Abstract
This research examines the multifaceted governance struggles associated with the alleged burial of Agent Orange at Camp Carroll in Chilgok County, Korea. To deal with this incident, the Korea central government forms bureaucratic conflict management system, which can be characterised as a joint response system, a one-voice system for press briefing, and an intergovernmental joint supporting group. However, this system conflicts with the participatory governance of local governments and civic society. This research explores why the Korean central government's bureaucratic conflict management prevails over the participatory governance of local governments and environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It argues that the Status of Forces Agreement between Korea and the USA provides the Korean central government with a reason to curb the participation of local governments and environment NGOs in the governance of Camp Carroll conflict.
Acknowledgements
The work of this article is partially based on my 2012 report of the Korea Institute of Public Administration and the Prime Minister's Office entitled ‘An Analysis of Governmental Response on a Conflict on the Alleged Burial of Agent Orange at Camp Carroll.’ This work has nothing to do with the view of the Prime Minister's Office. I am very grateful to Da-Hye Lee and Haejun Moon for their assistance.
Notes on contributors
Eun-sung Kim is assistant professor in the Department of Sociology at the Kyung Hee University, Seoul, Korea. He has published on the topics of risk, conflict, bioethics, and science associated with human health, emerging technologies, and the environment in Journal of Risk Research, Science, Technology, and Human Values, New Genetics and Society, Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning, and Minerva.
Notes
1. The USFK relocated to two permanent hubs: the Northwest (Pyeongtaek) hub and the Southeast (Daegu) hub (AOCCC Citation2012).
2. Intergovernmental relations are established via complex pathways, as follows: (1) human interactions (Anderson Citation1960; Walters Citation2007; Wright Citation1988); (2) policy networks (Rhodes Citation1996); (3) legal, political, and administrative relationships (Walters Citation2007, 348); and (4) the role of an advisory commission in intergovernmental relations (Walters Citation2007).
3. The DGAOCC held 30 one-person demonstrations, 15 candlelight vigils, and 2 political rallies.
4. The text of the Agreement is available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121026065214/www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/A921BCF9-97C5-4716-8262-44F96196061E/0/nato_sofa_supplementary_agreement.pdf
5. This phrase appears in Dong Han Yook's personal presentation material entitled ‘Governmental Conflict Management and Cases of Coordination’ at the Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University around September 2013. At that time, he was retired and worked as a visiting professor at the Seoul National University.
6. The record of this meeting states that by conducting a joint investigation, the ROK and the USA strengthened their cooperation and facilitated the exchange of information lacking in SOFA.