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Abstract
The six sections of the essay discuss recurrent issues relative to the modern advocacy of human rights and the vicissitudes of the Chinese response—universal standards versus cultural and historical particularity, individualism versus community, traditional Confucian ethics versus Western modernism, nativism versus foreign influence, the stability of the social order versus individual well-being, and the possibility of developing a view of rights a part of which is drawn from the Chinese philosophical tradition. The concluding segment examines historical conditions of law and religion and their relevance for contemporary discussion on human rights. By looking closely at selected classical texts and events, the essay offers both a sustained critique of Confucianism in its traditional formulation and a suggested attempt to re-interpret aspects of the tradition for the current situation.
Acknowledgements
The initial form of this essay was used as a lecture given on various US campuses during my appointment in 2001–2002 as the Frank M. Updike Memorial Scholar and Visiting Campus Scholar, Phi Beta Kappa. In December 2002, the lecture was presented at Cambridge University, UK under the sponsorship of its Faculty of Oriental Studies, Trinity College. For the honour and the generosity of my host institutions, I hereby express my deep gratitude.
Notes
1. For the white papers released by the State Council on the subject, one may cite the following: ‘Human Rights in China’ (1991), ‘Criminal Reform in China’ (1992), ‘Tibet—Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation’ (1992), ‘The Situation of Chinese Women’ (1994), ‘Family Planning in China’ (1995), ‘The Progress of Human Rights in China’ (1995), ‘The Situation of Children in China’ (1996), ‘Progress in China's Human Rights Cause in 1996’ (1997), ‘Freedom of Religious Belief in China’ (1997). See also Deng and Wang (1999, 99).
2. One most succinct statement exemplifying the range of meanings for the word may be found in Mencius 1A. 7, where the thinker is counselling Prince Xuan of Qi: ‘Weigh it, and then one knows whether a thing is light or heavy; measure it, and one knows whether it is long or short. If things are so, it is even more with the heart-and-mind. My King should measure it.’ All translations of Chinese texts in this essay, unless otherwise indicated, are my own.
3. For a detailed analysis of this and related passages on the topic in Xunzi, see Yu (Citation1997), chapter 2).
4. See Mencius 4A 17: ‘Not to help by the hand an elder sister-in-law drowning is to be a wolf. In the matter of giving and receiving, a man should not touch a woman—this is ritual. When a sister-in-law drowns and one helps her with the hands, this is weighing (quan).’
5. See the rest of the chapter in this book for the development of the idea of the moral self.
6. Originally deriving from the vocabulary of Chinese astronomy, the word served as the name for the North Pole Star. That constellation and an associated string of stars were given imperial titles such as Star of the Heavenly Emperor and Imperial Concubine (tiandi xing, zheng fei), and the whole group was also called Central Palace or Zhong gong. According to the first-century lexicon Shuowen jieji [Explaining Lines and Analyzing Composite Graphs] compiled by Xu Shen, the graph in its palaeographic form ‘imitates a human belly (xiang ren fu)’ (14B). The Qing philologist Duan Yucai's gloss on this passage argues that from this ‘the meaning is extended to indicate the human self (ren ji) as that which is different from others.’ If anything, the etymology of the word seems to place more emphasis on the distinctiveness of physical shape and form than on the psycho-moral role fashioned by culture. This sort of distinctiveness, moreover, is more appropriate to individuals than to groups.
7. All-embracing: reading rong as all-embracing, accepting, accommodating, or capacious, similar to the usage in Daodejing 16.
8. Citation, to facilitate easier access, is taken from the chapter titled ‘Jiebi or Dispelling Blindness’. My translation obviously differs from that in Knoblock (1988–1994, vol. 2, 105), and I reject his needless textual emendation.
9. The astute observation in Schwartz (1985, 113 ) deserves a full citation: ‘On the side of “individualism”, we have the fact that while an individual is linked to his social roles, his behaviour is not simply a function of these roles. He has a potential moral autonomy which makes it possible at least for some individuals to realise the full moral potentialities of their roles and to convey to others their full humanity, whether through the framework of the “role structure” or outside of it. Such individuals possess a spiritual self-sufficiency which renders them independent of “popularity” or dependence on the powerful. Even the “people” taken as a whole—when a proper environment is created for them—enjoy a degree of moral autonomy which governs them in their familial and community relations. If individualism refers to something like Kantian moral autonomy, some of it can certainly be found here.’
10. Confucius's remark is found in the little parable of his passing by Mount Tai, when he made inquiry as to why a woman was weeping grievously by several fresh-dug graves. Queried by Confucius as to why she did not quit her region after her father-in-law, her husband, and her son were all devoured by tigers, she gave this decisive reply: ‘There's no harsh government here’. Whereupon Confucius was moved to say to his disciples: ‘Remember this, little ones. Harsh government is worse than tigers!’ See the Liji [The Record of Rites]. 1992. In Liji zhuzi suoyin [A Concordant Edition of the Liji], ed. D. C. Lau and Chen Fong Chin, 4. 45, 28. Hong Kong: Commercial Press.
11. The accounts are varied and familiar. For a recent and elegant treatment, see Jonathan D. Spence (Citation1990), 137–268).
12. As reported in The New York Times, 10 August 2001, A1.
13. For more provocative studies of these and related topics, see Sun (Citation2002), and Long and Zhu (Citation1998).
14. See Keightley (Citation2004), Hulsewé (1985), and Peerenboom (Citation1993).
15. Peerenboom (Citation2002), which provides the most up-to-date and authoritative account of law and its evolving meaning and function for contemporary Chinese society, defines li as follows: ‘customary norms that gain favor within a particular historical tradition at a particular time and that constitute not unchanging, determinant rules of behavior but culturally valued, though negotiable, guidelines for achieving harmony in a particular context’ (p. 31).
16. See Keightley (Citation1978) and his chapter on ‘The Shang’ (Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C Citation1999 ), 232–291.
17. Huang's essay details most incisively the perduring and pervasive practice of worshipping Confucius in historical Chinese society, a topic too often overlooked or neglected in the study of Chinese religion.
18. See also all the essays in The China Quarterly (2003, vol. 174). This last issue of The China Quarterly is most timely in that its entirety is devoted to an up-to-date survey of all aspects and movements of religion in China today.