to transcend the plurality of contexts. For example, when addressing a broader international audience, he often framed resistance as an innate right to appeal to international norms and universal human experiences and sentiments. For example, when discussing the war and suffering in Yemen to address the wider region in the Middle East, he argued that ‘behind this blood there are rights’, stressing ‘our faith in our rights’.⁷⁸ However, such a discussion of the naturalness of resistance was not very prominent in the speeches addressing Hezbollah’s supporters. This is possibly because this audience – people who are in the context of their everyday lives in touch with resistance – does not need to be convinced of it. When addressing a wider domestic audience, Nasrallah sometimes justified military resistance by normalising it as the last option. For example, in 2015, in the context of commemorating Hezbollah’s military activities in eastern Lebanon, he argued that there is no alternative to military action when aggression is seen as an existential threat: ‘There is no other choice before those who want to defend their existence, survival, dignity, honor, and homeland other than being ready to offer sacrifices and to offer them eventually’.⁷⁹ Thus, although Nasrallah sought to transcend the plurality of contexts through normalisation of resistance, the context mattered for how the guiding ideas of normalisation were framed when addressing different audiences.

Nasrallah’s speeches did not seek to provide exhaustive analytical categories of resistance, as the interviews were better able to. Nasrallah ‘speaks both as political leader and a cleric’.⁸⁰ Moreover, the content of the speeches, and therefore also the context in which resistance was interpreted, were affected by the many audiences that he could be addressing simultaneously. For example, the speeches framed the history of the organisation, interpreted the meanings of current events, predicted future developments, inspired current supporters, mobilised potential supporters and sent political messages to both domestic and international actors. However, out of this diversity, two prominent ways to frame resistance stood out.

First, seeking to inspire the local supporters of the movement, he mostly referred to military resistance, often speaking of the historical example of ‘the first generation’ who took up arms against Israel. He thus normalised military resistance by placing it in a broader historical context that the supporters can be proud of and that will continue to inspire them. Indeed, much of Nasrallah’s focus was on the ‘moral duty’ and the ‘moral heritage’⁸¹ of resistance, which both sought to secure the motivation to continue and support military activities as a normal part of human life. Second, when addressing a wider target audience, often consisting of all Muslims (ummah), he did not offer specific examples but used resistance as a generic concept, which the varied audience members could freely apply to their own life situations. Resistance as generic concept normalises the diversity of resistance. As El Houri argued, resistance is the act of joining ‘hitherto scattered groups individuals in a common frame’.⁸² Both approaches are imbued with strong moral connotations, which contribute to the normalisation of resistance.

The interviews confirmed how Hezbollah views resistance as a normalised act, but this normalisation was founded on a deeper theological reasoning, which was lacking in the speeches addressing various target audiences. While the anonymous sheik argued that an individual’s jihad al-nafs is the foundation of all resistance at the individual level, he further explained that it ‘enables you to see al-haqq [truth or right], which is a common principle for all human beings’. Moreover, although an individual’s internal struggle makes it easier to see, for example, social power structures, the discourse of al-haqq also relates to moral judgments – including arguments about what is natural or universal – about the identified problem. This means that we can speak of a normalisation of resistance.

An example of this normalisation is Sayyed Ammar Al Mousawi arguing that resistance in general is a matter of natural cause and effect for human beings engaged in a web of social relations that have become oppressive:

Muqawama is a reaction to something negative that has happened. This reaction is normal for human beings. If a disease attacks the body, it will resist …. It is normal to participate in resistance. If there is no resistance, there is something wrong with the society.

Moreover, Sheikh Khalil Rezik argued that even military resistance is a natural reaction: ‘Warfare is not the most important way of acting, but it arises as a reaction to and a defense against aggression. It is natural for the oppressed to defend themselves’. Sayyed Ammar Al Mousawi further explained that this naturalness is in part based on general human farsightedness: ‘If you accept aggression, they [your oppressors] will continue oppressing you forever’.

Echoing Nasrallah, Sayyed Ammar Al Mousawi argued that resistance also becomes more appealing or necessary for the ‘oppressed’ as a ‘last option’. It therefore builds on a general tendency to loss aversion. Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory identified loss aversion as a way to explain how people act, especially under uncertainty.⁸³ Loss aversion formally means that an individual’s utility function is concave regarding gains and convex when it comes to losses: a gain therefore contributes less to utility than an equal loss subtracts from it. Loss aversion possibly exerts the strongest effect on the least well-off operating close to the edge of survival; for example, for the poor, the loss of a cultivated field could cause death, while the gain of an extra field to cultivate would not bring an extra day of life. Therefore, resource mobilisation for an oppositional social movement may become more likely when loss aversion increases.

In sum, framing resistance as a natural or normal act requires different arguments when addressing varying target audiences. In the broader international context, it is framed as an innate right or generic concept that the listeners can apply to their various life situations. In the local context, it is the last option for the oppressed, illustrated with examples from Hezbollah’s long history of resistance. However, normalisation of resistance serves as a unifying theme that makes these frames complementary. Such normalisation became a necessary component of securing the longevity of resistance when it turned into a long-term project not merely focussing on its military aspects and needed to appeal to the imagination of many target groups.

Social dimensions of resistance

While resistance as a social movement builds on the various forms of resistance that give rise to a culture of resistance to remedy the identified problem, resistance by example is an important frame and mechanism by which this culture is believed to arise. Some of Nasrallah’s speeches aimed at strengthening such social dimensions of resistance by example. Those speeches that commemorated prominent deceased military leaders sought to inspire the supporters of the party by detailing how the person in question had become involved in resistance and had heroically contributed to trying to reach its goals. For example, in a speech, a narrative about the development of a resistance fighter could be related to current challenges facing the organisation so as to motivate the listeners to continue or to take up resistance: ‘These are the stages through which our Martyr Leader passed. In every stage, I will comment or clarify some important ideas that are linked to today’s developments and the ongoing events’.⁸⁴

However, while resistance by example is a prominent mechanism for motivating supporters of the party, Nasrallah mostly only referred to deceased members of the resistance who had achieved the status of martyrdom: ‘They do not come to the light spot until they become martyrs and leave this world and its people’.⁸⁵ The resistance movement is framed, in terms of both a remedy and a moral judgement, as an unyielding collective body where not even the leaders are irreplaceable:

In fact, the Resistance is not anymore a personal initiative. It is not anymore a group that exists as long as definite members or definite leaders exist. It has transcended the stage of establishment. It has its structure, pillars, school, leaders, cadres, fighters, intellect, doctrine…. However, praise be to Allah, these leaders changed their Resistance to a school, to an institution, and to an entity beating with life and able to get along and continue the path no matter who is martyred in the midway.⁸⁶

When addressing the general public in the Lebanese context, Nasrallah used broader social frames, such as the emotional attachment to the village, to motivate the listeners. The frame portrayed preserving or re-establishing old social ties as an essential part of the resistance society:

This is what we wish to all our generation and the generation of our children and the generation of our grandchildren; to preserve this emotional and sentimental bond with their villages especially if they have family and relatives. This strengthens and solidifies the social structure and the general environment on which we depend on and live in.⁸⁷

Appealing to multiple layers of grievances, Hezbollah has used the Shia population as a hub for mobilisation, while its broader appeal through the ‘anti-Israeli element gave it scope to expand its support base’.⁸⁸ Indeed, El Houri argued that Hezbollah ‘is a socially conservative movement that succeeds in presenting a model of resistance that appeals to a strikingly wide range of people with a variety of political views’.⁸⁹ Despite its socially conservative ideological base, expressed for example by a need to preserve old social ties, in the domain of resistance art Hezbollah is creative and employs ‘“soft power” in its artistic social practices’.⁹⁰ The organisation promotes what it considers to be purposeful cultural practices, such as theatre, as an expression of the culture of resistance⁹¹ and encourages jihad, for example through music.⁹² Such practices carefully balance religious arguments about piety against the need to inspire and increase mobilisation among both men and women.

After the 2006 war against Israel, Hezbollah focussed on establishing resistance as ‘a Lebanese national demand …. unified against the common existential enemy: Israel’.⁹³ However, this framing of resistance as a common Lebanese project against Israel would soon be overshadowed by the urgency of domestically justifying military resistance against new enemies, as Hezbollah got involved in the Syrian Civil War and in the fight against what it called Takfiri groups⁹⁴ in eastern Lebanon. While Hezbollah had previously enjoined the support of many Sunni Muslims for its fight against Israel,⁹⁵ its involvement in Syria exacerbated sectarian relations, especially in Lebanon, as critics accused Hezbollah of beginning to ‘reproduce the discourse its enemies have used to justify their own actions against it’.⁹⁶ When Hezbollah’s strategic needs in Syria and the ensuing domestic tensions increased,⁹⁷ a new discourse on resistance emerged, centred on seeking to justify new forms of military resistance and to save the idea of Hezbollah being the torchbearer of Lebanese resistance.

Part of this framing was reflected in Nasrallah’s speeches, which portrayed Hezbollah’s military activity in Syria as a natural continuation of the first generation of resistance against Israel. This included new social dimensions of resistance through seeking to institutionalise the new form of military activity. This was done, for example, by having a special day to commemorate Hezbollah’s military feats in eastern Lebanon, thus incorporating it into Hezbollah and the resistance’s military history. Moreover, using the same concepts that had previously been attached to the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, such as ‘liberation’, set it on a par with Hezbollah’s previous military struggle against Israel. For example, in 2018, Nasrallah said in a speech in Hermel: ‘Today we celebrate this occasion. This is the second Liberation Day, in which we have been able to liberate our villages, farms, fields and borders, our entire border with Syria from the terrorists and the Takfiri groups’.⁹⁸

While this historical framing, through the institutionalisation of new forms of military activity and the use of old concepts, sought to strengthen the social dimensions of resistance, it was also an expression of the broader social division in Lebanon as it created demands on the target audience. After Hezbollah had taken military action against ‘the Takfiri groups’ in eastern Lebanon,⁹⁹ Nasrallah lauded the locals in Bekaa Valley for their support for the resistance, but he also reminded them that ‘Hezbollah stood by your side’,¹⁰⁰ which should be reflected in the context of the upcoming elections in 2018:

On the sixth of May, I ask you, O people of Baalbek-Hermel and the people of Zahle, who will you vote for? Will you vote for those who defended you, who supported your defense, who gave their blood, their children and their loved ones to defend your families or those who prevented the army from defending you? More than that, will you vote for those who conspired with the armed groups to overrun your towns and villages?¹⁰¹

Thus, different contexts, such as the military confrontation in eastern Lebanon and the national elections, were fused. However, although resistance was still framed as a Lebanese project, the new discourse on resistance was not only a manifestation of increasing social and political divisions in Lebanon but also exacerbated them. While opening a new front in Syria could be incorporated into the old narrative of military history, the domestic tensions it caused made it increasingly difficult to use the social dimensions of resistance, in a broader national perspective, as a unifying theme to frame resistance.

The interviews confirmed that resistance by example is a foundational frame of the social dimensions of resistance, as it is believed to motivate others to join resistance. Sheik Khalil Rezik said that ‘when you see that a person becomes a shaheed [martyr], it creates an example in the society that inspires others to resist. Muqawama is not a private thing. You must teach your children’. Furthermore, the anonymous sheikh argued that although resistance ‘comes from the heart’, there is a need to have ‘posters of martyrs and Hezbollah flags in many places and public events to commemorate the martyrs. All these things help people to feel and think about resistance’. However, he stressed that the idea of resistance spreads in both new and pre-existing social networks, often relying on the strong sentiments that these bonds create, as people act by following an example:

Muqawama is like football. You first gather around a common idea and then you strive and support each other to reach the goal. Sometimes it is not before your friend dies that a person becomes interested in resistance. It creates a strong feeling. Also, if you help other people, it awakens an idea in them that they also can help, which strengthens the resistance. For example, it can be about Hezbollah helping some village get access to fresh water. When people see that Hezbollah leaders’ own children take part in the resistance, it inspires people to participate and to allow their children to do so too.

However, disseminating the idea of resistance beyond close social networks that rely on family ties, friendship or common experiences of oppression is more difficult, because it requires competing with other actors’ framing. Therefore, other channels of communication and methods are also used. While Qassem said that ‘the camera is an essential element in all resistance operations’,¹⁰² Sayyed Ammar Al Mousawi argued that the ability to frame military activity as resistance rather than as terrorism depends on access to global media: ‘We are not terrorists. We fight Israel on Lebanese soil and against Israeli soldiers. We do not have access to media channels such as CNN, like Israel and the United States do, to change the picture of reality’. Indeed, as El Houri argued, media is ‘essential for the construction of Hezbollah’s political subjectivity’.¹⁰³ Although Hezbollah probably has ‘the most organized and wide-ranging media structure of any Islamist grouping, Shiite or Sunni, in the Arab world’,¹⁰⁴ Sheikh Khalil Rezik lamented that from a global perspective, ‘Israel gets too much help from the outside world and has succeeded in creating a picture of us as terrorists’.

In sum, the social dimensions of resistance served as a unifying theme for several frames, such as emotional attachment to the village, resistance by example, Hezbollah being an unyielding collective body, and historical framing through the institutionalisation of new forms of military activity and the use of old concepts. The context of resistance by example and Hezbollah being an unyielding collective body was efforts to inspire local supporters of Hezbollah to strive harder, while other forms addressed broader audiences, seeking to frame resistance as a Lebanese national project. However, with the domestic tensions caused by the opening of a new front in Syria, it became increasingly difficult to use the social dimensions of resistance, in a broader national perspective, as a unifying theme to frame resistance. Still, both the speeches and the interviews showed that resistance by example is the foundation of the social dimensions of resistance for the organisation’s supporters.

Discussion and conclusion

While much of the literature has focussed on the recruitment of individuals to social movements¹⁰⁵ and the production of collective action frames – that is, ways of understanding that ‘inspire and legitimate movement activity’¹⁰⁶ – variation in how, for example, Hezbollah frames key concepts such as resistance, that are vital for motivating people, has not been thoroughly explored. Harb and Leenders and El Houri see Hezbollah as a holistic network, the social, political, military and cultural dimensions of which are all parts of a discourse of resistance.¹⁰⁷ Taking this view as its point of departure, this study has given unique, comparative insights into the construction of resistance through various frames in Nasrallah’s speeches, supported by interviews with the three respondents.

Frames define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments and suggest remedies.¹⁰⁸ In doing so, frames are important for mobilising people and other resources. Indeed, resource mobilisation theory stresses not only material resources but also the ideological frames that ‘justify and motivate collective action’.¹⁰⁹ Like Hamas,¹¹⁰ Hezbollah has several resistance narratives that can be interpreted and reinterpreted depending on the prevailing circumstances. However, although Nasrallah used different frames, expressed in terms of remedies and moral judgement, when addressing different target audiences, three overarching themes contributed to creating frame alignment: diversity of resistance, normalisation of resistance and social dimensions of resistance.

Diversity of resistance served as a unifying theme for different ways of resisting when addressing different target audiences in varying contexts. For example, when addressing Shia women who support Hezbollah in the context of Dahiya, the framing of resistance sought to reconcile women’s activity and piety. But when addressing potential supporters of Hezbollah, the context could be the Lebanese parliamentary elections, where voting was framed as essential to supporting resistance. Speeches targeting university students in the university context would provide a more global frame of a religious duty to act. However, the speeches and the interviews often related differently to the unifying theme of diversity of resistance. Although Nasrallah frequently referred to domestic political issues or specific individuals as inspiring examples of resistance, this was not the case with the interviews, which better provided analytical categories of the concept and even causal relations. Thus, Nasrallah focussed more on resistance in Lebanon, whereas the interviews provided a deeper religious foundation, such as jihad al-nafs, for the diversity of resistance.

Normalisation of resistance also required different arguments when addressing varying target audiences. In the broader international context, resistance was framed as an innate right. Nasrallah also often used muqawama as a generic concept – without being precise about its specific implications – which the various listeners could freely apply to their own life situations. Resistance as a generic concept normalises the diversity of resistance. In the local context, it was framed as the last option for the oppressed. It could also be placed in a broader historical context that supporters could be proud of, illustrated with examples from Hezbollah’s long history of resistance. However, normalisation of resistance served as a unifying theme that made these frames complementary. Such normalisation became a necessary component of securing the longevity of resistance when it turned into a long-term project not merely focussing on its military aspects and needed to appeal to the imagination of many target groups.

The social dimensions of resistance served as a unifying theme for several frames, such as emotional attachment to the village, resistance by example and Hezbollah being an unyielding collective body. Further, historical framing through the institutionalisation of new forms of military activity and attaching old concepts of resistance to new military activity belonged to the same theme. The context for resistance by example and Hezbollah being an unyielding collective body was efforts to inspire local supporters of Hezbollah to strive harder, while other forms addressed broader audiences, seeking to frame resistance as a Lebanese national project. These social dimensions of resistance, together with the diversity of resistance, consisting of several ways to resist by different actors facing different contexts, contribute to creating a culture of resistance. Women are an important part of this culture, although their roles are often limited. However, Nasrallah lauding Ahd Tamimi for physically taking on an Israeli soldier suggests that the potential scope of women’s agency can be broader. As women link piety and political activism together,¹¹¹ creating agency is a careful balancing act, but it also makes the future study of women’s roles and how these roles resonate with women’s other social aspirations important for our understanding of Hezbollah’s ideology.

Indeed, in framing resistance, Hezbollah must carefully balance the need to mobilise its different constituencies with an effort to prevent the rise of group and personal interests that can weaken the social dimensions of resistance by creating new tensions inside the movement. To that end, even if Hezbollah has different frames for resistance that enable it to mobilise various target audiences, it also needs unifying frames. Religion serves this purpose when addressing the Shia constituency, as religious references feature in practically all such speeches, no matter whether the more specific theme is diversity of resistance, normalisation of resistance or social dimensions of resistance. Similarly, resistance as a national Lebanese project that is supported by international norms serves as a unifying frame, when addressing the general Lebanese public, to unite the different constituencies across sectarian lines. However, these unifying frames can also conflict with each other, creating ideological and practical tensions for the organisation, as their use affects and is affected by domestic political developments in Lebanon.

Oppositional organisations’ strength is created not only by the number of their missiles and fighters, but also by how events and actions in changing circumstances are constantly framed and reframed to increase human motivation to contribute to the resistance project, while at the same time carefully considering how the varying contexts impinge on this process and the aims of resistance. Thus, the future course of Hezbollah will be decided not only on the battlefield, but also in the organisation’s ability to use unifying themes of resistance that can appeal to the hearts and minds of both the general Lebanese public and those who have potentially become not only the conveyors but also the creators of a culture of resistance in everyday practices. A more complete analysis of the dynamics of Hezbollah’s ideology and framing would require analysing grassroots actors involved in the process of constructing resistance. While this study has focussed on framing among Hezbollah’s leadership, future studies should also analyse frame alignment between Hezbollah’s leadership and its supporters.

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There is no funding or conflict of interest to report.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Marco Nilsson

Marco Nilsson has a PhD in Political Science from the University of Gothenburg (2010). He is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Jönköping University, Sweden, and has research interests in religion and war, terrorism and jihadism.

Notes

1 Hollander and Einwohner, “Conceptualizing Resistance.”

2 Hamzeh, “Lebanon’s Hizbullah,” 321.

3 Mabon, “Circle of Bare Life,” 6.

4 Knio, “Structure, Agency and Hezbollah,” 857.

5 Abul-Husn, Lebanese Conflict.

6 Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, 9.

7 Worall, “Reading Booth in Beirut,” 241.

8 Worall, Mabon, and Clubb, Hezbollah: From Resistance to Government, 35.

9 Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within, 63.

10 Saad-Ghorayeb, “Factors Conducive to the Politicization,” 299.

11 Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within, 65.

12 Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents, 15.

13 Ibid., 40.

14 Qassem, Hizbullah, 66.

15 Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents, 41.

16 Ibid., 25.

17 Ibid., 65–6.

18 Ibid., 66.

19 Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within, 25.

20 Nasrallah's Speech on Al Quds Day, 28 October 2005, quoted in Roe, Voice of Hezbollah, 361.

21 El Houri, Meaning of Resistance, 96.

22 Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents, 85–6.

23 Ibid., 132–3.

24 Ibid., 117.

25 Worall, Mabon, and Clubb, Hezbollah: From Resistance to Government, ix.

26 Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within, 20.

27 Ranstorp, Hizb’Allah in Lebanon.

28 Alagha, Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology.

29 Alagha, Hizbullah’s Identity Construction, 17.

30 Saouli, Hizbullah: Socialisation and Its Tragic Ironies, 6.

31 Ibid., 7.

32 Harb and Leenders, “Know Thy Enemy,” 173–97.

33 El Houri, Meaning of Resistance, 202.

34 Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History.

35 Worall, Mabon, and Clubb, Hezbollah: From Resistance to Government.

36 Alagha, “Hizbullah’s Post-Islamist Resistance Art.”

37 Harb and Leenders, “Know Thy Enemy.”

38 El Houri, Meaning of Resistance, 5.

39 “Hamas Leader Khalid Mishal, Remarks.”

40 Roy, Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza.

41 Dunning, Hamas, Jihad and Popular Legitimacy.

42 Koss, Resistance, Power, and Conceptions of Political Order.

43 Sadiki, “Reframing Resistance and Democracy,” 356.

44 Mabon, “Circle of Bare Life,” 21.

45 Goffman, Frame Analysis, 21.

46 Snow, “Framing and Social Movements.”

47 Kuypers, “Framing Analysis,” 182.

48 Ibid.

49 Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, 19.

50 Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements.”

51 Davis, Stories of Change, 7.

52 Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes.”

53 Ibid., 464.

54 Although some of the speeches delivered by Nasrallah may not be reported by Al-Ahed News, the sample is suitable for a qualitative analysis of how Hezbollah frames resistance, as Al-Ahed News is a pro-Hezbollah media outlet.

55 El Houri, Meaning of Resistance, 78.

56 Harb, Channels of Resistance in Lebanon.

57 Gunning, Hamas in Politics, 4.

58 Kuypers, “Framing Analysis,” 182.

59 Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within, 122–3.

60 Wimmer and Dominick, Mass Media Research, 152.

61 Kuypers, “Framing Analysis,” 182.

62 Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes,” 464.

63 Azani, Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God, 2.

64 Al-Ahed News, “Full Speech Delivered by Hizbullah Secretary General His Eminence Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah on al-Quds International Day.”

65 Al-Ahed News, “Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's Speech Delivered on the Occasion of the Resistance and Liberation Day.”

66 Al-Ahed News, “Full Speech Delivered by Hizbullah Secretary General, His Eminence Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, during the University Students Meeting.”

67 Al-Ahed News, “Sayyed Nasrallah’s Full Speech in the Memory of the Martyred Leaders.”

68 Al-Ahed News, “Speech of Hezbollah Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah Delivered at the Memorial Service of the Mother of Martyrs.”

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.

73 Deeb, “Piety Politics,” S115.

74 Ibid.

75 Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within, 90.

76 Sadiki, “Reframing Resistance and Democracy,” 8.

77 Mabon, “Circle of Bare Life,” 8.

78 Al-Ahed News, “Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah’s Speech Delivered at the ‘Devine Victory Festival.’”

79 Al-Ahed News, “Full Speech Delivered by Hizbullah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah on the Day of Resistance and Liberation.”

80 El Houri, Meaning of Resistance, 87.

81 Al-Ahed News, “Sayyed Nasrallah’s Full Speech in the Memory of the Martyred Leaders.”

82 Ibid., 2.

83 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory.”

84 Al-Ahed News, “Full Speech Delivered by Hizbullah Secretary General, His Eminence Sayyed Nasrallah, on the First Week Commemoration Ceremony.”

85 Al-Ahed News, “Full Speech Delivered by Hizbullah Secretary General, His Eminence Sayyed Nasrallah, in the Ceremony Held to Mark a Week.”

86 Ibid.

87 Al-Ahed News, “Sayyed Nasrallah’s Full Speech on January 19, 2018.”

88 Worall, Mabon, and Clubb, Hezbollah: From Resistance to Government, 36.

89 El Houri, Meaning of Resistance, 2.

90 Alagha, “Hizbullah’s Post-Islamist Resistance Art,” 29.

91 Ibid.

92 Alagha, “Jihad through Music.”

93 El Houri, Meaning of Resistance, 88.

94 ‘Takfiri groups’ refers to extremist Sunni groups such as IS that use the concept of takrif – excommunication – to justify fighting and killing other Muslims.

95 Josefsson, Nilsson, and Borell, “Muslims Opposing Violent Radicalism and Extremism,” 190.

96 Saouli, Hezbollah, 10.

97 Nilsson, “Primary Unit Cohesion.”

98 Al-Ahed News, “Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah’s speech delivered at the Second Liberation Day Festival.”

99 On the use of the concept, see eg Harb, “Hezbollah, Al-Manar and the Arab Revolts.”

100 Al-Ahed News, “Sayyed Nasrallah’s Full Speech at the ’Loyalty to Land’ Electoral Rally.”

101 Ibid.

102 Khatib, Matar, and Alshaer, Hizbullah Phenomenon, 53.

103 El Houri, Meaning of Resistance, 65.

104 Lamloum, “Hezbollah’s Media Political History in Outline,” 353.

105 Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements.”

106 Davis, Stories of Change, 7.

107 Harb and Leenders, “Know Thy Enemy”; El Houri, Meaning of Resistance, 202.

108 Kuypers, “Framing Analysis,” 182.

109 Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, 19.

110 Dunning, Hamas, Jihad and Popular Legitimacy.

111 Deeb, “Piety Politics,” S115.