Islamic revolutionary ideology and its narratives: the continued relevance of the Islamic Republic’s ideology

Abstract

Is the Islamic Republic of Iran’s revolutionary ideology still relevant more than 40 years after the revolution? Is it still relevant in the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy? While the Islamic Republic’s ideology undoubtedly developed alongside its institutions over the course of 40 years, this article argues that its revolutionary ideology continues to remain relevant and in fact important. Centring on the Islamic Republic’s ideological discourse, it further argues that it contains several recurring narratives which have remained salient throughout the Islamic Republic’s existence: narratives about the revolution; resistance, anti-imperialism and independence; nationalism; the Iran–Iraq war; and narratives in reference to Islam. Those narratives are part of the Islamic Republic’s ideological foundation and continue to play an important role in contemporary Iranian domestic and foreign policy. The article contributes a comprehensive study of how and why this is the case by enquiring into the strategic discursive employment of these narratives by analysing a major case of international interest: the nuclear issue.

Keywords:

• Islamic Republic of Iran
• ideology
• narrative
• domestic politics
• foreign policy
• the nuclear issue

Acknowledgements

The author thanks her anonymous reviewers for their constructive and intellectually stimulating engagement with this article. Their kindness and generous efforts to deeply engage with the article are greatly appreciated and have contributed significantly to shaping and improving it. The author also thanks Ferran Izquierdo, Mehran Kamrava and Luciano Zaccara for their valuable suggestions and comments on earlier drafts of this article, and Mohammad Kalantari, Mustafa Menshawy, Edward Wastnidge as well as the fellows of the project SEPAD for the fruitful discussions around the piece.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 The Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme, inherited from the former Shah of Iran, has been an ongoing issue of contention between the Islamic Republic and large parts of the international community ever since the Islamic Republic restarted the programme in the 1980s. The contention reached a climax in 2002, when the existence of additional nuclear facilities was made public. The Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme has attracted and continues to attract immense international attention and has been the subject of repeated cycles of negotiations and sanctions. For a history of Iran’s nuclear programme, see eg Gaietta (2015).

2 The works of Rakel (2009) and Ayatollahi Tabaar (2018) provide further details on the Islamic Republic’s factionalised political elite and the competition among them.

3 See Ayatollahi Tabaar (2018) for a detailed account of the competition taking place among the political factions and its influence on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear politics. For a more personal account of the Islamic Republic’s internal dynamics in connection to the nuclear issue, see also Mousavian’s (2012) memoirs.

4 However, it should be noted, as van Dijk (2013, 177) points out, that ‘[i]deologies, on the other hand, are belief systems that are only shared by specific (ideological) groups of people, and are typically not shared and taken for granted by the whole sociocultural community. In other words, they embody beliefs about which there are differences of opinion, and that hence are typically persuasively attacked and defended among members of different ideological groups. Thus, whereas ideologies may be beliefs that are taken for granted and presupposed within the own group, they are not so across groups and in society as a whole. […] Hence the general consequence that ideological differences become manifest in ideological struggle’.

5 Khamenei (2009c).

6 For more information on the initial primary ideologues of the Islamic Revolution, see Dabashi (2008), Arjomand (2009) and Zubaida (2009).

7 At the same time, however, there have nevertheless been repeated attempts by various governments to initiate dialogue and improve the Islamic Republic’s foreign relations. This was the case, for example, with former President Hassan Rouhani’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’ or former President Mohammad Khatami’s famous ‘dialogue among civilizations’.

8 Khamenei (2006c).

9 Khamenei’s representation of people’s commitment is not necessarily a complete reflection of reality. While there are many supporters, there are also many opponents. In connection to this, see Bajoghli’s (2019) account of the Islamic Republic’s cultural efforts to uphold its revolutionary values and its preoccupation with transmitting them to younger generations. Acting as if, Khamenei’s words are therefore also an expression of this preoccupation.

10 See Khamenei’s official website for a detailed explanation of the meaning and use of the term ‘arrogance’: https://english.khamenei.ir/news/8190/What-does-Arrogance-mean-in-Imam-Khamenei-s-statements.

11 Khamenei (2006b).

12 To name but one important historical event marked by foreign interference, and which left a long-lasting imprint, was the coup d’état of 1953 instigated by the United States and the United Kingdom that overthrew Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. See Abrahamian (2013).

13 On the concept of the ‘economy of resistance’ and further context, see Lob and Habibi (2019).

14 Indeed, the knowledge and expertise around nuclear technology that the Islamic Republic has been able to acquire over the years is complicating the negotiations that started in 2021 to revive the nuclear deal.

15 Khamenei (2012a).

16 Under the surface, statements along these lines also mirror another of the Islamic Republic’s concerns, ie the incessant annual emigration of citizens from all segments of Iranian society, including highly educated and skilled parts of the population. For details, see for example the Migration Data Portal (2020):

https://www.migrationdataportal.org/data?cm49=364&amp%3Bfocus=profile&i=stock_abs_&t=2020

17 Khamenei (2006d).

18 It is worth noting that contrary to Khamenei’s assertions of a great victory, Khomeini had initially described the acceptance of the ceasefire as drinking from a ‘poisoned chalice’ (see Abrahamian, 2018, 186).

19 Khamenei (2012a).

20 The contestation of policies and decisions or even the entire system of the Islamic Republic on parts of the population have been an inherent part of the Islamic Republic ever since its inception. These include the recent demonstrations protesting socio-economic conditions and other well-known examples such as the student protests of 1999, the Green Movement or the Girls of Enghelab Street. See for example Blumberg and Farhi (2016).

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Olivia Glombitza

Olivia Glombitza is Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB) and the Open University of Catalonia (UOC), and a fellow for the project ‘Reconfiguration of Transnational Actors & Elites in the MENA Region’ based at UAB and the project ‘Sectarianism, Proxies and De-Sectarianization’ (SEPAD) based at Lancaster University. She has led projects on the ongoing transformation of the Republic of Turkey and the role of ideational factors in foreign policy and peacebuilding in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, both supported by the International Catalan Institute for Peace (ICIP). Her research interests include the history, contemporary politics and international relations of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf; Iran’s and Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies; symbolic politics; relations of power; conceptualisations of ideology and identity; peacebuilding and mediation; media representation; and narrative and discourse analysis.