https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4873-9851
![Sample our Global Development journals, sign in here to start your access, latest two full volumes FREE to you for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5929/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Global-Development.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
Long regarded by students of comparative politics as an important if muddled concept, oligarchy, as I define it, denotes modes of rule in which public office holders govern with a view to the private interests of the wealthy. The enabling condition in a democratic regime is weak institutional mechanisms of citizen representation and participation. The persistence of oligarchic modes of rule under democracy helps account for the enduring appeal of populism in Latin America. This article outlines the classical theory of oligarchy, examines the use of the concept in contemporary theories of comparative politics, describes oligarchic modes of rule in Latin America’s hierarchical market economies, offers an account of the dynamics of populist mobilisation and oligarchic modes of rule in Peru, and draws lessons from the Odebrecht corruption scandal.
Acknowledgements
Presented at a meeting of the Canadian Association of Latin American and Caribbean Studies in Toronto, 11 May 2019. Earlier versions were presented at Lund University on 16 May 2018, a meeting of the Latin American Studies Association in Barcelona, 22–26 May 2018, and the Catholic University of Peru, Lima, 4–8 June 2018. I am grateful to Agustín Goenaga, Joe Foweraker, Paolo Sosa Villagarcia, Carmen Ilizarbe, Mark Warren, Ken Sharpe, Liisa North, Francisco Durand, Judy Hellman, Gillian McGillivray, Laura Macdonald, Paulo Ravecca, Lisa Sundstrom, Yana Gorokhovskaia and the anonymous reviewers of the journal for comments on earlier drafts. Errors and omissions are the sole responsibility of the author. Dedicated to the memory of Julio Cotler, Peru’s most perspicacious analyst of oligarchy.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 For recent titles, see Winters, Oligarchy; Tabachnick, On Oligarchy: Ancient Lessons; Sherry, Oligarch: Rewriting Machiavelli’s the Prince.
2 Manent, World beyond Politics, 10.
3 Bartels, Unequal Democracy, 287.
4 Winters and Page, “Oligarchy in the United States?,” 731.
5 Slater, “Democratic Careening,” 731.
6 Mosca, Ruling Class: Elementi di Scienza Politica; Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study; Payne, “Oligarchy Muddle”; Bourricaud, “Structure and Function of the Peruvian Oligarchy.”
7 Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism.
8 O’Donnell, Counterpoints: Selected Essays on Authoritarianism and Democratization, 36–7.
9 Malloy and Seligson, Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition, 4; O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy”; Merkel, “Embedded and Defective Democracies.”
10 Judis, Populist Explosion; Mudde, “Europe’s Populist Surge”; Berman, “Populism Is Not Fascism.”
11 Levitsky and Loxton, “Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism in the Andes”; Zakaria, “Populism on the March”; Luce, Retreat of Western Liberalism.
12 Berman, “The Pipe Dream of Undemocratic Liberalism,” 30.
13 Levitsky and Loxton, “Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism in the Andes”; Zakaria, “Populism on the March”; Luce, Retreat of Western Liberalism.
14 Foweraker, Polity: Demystifying Democracy; Barker, “Oligarchy or Elite Democracy.”
15 Aristotle, Introduction to Aristotle, 583; 1276b20 and 1279a5.
16 Aristotle, Introduction to Aristotle, 591; 1279a35.
17 Ibid., 592–3; 1279b20–1280a5.
18 Ibid., 591; 1279a30.
19 Cameron, Strong Constitutions: Social-Cognitive Origins, 63–7.
20 Castoriadis, “Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy,” 276; Manin, Principles of Representative Government.
21 See Reich, Common Good, 38.
22 Urbinati and Warren, “Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory,” 389.
23 MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory.
24 Warren, “Problem-Based Approach to Democratic Theory.”
25 O’Donnell, “Democracy, Law, and Comparative Politics”; O’Donnell, Democracy, Agency, and the State.
26 Urbinati and Warren, “Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory,” 406.
27 For a review, see Gilbert, Oligarchy and the Old Regime in Latin America.
28 Cotler, “New Mode of Political Domination in Peru,” 47; R. B. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena; Bambirra, El Capitalismo Dependiente Latinoamericano; Ianni, La Formación Del Estado Populista en América Latina.
29 O’Donnell, Democracy, Agency, and the State; Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory.
30 Germani, Política y Sociedad; Germani, di Tella, and Ianni, Populismo y Contradicciones de Clase en Latinoamerica.
31 Roberts 1995, “Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America,” 83–9; see also Weyland, “Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America.”
32 Jansen, “Populist Mobilization,” 81.
33 See Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics; Mitchell, “How Neoliberalism Makes Its World”; Silva, Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America; Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason; Drinot, “Foucault in the Land of the Incas”; Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution.
34 Roberts, “Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America”; Weyland, “Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America”; Weyland, “Clarifying a Contested Concept”; Weyland, “Latin American Neopopulism.”
35 D. Collier and Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives,” 434–42.
36 See Weyland, “Clarifying a Contested Concept.”
37 Schneider, Hierarchical Capitalism in Latin America; see also North, “Introduction – Reconfiguring Domination,” 5–10.
38 Blofield, Care Work and Class, 12.
39 Luna, Segmented Representation.
40 Blofield and Luna, “Public Opinion on Income Inequalities.”
41 Blofield, Great Gap: Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution, 379.
42 Ibid., 377.
43 Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, 130, 131, 149.
44 Lindblom, “Market as Prison,” 324.
45 Fairfield, Private Wealth and Public Revenue, 42.
46 Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution.
47 See Cameron, Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru.
48 Luna, Segmented Representation; Luna and Kaltwasser, Resilience of the Latin American Right.
49 On the connection between oligarchy and patriarchy see Encarnación, “Patriarchy’s Revenge.”
50 Roberts, “Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America,” 83.
51 Ibid., 90.
52 See also Luna, Segmented Representation.
53 Roberts, “Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America,” 97.
54 Durand, “Neoliberalismo, empresarios y el estado”; Crabtree and Durand, Peru: Elite Power and Political Capture, 1.
55 Crabtree and Durand, Peru: Elite Power and Political Capture, 3.
56 Vergara and Watanabe, “Presidents without Roots: Understanding the Peruvian Paradox.”
57 Data from World Development Indicators; see https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=PE. Accessed January 1, 2021.
58 International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database. https://ilostat.ilo.org/topics/informality/. Data retrieved in April 2019.
59 Balbin Torres, Informe: Situación de los Derechos Sindicales en el Perú, 14.
60 Wise, Reinventing the State; Dargent, Technocracy and Democracy in Latin America; Dargent, Feldmann, and Luna, “Greater Capacity, Lesser Stateness.”
61 On the role of vetoes in sustaining inequality, see Stepan and Linz, “Comparative Perspectives on Inequality.”
62 Vergara and Encinas, “Continuity by Surprise.”
63 Crabtree and Durand, Peru: Elite Power and Political Capture, 113–8.
64 Latinobarómetro, Análisis Online. Accessed May 19, 2020. http://www.latinobarometro.org/latOnline.jsp. In this respect, Peru is not an outlier in the region: most Latin American citizens perceive their political systems to be oligarchic, even when governed by populists. This should not surprise us: populist mobilisation is typically a reaction to oligarchic modes of rule, yet rarely does it lead to more robust citizenship regimes.
65 See charges outlined in United States of America vs Odebrecht SA. United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, #2016R00709.
66 This section draws heavily on Durand, Odebrecht: La Empresa Que Capturaba Gobiernos, especially chapter 4; Durand, La Captura Del Estado en América Latina; and Durand, “Odebrecht Tsunami.”
67 See charges outlined in United States of America vs Odebrecht SA. United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, #2016R00709.
68 “Peru: Vizcarra Slips as Odebrecht Deal Sealed,” Latin American Weekly Reports, February 21, 2019 (WR-19-07).
69 Anderson, “Downfall of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski.”
70 See Fogel, “Brazil: Corruption as a Mode of Rule.”
71 Durand, Odebrecht Tsunami.” See also “Jorge Barata revela aportes de Odebrecht a Keiko,” La República. March 1, 2018. pp. 2–5. Accessed April 7, 2019. https://larepublica.pe/politica/1204652-barata-revela-aportes-de-odebrecht-a-keiko-ag-y-ppk
72 Two individuals are under investigation in relation to the 2011 campaign, as well as the recall of Lima mayor Susana Villarán, Luis Favre and Valdemir Garreta. See Barboza Quiroz, “Luis Favre y las campañas bajo la lupa de la fiscalía.”
73 Durand, Odebrecht Tsunami.”
74 Cardenal Juan Luis Cipriani pide renuncia de Vizcarra,” Peru21. October 3, 2019. Accessed May 19, 2020. https://peru21.pe/politica/cardenal-juan-luis-cipriani-pide-renuncia-de-vizcarra-ahora-falta-el-segundo-paso-noticia/
75 “César Landa Arroyo: Todos pueden interpretar, pero el president debe gobernar y la decision es constitucional,” La República, October 3, 2019. Accessed May 19, 2020. https://larepublica.pe/politica/2019/10/01/cierre-del-congreso-cesar-landa-arroyo-todos-pueden-interpretar-pero-el-presidente-debe-gobernar-y-la-decision-es-constitucional-martin-vizcarra/
76 Winters and Page, “Oligarchy in the United States?,” 731; Barker, “Oligarchy or Elite Democracy,” 547.
77 Levitsky and Loxton, “Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism in the Andes”; Zakaria, “Populism on the March”; Luce, Retreat of Western Liberalism.
78 Foweraker, Polity: Demystifying Democracy, 9.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Maxwell A. Cameron
Maxwell A. Cameron is a Professor of political science at the University of British Columbia. His research focuses on comparative democratisation (especially in Latin America), constitutions, and the role of wisdom and judgement in politics. His publications include Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru, The Peruvian Labyrinth (as co-editor), The Political Economy of North American Free Trade (co-editor), Latin America’s Left Turns (co-editor), New Institutions for Participatory Democracy in Latin America (co-editor), The Making of NAFTA (co-author), Strong Constitutions and Political Institutions and Practical Wisdom, and he is currently preparing an edited book on politics in the Andes. Cameron is the recipient of a UBC Killam Teaching Prize. In 2020 he was selected by the Canadian Association of Latin American and Caribbean Studies to be the recipient of its Distinguished Fellow Award.