Existential Import in Cartesian Semantics

Abstract

The paper explores the existential import of universal affirmative in Descartes, Arnauld and Malebranche. Descartes holds, inconsistently, that eternal truths are true even if the subject term is empty but that a proposition with a false idea as subject is false. Malebranche extends Descartes’ truth-conditions for eternal truths, which lack existential import, to all knowledge, allowing only for non-propositional knowledge of contingent existence. Malebranche's rather implausible Neoplatonic semantics is detailed as consisting of three key semantic relations: illumination by which God's ideas cause mental terms, creation by which God's ideas cause material substances by a kind of ‘ontic privation’, and sensation in which brain events occasion states of mental awareness. In contrast, Arnauld distinguishes two types of propositions – necessary and contingent – with distinct truth-conditions, one with and one without existential import. Arnauld's more modern semantics is laid out as a theory of reference that substitutes earlier causal accounts with one that adapts the medieval notion of objective being. His version anticipates modern notions of intentional content and appeals in its ontology only to substances and their modes.

Notes

² Posterior Analytics, II,vii 92b5-8, translated by G. R. G. Mure.

³See, for example, De genesi ad litteram vi,10.

⁴William of Sherwood: Introductiones in logicam I.14, ed. M. Grabmann, Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, (10)1937, English text Sherwood 1966 (pp. 124–126). Klima also mentions a text to the same effect from Garland the Computist (eleventh century), cited in Henry 1984 (pp. 85–86). See also Rijk 1962–1967 (II-2, p. 730), and the discussion in Klima, ‘Introduction to Summulae’, xlv–xlvii, in Buridan 2001.

⁶SL P II.14. Ockkam 1980 (p. 123).

⁵Others in addition to Ockham include Roger Bacon (see Braakhuis 1977) and Robert Kilwardby (see Ebbesen 1986).

⁷He says:

… any affirmative proposition in which the name ‘chimaera’ or one just like it, taken significatively, is either the subject or the predicate is, strictly speaking, false … if the terms supposit significatively, then ‘A chimaera is a chimaera’ is, strictly speaking, false. Ockkam 1980 (II.14, p. 123).

  Note the use of ‘true’ and ‘false’ as applied to terms of a proposition. This is the same distinction we will find below in Descartes and Arnauld.

⁸ Summa logicae II.4, Ockkam 1980 (pp. 98–100).

⁹ Sophismata, chapter 1, Sophism 6, 5th Conclusion. Buridan 2001 (p. 834). See the discussion in Ashworth 1977.

¹⁰ Section 4.3.4, Buridan 2001.

¹¹ Section 4.3.4, Buridan 2001.

¹²The discussion here and below draws in Part on DM XXXI.12.44 and 45; Vivès XXVI.296.:

44. It seems to me that this controversy derives entirely from the multiple signification of the copula is which joins the extremes of these propositions, for it can be taken in two ways: first, so that it signifies the actual and real conjunction of the extremes that exist in the thing itself, for example, when man is an animal is said, it is signified that the thing itself exists (significetur reipsa ita esse); second, so that it signifies that the predicate exists as the subject's ratio, whether or not the extremes exist. In the former sense the propositions’ truth depends without doubt on the existence of the extremes because the union does not remove the tense from the signification of the word is, or – what is the same thing – is signifies a real and actual duration. For when existence [at a time, as indicated by its present tense] is taken away, there is nothing there [nulla est]; and therefore, such a proposition is false because it is affirmed of a subject that does not stand for anything [non-supponente]. It is also in this sense that the rationes conforming to the facts well establish that the truth of these sentences depends on the efficient cause on which the existence of the extremes depends. Further, it is established not only that a created essence, taken absolutely, has an efficient cause, but also that ‘the application of the essence’ [applicationem essentiae] (as I call it) to this thing has an efficient cause, i.e. not only that a man or an animal has an efficient cause but also that a-man's-being-an-animal, itself a thing, [hominem reipsa esse animal] has an efficient cause. For, even though action and efficiency are not ‘two’ [duplex], it is one thing to be a man, and another for a man to be an animal, even though when a man is brought into being, so is the other. They differ only in this: when the thing [i.e. a man] is conceived by us, it is signified ‘complexly’ [complexe] by the words man is an animal; the thing itself, however, comes to be through a simple action in that it comes to be a thing that is both man and animal inasmuch as in the thing man and animal are the same. Hervaeus teaches this at length (Quodl. I, q. 10, whom Lavell defended, in Metaph. V, q. 12, ‘Against Soncinas’, ibid. V. q. 10, who clearly employs the double meaning explained.) Thus, it is in this same signification [of the copula, namely the first sense of above] that our claim is being made that existence is not separated from essence without the destruction and removal of that same essence. Nor can the objection be sustained, which was advanced earlier against our proposal relative to this sense, for when existence is taken away from an actual thing, it is denied that propositions are true in which essential predicates in this sense are said of subjects, for, as it is true, as it says in Categories (in the chapter on substance) concerning substance, ‘when primary substance is taken away, it is impossible that anything remains’, and in the same way Averroes said (Phys. I, com. 63) that when a thing ceases to exist, its name and definition are lost as well.

45. Certainly in another sense propositions are true even if the extremes do not exist, and in this sense they are necessary and perpetual truths, for since the copula is in this sense does not signify existence, it does not attribute actual reality to the extremes in themselves, and therefore does not require for its truth either existence or actual reality. Further, this view is defended in the authors mentioned earlier because propositions in this sense are reduced to a hypothetical or conditioned sense [sensum hypotheticum seu conditionatum], for when we abstract from a tense and say that man is an animal, we say only the nature of man is such that it would not be possible for a man to exist unless it was an animal. Hence, just as the conditional if it is a man, it is an animal, is perpetual or if it runs, it is moved, so too this is perpetual: man is an animal is perpetual, or running is a motion. From this it also true that these connections, in this sense, do not have an efficient cause because every efficiency is terminated in an actual existent from which the stated propositions understood in this sense abstract. And those arguments that Soncinas collected in the place cited establishes only this. Indeed, these connections, understood in this sense, not only do not require an efficient cause in act, neither, in truth, does it appear necessary to postulate one in potency – if we rest on their truth understood formally and precisely. This can be maintained on the basis of the argument already given about a conditional proposition whose truth does not depend on an efficient cause or on the power to effect [something], and therefore does not require, and therefore neither [efficient cause nor the power to affect something] is found in things that are impossible, or possible [but not actual]. For both of these conditionals are equally true: if a stone is an animal, then it is sensible, and if a man is an animal, it is sensible. Also, therefore, this proposition every animal is sensible does not [for its truth] depend, in itself [per se], on a cause that can effect an animal. Hence, if per impossibile there were no efficient causes [and hence no actual entities or actual truths], that sentence would nevertheless be true, just as this would be true: a chimera is a chimera, and similar examples. If we can make a distinction among necessary, conceptual or sentential connections between possible things and real essences or between invented things [res fictitas] and beings of reason, it is because among these there is such a necessary connection [as described above] conforming to an intrinsic disposition [habitudinem] of extremes abstracted from actual existence, so that it is possible for actual existence to be so ordered, and all of this can be signified by the copula is, so that it even it abstracts from tense – as when it is said man is a rational animal, it is signified that man has a real essence definable in this way, or (what is the same thing) that man is such a being [ens], one that is not invented [fictum] but real, or at least possible, and on account of this the truth of such sentences depends on a cause potent enough to affect the existence of the terms. But, really, among invented entities [in entibus fictitiis] necessary connections only come to be if they lack a disposition [sine habitudine], and even relative to one that is possible, it only could come to be an existing thing in the manner ordered by the imagination or as a mental fiction [solum per ordinem ad imaginationem seu fictionem mentis]. Thus, when this sense is adopted, the proposed objection against our assertion is stymied because though connections might be necessary independently of existence, the essences signified by these connections, if they are deprived of existence, nonetheless are not true or actual entities.

¹³ DM XXXI.12.44.

¹⁴ DM XXXI.12.44 cont.

¹⁵ DM XXXI.12.44 cont.

¹⁶ DM XXXI.12.44 cont.

¹⁷ DM XXXI.12.45.

¹⁸ DM XXXI.2.1. Vivès XXVI.229.

¹⁹ DM XXXI.2.10. Vivès XXVI.232.

²⁰DM XXXI.2.1, Vivès XXVI.229.

²¹Of pre-Cartesian semantic explanations of how concepts signify objects outside the mind, two are relevant to the Cartesian semantics of Arnauld and Malebranche: those that like Arnauld appeal to objective being, and those that like Malebranche appeal to divine illumination. The literature on objective being in medieval philosophy is substantial. For a broad discussion see Pasnau 1997. On Scotus’ and Suárez's use of objective being to explain God's ideas and their role in creation, as well as eternal truths, see: Cronin 1966, Normore 1986. Extended use of Neoplatonic ideas in semantics by medieval logicians is rare because they wer generally skeptical of robust Platonism. Malebranche accepts two key views that are distinctly Neoplatonic: that the direct objects of knowledge are ideas and the semantic relation ideas bear to the material objects is explained as a causal relation of ontic privation. To find any account similar in philosophy antecedent to Malebrance and as detailed in its semantics as his one must go back to Proclus. See Martin 2004.

²² DM XXXI.12.45 cont.

²³ DM XXXI.12.45 cont.

²⁵ Meditation V.05, AT 7.64, 76–77. English translations of the Meditations are from Descartes 2007–2010.

²⁶ Meditation 3.14; 7:41.26–29. III.6, AT 7.37,36.\newline See also Meditation. 5; 7:65.2–6, and 5; 7:64.6–9.

²⁴Response to 6th set of Objections, VI: HR II, 238; Pléiade 535, AT 7, 431–433.

²⁷See Suárez, DM XXXI.12.46. Vivès XXVI.298.

²⁸He distinguishes assertion from the possession of an ‘image’, roughly awarenss of a sensation, De anima III,8, 432a8-14. Truth and falsity, he says, require combination, but intuition is a ‘simple thought’. He says (De anima III,6, 430a25-b6):

The thinking then of the simple objects of thought is found in those cases where falsehood is impossible: where the alternative of true or false applies, there we always find a putting together of objects of thought in a quasi-unity. As Empedocles said that ‘where heads of many a creature sprouted without necks’ they afterwards by Love's power were combined, so here too objects of thought which were given separate are combined, e.g. ‘incommensurate’ and ‘diagonal’: if the combination be of objects past or future the combination of thought includes in its content the date. For falsehood always involves a synthesis; for even if you assert that what is white is not white you have included not white in a synthesis. It is possible also to call all these cases division as well as combination. However that may be, there is not only the true or false assertion that Cleon is white but also the true or false assertion that he was or will be white. In each and every case that which unifies is mind.

  In another place (De partibus animalium A I,16a13-19) he points out that even if the individuals in intuition were to have names, these alone are still pre-propositional and do not allow for truth or falsity:

Nouns and verbs, provided nothing is added, are like thoughts without combination or separation; ‘man’ and ‘white’, as isolated terms, are not yet either true or false. In proof of this, consider the word ‘goat-stag’. It has significance, but there is no truth or falsity about it, unless ‘is’ or ‘is not’ is added, either in the present or in some other tense.

²⁹ De anima III,6, 430a25-b6, De partibus animalium I,16a13-19.

³⁰ De veritate, q. 1 a. 3 co.

[51615] It is to be said that just as ‘the true’ is to be found more in the intellect than in things, so also is putting together and dividing more to be found in that act of the intellect than in its the act that consists of being informed by the quiddity of a thing. For the essence (ratio) of truth consists in the equality of the thing and the intellect; the same thing moreover is not being made equal to itself, but rather it is an equality of distinct things; whence the idea of truth is primarily found as belonging to the intellect when the intellect first comes to possess something unique to itself, which is not possessed by the thing outside the soul, but rather the thing outside the soul has something corresponding to it, such that between the two equality can be achieved. The intellect moreover when being informed with the quiddity of a thing does not possess only a similitude to the thing existing outside the soul, as the sensation does to the degree that it receives the sensible species.

[54811] … And therefore Augustine says that while man can do some things not willingly, it is not possible for him to believe without willing. Therefore it is patently clear from what was said that in that operation of the intellect by which it forms the simple quiddities of things, assent only occurs when there is something true or false; for we are not said to assent to something unless we inhear in it as something true.

³¹Note that though the application of false to an entire sentence is historically, and therefore lexically, earlier than its application to a subject term alone because the former was extended to the latter, once both usages are a fixed part of metatheory, it is a necessary condition for the truth of the sentence that its subject be non-false, and therefore the historically secondary usage becomes logically prior.

³² Meditations III.06, AT 7.13, 37.

³³ Meditations III.19-20; AT 7.43, 45–47.

³⁴ Meditations III.6. AT 7.37, 37. The text literally reads:

consist in this that I might judge that ideas, which are in me, are similar to things posited as external to me but without conforming [to them]. [Praecipuus autem error et frequemtissimus qui possit in illis reperiri, consistit in eo quod ideas, quae in me sunt, iudicem rebus quibusdam extra me positis similes esse siue conformes…].

³⁵ LAP IV, 13, KM 398, B 263. In the first edition of 1662 the text continues:

On the contrary, possibility [i.e. even a single possible instance, a possibilium] is a sure mark of the truth with respect to what is recognized as possible, whenever it is a question only of the essence of things. For the mind cannot conceive anything [concerning essences] as possible unless it conceives it as true according to its existence. Thus when a geometer conceived that a line could be described by four or five different motions, he never took the trouble actually to draw the line, because it was enough for it to be possible in order for him to consider it as true, and to reason based on this assumption.

In this additional remark the authors seem to be making what is essentially a point in modal logic, that if a proposition is about essences (which would be either necessarily true or necessarily false) and is also possibly true, then it is in fact necessary:

³⁶For further discussion of the concept of a false idea in Arnauld see Martin 2010.

³⁷ LAP I.2.

³⁸For Logic’s commitment to occasionalism see LAP I,2, KM 5,133, B 30; Discours II, KM V,122, B 33; I,9, KM V,157, B 49–50.

³⁹ LAP I.vii, KM 151-2, B 45; KM 145, B 40; KM 248, B 130, and KM 250, B 131.

⁴⁰ LAP I.vi, KM 145, B 59. See note 51 below.

⁴¹On singular propositions being a special case of universal see LAP II, 2, KM V,191, B 84.

⁴²On Arnauld's use of objective being see VFI chapter 6, KM I,204, G 71–71; LAP I,2, KM V,134, B 30; VFI chapter 4, KM I,193, 198–199, 200–201, G 61, 66, 68.

⁴³Brown makes a case for Descartes as the source in modern philosophy for Brentano's notion of intentionality. Descartes, however, says very little about semantics and scarcely anything that could be construed as a theory of reference. It is Arnauld and Nicole in the Art of Thinking who first lay out in a systematic way how a term's objective being determines its ‘modal content’ and thereby what it signifies. Brown 2007. Also, Brown 2000.

⁴⁴On signification see LAP I.2 and II. 27 and 28. On connotative terms see LAP I,8, KM V,153, B 46.

⁴⁵ LAP I,v.

⁴⁶See LAP, Discours I, p. 24, KM V, 11–113, B 11–12.

⁴⁷ Predicable is systematically ambiguous in LAP. When predicables are identified in the Logic as varieties of common nouns, they are abstract ideas. They are modes of the soul, not modes of bodies outside the mind. The two substantial predicables, genus and species, are always understood this way in the Logic. Though the Arnauld and Nicole speak straightforwardly as realists about the existence of extra-mental modes, they do not identify species or genera with extra-mental Boethian universals. Rather, they are purely spiritual. However, in the Logic’s ontology, difference, proprium and accident have already been introduced as terms that stand for modes, which in general exist outside the mind and inhear in extra-mental subjects. But the mind also has ideas that signify these three sorts of extra-mental predicable modes – second intentions in medieval logic – and these go by the same name in an ambiguous terminolgoy. Thus, an idea of difference, which is a mental mode, that has as its content an extra-mental difference, and hence signifies substances that instantiate that difference. Likewise an idea that signifies a proprium is called a proprium and one signifying an accident is called an accident.\newline In the main discussion of the five predicables (I,vii) it is clear that in the paragraphs devoted to genera and species, these two are identified with ideas. The authors says literally that genera and species are (être) ideas. But in the paragraphs explaining difference, proprium and accident the meaning of these terms is ambiguous. There the authors use the expression idea of difference, proprium and accident. The ambiguity lies in the genitive construction idea of (idée de). It can be read as the descriptive genitive, as in the genitive in he is a man of no character. On this reading an idea of a difference would refer to an idea of the sort that was literally a difference. That is, difference, proprium and accident would be ideas. On the other hand, idea of could be understood as the possessive genitive, as in the dog of the man. Philosophers use this sense to talk about the object that is paired with an idea, as does Arnauld in his standard example the idea of Alexander. Here Alexander is a thing in the world, not an idea. On this reading the three predicables difference, proprium, accident would in general not be ideas but modes in the world that inhere in subjects.\newline Though the use of the genitive is in principle open to both readings, the authors’ intention is clearly the second. They have already explained that they think modes exist, and in the case of accident have said explicitly in the section on the categories (I.iii) that the non-substantial categories are called as a group accidents. But in the section on the predicables under discussion the subject is the idea of accident. If the authors are here to be understood as using the descriptive genitive, they can be charged with equivocation. In the earlier section an accident is understood as a mode, but in this section it would be an idea. If they are here using a possessive construction, then the text may be read univocally using accident in both places to refer to a mode. This reading is the simpler and more straightforward. It avoids an equivocation and fits the authors’ earlier remarks on ontology. But on this reading we are forced into an interpretation in which the predicables are treated unequally. The first two, genera and species, are literally universal ideas, but the last three, difference, proprium, and accident, are extra-mental modes of which we also have corresponding abstract ideas of difference, proprium, and accident. Such seems to be the Logic’s view.

⁴⁸ LAP I,9, KM V,157–158, B 49–50.

⁴⁹ LAP I,2, KM V,136, B 32.

⁵⁰ LAP I,9, KM V,163, B 54.

⁵¹ LAP II,4, KM V,201, B 86.

⁵²The ideas inferior to a species is called its extension. Comprehension and extension are defined as follows (LAP I.6, KM 145, B 59):

I call the comprehension of an idea the attributes that it contains in itself, and that cannot be removed without destroying the idea. For example, the comprehension of the ideas of triangle contains extension, shape, three lines, three angles, and the equality of these three angles to the two right angles, etc. I call the extension of an idea the subjects to which this idea applies. These are also called the inferiors of a general term, which is superior with respect to them. For example, the idea of triangle in general extends to all the different species of triangles.

⁵³On the truth-conditions for the universal affirmative see LAP II.17, KM 147–149, B 129–131).

⁵⁴See LAP 1:12, KM V, 170–175, B 60–63.

⁵⁵On the rejection of representational realism see: VFI chapter 1, KM I,190; G 58; chapter 4, KM I, 192–2, G 60–62.

⁵⁶In this the Logic holds to a general pattern of eschewing the complexities of medieval semantics. Likewise it totally ignores the rich resources of supposition theory, though both supposition and application theory were still being expounded in various logical manuals of the day. For Arnauld's principled rejection of possibilia see ‘Arnauld to Leibniz’, 13 May 1686, KM VI, pp. 31–32:

I acknowledge in good faith that I have no idea of substances purely possible, that is to say, which God will never create. I am inclined to think that these are chimeras which we construct and that whatever we call possible substances, pure possibilities are nothing else than the omnipotence of God who, being a pure act, does not allow of there being a possibility in him. Possibilities, however, may be conceived of in the natures which he has created, for, not being of the same essence throughout, they are necessarily composites of power and action. I can therefore think of them as possibilities. I can also do the same with an infinity of modifications which are within the power of these created natures, such as are the thoughts of intelligent beings, and the forms of extended substance. But I am very much mistaken if there is any one who will venture to say that he has an idea of a possible substance as pure possibility. As for myself, I am convinced that, although there is so much talk of these substances which are pure possibilities, they are, nevertheless, always conceived of only under the idea of some one of those which God has actually created. We seem to me, therefore, able to say that outside of the things which God has created, or must create, there is no mere negative possibility but only an active and infinite power.

Because Arnauld rejects possible beings and does not appeal to ampliation, I think the reconstruction by Bas van Fraassen of Arnauld's theory of comprehension as extensions of possible object points in logical space, though capturing the sort of meaning relations Arnauld would like, does not cleave very closely to his ontology. See Van Fraassen 1967.

Suárez, in contrast, clearly identities the objective being of ideas in God's mind with possibilia. See DM XXXI.2,6 Vivès XXVI.30; DM XXXI.2,8, Vivès XXVI.23; DM XXXI.2,10, Vivès XXVI.232. Descartes too seems to treat objective being in his sense as possibilia. See Normore 1986.

⁵⁷ Search after Truth (hereafter Search) I.3.2; LO 14-15; OC 1:63. Search VI.2.vi.; Elucidation VI, OC 3:66–66, LO 575.

⁵⁸See Search III.2.i; OC 1:414–5; LO 217-18; and TL I, OC 6:217, and Also Réponse du Père Malebranche au Livre des fausses Idées VI:vi, OC 6:58, S p. 317.

⁵⁹See Elucidation VIII,20, OC 3:85–86, LO 586-7.

⁶⁰All knowledge, which is through God's ideas, is necessary, immutable, and eternal. TL I, OC 6:199–200; LO 217-1.

⁶¹See the discussion of Olivi in Pasnau 1997.

⁶² Elucidation X, OC3:136, LO 617.

Elucidation X, OC 3:141–143, LO 621.

Elucidation X, OC 3:151–153, LO 626-8.

⁶³For a general review of Malebranche's arguments see N, chapter 2, and chapter 4. p 108 ff.

⁶⁵ Elucidation X, OC 3:149, LO 625.

⁶⁴ Search I.4.i. OC 1:66, LO 16; Search I.1.2, OC 1:48, LO 5.

⁶⁶ TL I, OC 6:217. Also see note 51 above, and Réponse du Père Malebranche au Livre des fausses Idées VI:vi,xii, OC 6:58,60, S p. 317, 319.

⁶⁷ Elucidation X, OC 3:136, LO 617.

⁶⁸Suárez offers the same truth-conditions for essential propositions: the sameness of the objective being in the mind of God to which the terms correspond. DM XXXI.12.46. Vivès XXVI.298. DM XXXI.12.45. Vivès XXVI.297.

⁶⁹ Search III.2.vi, OC 1:444, LO 234.

⁷⁰ Search III.2.vi., OC 1:444, LO 234. Also, Search III.2.vi, OC 1:444, LO 234.

⁷¹Examples include mathematics, essential truths, speculative and moral principles, eternal laws. Dialogues, Preface OC 12:18; Response OC 6.64. For an example of one of the many quotations in which Malebranche quotes views similar to his in Augustine see OC 9:933.

⁷²The discussion will explain why, contrary to Nadler's interpretation, Malebranche holds to a resemblance theory of reference. This is not the resemblance of a concept resembling its referent because the very same mode, or an ‘intentional’ version of it, has traveled by Aristotelian sensation and abstraction from the referent to the concept, which is the kind of resemblance found in medieval accounts like that of Aquinas. Rather it is the resemblance characteristic of Platonic theory in which an idea resembles the material objects that participate in it because the objects are less perfect or incomplete versions of the idea. Compare N pp. 45–49.

⁷³ Search III.2.x; OC 1:474, LO 252.

⁷⁹ Elucidation X, OC 3:151–153, LO 626-8.

⁷⁴In Malebranche ideas are exemplar causes. OC 17:1, 307–8.

⁷⁵ Elucidation X, OC3:136 LO 617. Also, Elucidation X OC3:136, LO 61;\\ Elucidation X, OC 3:138, LO 617-18; Elucidation X, OC 3:137–138.

⁷⁶ Dialogues, Preface OC 12:12; and OC 12:19.

⁷⁷Proclus describes the part-whole ordering in a triad of progressively diminutive parts: ‘Every whole is either a whole-before-the parts, a whole-of-the-parts, or a whole-in-the-parts’. Elements of Theology, Proposition 70. Proclus 1963 (pp. 66–67).

⁷⁸See In platonic parmenidem, Proclus 1987 (p. 416). On Proclus's semantics see Martin 2001. Reprinted in Martin 2004.

⁸⁰ Dialogue I, Malebranche 1997a (p. 17).

⁸¹ Elucidation X, OC 3:153-154. LO 626-27.

⁸² Search, Elucidation VI OC 3.66, OC 3:65–66, LO 575.

⁸³For representative texts explaining sensation see Elucidation X OC 3:141–143, LO 621), and

Response VI, OC 6:61, N 16.

Response VI, OC 6:55.

Elucidation X, OC 3:141–143, LO 621 cited in notes 61 and 82 above.

Elucidation X, OC 3:136, LO 617;

Réponse de Père Malebranche au Livre des vraie et des fausses Idées, VI:xii, OC 6:60–61, S p.319, XII as quoted in note 64.

⁸⁴ Elucidation X, LO 626-8, OC 3:151–153.