State apologies, postcolonial resistance and ontological insecurity: the Matabeleland massacre

Abstract

Building on the causal relationship between ontological (in)security and state apology, this article explores the Zimbabwean government’s refusal to apologise for the state-sanctioned Matabeleland massacre. First, I situate the Zimbabwean government’s response to the demand for an apology within the multifarious ontological insecurities it is grappling with in its relationship with both domestic and international actors. Second, I argue that the Zimbabwean government has refocused and repurposed this ontological insecurity-induced refusal to apologise to fulfil contemporary ontological and political exigencies. It has become a site for postcolonial resistance and domestic legitimisation in which well-rehearsed anti-Western sentiments, anti-imperialism and faux Pan-Africanism are built around the apology discourse to switch the focus from rectifying the wrongs of the past to opposing the unfinished Western civilising project. Such postcolonial posturing contains internal contradictions, particularly in reproducing oppressive and exclusionary politics domestically, and endangering the victims’ ontological security. Moreover, the continuous demands for a national apology by surviving victims and families of the deceased threaten the state’s sense of self. The article thereby identifies the practice of state apologies, particularly the refusal of apology, as a critical discursive site where contemporary postcolonial politics are negotiated, reproduced and sustained.

Keywords:

• Matabeleland massacre
• ontological insecurity
• postcolonial resistance
• state apologies
• Zimbabwe
• Gukurahundi

Acknowledgements

An early version of this article was presented at the Virtual Workshop on Political Apologies for Historical Wrongs organised by Tom Bentley of the University of Aberdeen. I thank the participants for their helpful questions and feedback. I thank the Third World Quarterly anonymous reviewers and Tom Bentley for their valuable comments, which significantly improved this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 For a broad analysis of political apologies across the world, see Schaafsma and Zoodsma (2021).

2 The Zimbabwe War of Independence was fought between two nationalist liberation forces and the Rhodesian force. The Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) was the military wing of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), while the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) was the military wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).

3 In 1983, Robert Mugabe set up the Chihambakwe Commission of Inquiry to investigate the alleged massacre of the Ndebele people, but the findings were never made public. On 22 December 1987, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo signed the Unity Accord. In 1988, Robert Mugabe’s government also issued Clemency Order Number 1, pardoning all people (state security forces and dissidents) involved in human rights violations committed between 1982 and 1987.

4 See, among others, CCJP and LRF (1999), Mashingaidze (2005), Rwafa (2012), Killander and Nyathi (2015), Murambadoro (2015), Ngwenya and Harris (2015), Ncube and Siziba (2017) and Tarusarira (2019).

5 See, among others, Wendt (2004), Neumann (2004) and Jackson (2004a).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Osondu C. Ugochukwu

Osondu C. Ugochukwu obtained his undergraduate degree in philosophy from the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, in 2010. He proceeded thereafter to pursue his MSc and PhD in Politics and International Relations from the University of Aberdeen in the United Kingdom. His doctorate thesis is on Ontological Security, Resistance and State Apologies: Zimbabwe and Turkey. He is originally from Nigeria and his research interests are in international relations, political apologies, socio-political philosophy, African philosophy, peace and conflict resolution, post-conflict reconciliation, and Global South politics.