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Abstract
One of the outcomes of the work of the global NGO Transparency International has been the development of the concept of the ‘national integrity system’, and within that context there is growing interest in a set of public agencies involved in the encouragement, establishment, protection and maintenance of such systems. Some of these agencies are now quite venerable, but their number has been increasing rapidly. In their work, however, they face a serious problem. Governments draw attention to them as accountability devices, but is that just window-dressing? In the performance of their work they will inevitably conflict with or embarrass governments from time to time, so the temptation is to starve them of funds or otherwise weaken them so that their threat potential is much diminished. It is important, therefore, that measures be put in place to protect THEM as they perform their duties. This article examines this proposition, explores the role of parliament as the obvious (but problematic) protector, and notes particularly the development of the notion of ‘officers of parliament’ as a special protective device.
Notes
1. The term ‘integrity institution’ has also come into play, being the term used in a treatment that was particularly concerned with auditors-general, ombudsmen, anti-corruption commissions, crime commissions, and police complaints authorities/police integrity commissions (Brown, 2008, p. 172). In the Monterrey conference reported on in this article, they were being referred to also as ‘TAI (transparency-accountability-integrity) agencies’. On the police oversight authorities, see esp. Lewis and Prenzler 2008.
2. These propositions apply to the statutory creations but not to other NDPB forms such as the government-owned companies that are created by registration, on the initiative of a minister, under an available companies or corporations act; there, the parliamentary connection is even more distant (Wettenhall 1993). For an extended discussion of forms of public sector organisation, see Thynne and Wettenhall Citation2003. In the context of a discussion of integrity agencies, it needs to be noted that the body may be either single-headed, e.g. with an ombudsman or auditor-general at the top, or multi-headed, with a board or commission at the top.
3. For my contribution to these discussions and my report on them to the Australasian Study of Parliament Group, see Wettenhall 2006, 2007.
4. From material presented at the conference and a check with the post-Apartheid South African constitution, it seems that that country does well in holding a set of ‘state institutions supporting constitutional democracy’ directly accountable to the National Assembly, which is, moreover, involved in several of the appointment processes.
5. ‘Head of state’, of course, in accordance with the classical political science position – so often ignored today – which separates that office functionally from ‘head of government’.
6. For a careful assessment of the political and legal environment in which the Public Accounts and Estimates Committee undertook this inquiry, see Clark and De Martinis 2003.
7. This ambivalence is repeated in the commentary on the PAEC report presented by its chairman to the Integrity Agencies Workshop at the University of Canberra in July 2009, see Stensholt 2009.
8. A NSW contribution to the Australian Integrity Systems project noted above raised the possibility that agencies charged with improving public sector integrity might actually see themselves as competing with supposedly supporting parliamentary committees covering the same ground (Smith 2006, p. 49). The implication is that it is important, where committees and agencies have a close relationship, that care is taken to see that mission overlaps are avoided.
