https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2003-2053
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Abstract
The progressive refugee policy of the Ugandan government has been widely applauded as a success story, and Uganda has been depicted as a role model. This article argues how the perceived success created a situation of mutual dependency between the Ugandan government and the international community. While the Ugandan government relied on aid from the international community, the international community had interests in the success story as proof that their policies work (for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), and in response to the European migration crisis (for bilateral donor governments). Nevertheless, in 2018, it emerged that the Ugandan refugee policy suffered from large-scale corruption. The article argues that the mutual dependency provided a fertile breeding ground for corruption, and negatively impacted accountability. Similarly to how the Museveni regime has been able to benefit from an image of success to deflect accountability on governance transgressions in the past, it has now largely managed to evade accountability for corruption in its refugee policy.
Acknowledgements
The author thanks Anna Reuss, Michael O’Hagan, Sarah Vancluysen, Sara de Simone and Mark Marvin Kadigo for comments on earlier versions of this paper.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Funding
This work was supported by the VLIR-UOS TEAM project ‘Making Refugee Integration Sustainable: In Search of Durable Relations with Host Populations in Uganda’.
Notes
1 This project received ethical clearance from the Ethical Commission for Social and Human Sciences from the University of Antwerp (#SHW_103).
2 See also Hovil (Citation2007), IRRI (2018) and Krause (Citation2016).
3 For example, according to a UNHCR official, ‘it [the CRRF] reads like a description of Uganda: The way the Ugandan government has taken on refugees is a very good example of this. So we’ve done very good in Uganda; we’ve done better in Uganda in many areas […] Uganda did present itself as a success story in the CRRF’ (interview, UNHCR official, 14 January 2019).
4 Interview, humanitarian actor, 8 July 2021.
5 Interview, humanitarian actor, 6 July 2021.
6 When ‘UNHCR is used in this chronology, it is short for ‘UNHCR Uganda’. The audit report, for example, mentions how other UNHCR divisions had also raised these concerns for several years (OIOS Citation2018, 19).
7 Interview, humanitarian actor, 6 July 2021.
8 Interview, humanitarian actor, 6 July 2021.
9 Interview, humanitarian actor, Kampala, 4 December 2018. The audit similarly notes how this lack of access seriously affected ‘programming, distribution of assistance, resettlement processing, case management, and planning of cash-based interventions’ (OIOS Citation2018).
10 Interview, analyst, 10 July 2021.
11 Kazungu’s LinkedIn page publicly states he is on the board of trustees of this NGO: ‘He is also a member of the Board of Trustees of African Initiative for Relief and Development (AIRD) an African NGO that has presence in Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo, handling logistics management on behalf of UNHCR’. https://ug.linkedin.com/in/kazungu-david-apollo-4a0414112?trk=public_profile_samename-profile, accessed 7 July 2021.
12 Interview, humanitarian actor, Kampala, 25 February 2020.
13 Interview, humanitarian actor, Kampala, 5 December 2018.
14 UNHCR would say that they were here at the invitation of the government, to protect themselves against these issues. While this is definitely true, it also highlights the broader issues at stake.
15 Interview, humanitarian actors, 6 July 2021.
16 Interview, UNHCR official, 14 January 2019.
17 Interview, local analyst, 1 July 2021.
18 Indeed, the funding for UNHCR Uganda increased from $63 million in 2015 to $125 in 2016 and $205 million in 2017 (UNHCR 2020). Source: UNHCR. “Global Focus, Uganda.” http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/5129 Accessed May 4 2020.
19 Interview, journalist, Kampala, 3 November 2004.
20 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the European Union Delegation, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Republic of Korea, Sweden, UK and USA.
21 Joint Local Statement on the Uganda Refugee Response | Kampala, 14 December 2018. https://ug.usembassy.gov/joint-local-statement-on-the-uganda-refugee-response-kampala-14-december-2018/
22 Omondi Walter was taken to the anti-corruption court in December 2019 (Inspectorate of Government 2020).
23 A 2018 judgement by Uganda’s anti-corruption court on corruption with refugee money by OPM officials – dealing with the 2013–2014 time period, before the current scandal broke out – is an earlier illustration of this. The judgement describes how the concerned OPM officials were forced to send back a percentage of the refugee money to Commissioner Kazungu, and the judge expresses dismay at the fact that Kazungu is not on trial. Anti-Corruption Division Uganda, ‘Uganda v Moses Papa & 3 Ors (Criminal Session Case-2017/4) [2018] UGHCACD 10 (17 December 2018)’.
24 Two points were emphasised. First, that the UN money was never stolen: it had been promised by UNHCR, but had never arrived. Second, that the scandal was the result of a turf war with other ministers working on the refugee issue and who wanted him out. This turf war falls outside the scope of this paper. (interview data 2018-2021)
25 Interviews, and also this online article: Mulengera News (2020), ‘OPM Refugee Bosses Fight for Office as Hillary Onek, Ecweru Defy M7 Directive’, 16 September 2020, https://mulengeranews.com/opm-refugee-bosses-fight-for-office-as-hillary-onek-ecweru-defy-m7-directive/
26 His return led to tensions with the acting commissioner, who initially refused to leave. It reached the point where both were occupying opposite ends of the same desk until the acting commissioner finally left office (Mulengera News 2020).
27 Interview, international actor, 2 July 2021.
28 In the initial meetings, a compromise was suggested by the Ugandan actors that he would be reshuffled to another position. The general understanding was that he would be appointed an ambassador (Interview data 2021).
29 Interview, international actors, 3 July 2021.
30 Interview, local analyst, 30 June 2021.
31 Interview, local analyst, 30 June 2021.
32 Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions ‘DFID Hands over Vehicles to ODPP (U) and CID’, https://www.dpp.go.ug/index.php/media-center/news-and-announcements/item/33-dfid-hands-over-vehicles-to-odpp-u-and-cid, accessed 30 June 2021.
33 The refugee commissioner was contacted (on 29 October 2021) for his part of the story. He confirmed to be back in position, and emphasized that he was innocent. He refused to answer any other question.
34 Interview, international actor, 1 July 2021.
35 Interview, international actor, 1 July 2021.
36 ‘I don’t think the international community – UN or bilaterally – have pushed very hard for Kazungu to leave’ (Interview, international actor, 20 June 2021).
37 Interview, international actor, 24 June 2021.
38 Interview, local analyst, 30 June 2021.
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Kristof Titeca
Kristof Titeca is Associate Professor at the Institute of Development Policy at the University of Antwerp. He is interested in issues related to governance and conflict in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, subjects on which he has published widely. His latest books are Rebel Lives. Photographs from inside the Lord’s Resistance Army (Hannibal Books/FOMU) and Negotiating Public Services in the Congo (with Tom De Herdt, ZED Books).