The Changing Demographics of the U.S. Southern Security Perimeter: A First Look at the Numbers

This paper attempts to use available demographic data to cast light on trends indicative of, or potentially supportive of, an accretion of security threats from what has been termed “the U.S. southern security perimeter”: the USA's interface with Latin America and the Caribbean. Available data on fertility, urbanization, religious affiliation and migration suggest that many local demographic trends defy prevailing North American stereotypes for the region—and that the significance of these emerging trends thus remains imperfectly recognized and poorly appreciated in Washington.

This paper is a revised and extended version of a study originally prepared for the Long Range Strategy Project. Thanks are due Dr. Todd M. Johnson, Director of the Center for the Study of Global Christianity at Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, for generously permitting me to draw upon the World Christian Database. Thanks also go to the staff of the UN Population Division for Patiently answering so many of the author's questions. This Paper benefited from research assistance from Ms. Assia Dosseva, Ms. Karla Heredzik, and Mrs. Coutney Myers. A special salute is due to Mr. Christopher Griffin and Ms. Megan Davy, whose gentle but insistent proddings forced the author to clarify his own thinking on a number of substantive points. Any errors still remaining in the paper are the authors own.

Notes

1. Cf. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002).

2. Schultz's memorable phrase can be found inter alia in Faye Bowers, “U.S.-Mexican border as a terror risk,”Christian Science Monitor, March 22, 2005, p. 1.

3. The only extant state within the “southern security perimeter” to have posed such a threat is Castro's Cuba—but Cuban international policy has been principally preoccupied with regime survival since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and has grown even more quietist since 9/11. Some current governments in the region are of course unfriendly or even somewhat hostile to Washington, but an anti-American official posture does not prima facie constitute a security threat to the United States.

4. The polity change in the Latin America/Caribbean region can be described by a variety of metrics, but the assessments of the Freedom House Freedom in the World survey is as good as any other. In 1977, in the judgment of Freedom House, the Latin America/Caribbean area contained seven nations that were “not free,” ten nations that were “partly free,” and only six that were “free.” By 2004, only two countries in the region—Cuba and Haiti—were judged “not free,” while fully twenty-two were judged “free.” [Raymond D. Gastil, ed., Freedom in the World 1978 (New York: Freedom House, 1978), p. 21; Freedom in the World 2005—“Combined Average Ratings: Independent Countries,” http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2005/combined2005.pdf, accessed November 14, 2004.

5. To represent the many references through a few: Jeffrey Goldberg, “In The Party of God: Hezbollah Sets Up Operations in South America and the United States,” The New Yorker, October 28, 2002; Yarida Ferrer, “Politics-Colombia: Alleged IRA-FARC Ties Dampen Peace Prospects,” UPI, August 20, 2001; Glenn R. Simpson, Gordon Fairclough and Jay Solomon, “U.S. Probes Banks' North Korea Ties,” Wall Street Journal, September 8, 2005, p. A3; David Rosenzweig and Greg Krikorian, “2 Indicted in Plot to Sell Missiles,” Los Angeles Times, November 10, 2005, p. B1.

6. See Correio Braziliense, “Colombian Rebels Recruiting Brazilians on Shared Border,” August 25, 2005 (via BBC Monitoring); Steven Dudley, “Border Fighting Puts Nations on Edge: Violence Along the Border between Ecuador and Colombia has led to escalating tensions between the two nations,” Miami Herald, March 15, 2006; David Gollust, “U.S.: Colombian Terrorists Getting Refuge in Venezuela,” U.S. Fed News, August 4, 2005; Ana Arana, “How the Street Gangs Took Central America,” Foreign Affairs vol. 84, no. 3 (May/June 2005): 98–110.

7. Though there are other purported security issues for the United States that some writers adduce to Western Hemispheric demographic change—most notably, the now fashionable and increasingly voluminous literature on “environmental security” and “human security,”–we will not address any of those here.

8. To borrow Pitirim A. Sorokin's apt phrase. Pitirim A. Sorokin, Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1956).

9. Steven A. Holmes, “After Standing Up To Be Counted, Americans Number 281,421,906,” New York Times, December 28, 2000, P. A1.

10. Cf. United Nations, Demographic Yearbook 2000, (New York: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2002), Table 15. The UN Statistics Division designates as “virtually complete” those systems in which 90% or more of the vital events are estimated to be registered.

11. U.S. Bureau of the Census, “Census Dates for Countries and Areas of Latin America and the Caribbean: 1945 to 2014,” http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/cendates/cenlac.html; accessed November 15, 2005. Note, however, that official reports from the Nicaraguan and the Peruvian governments indicate that national population counts were in fact conducted in both countries in the year 2005; cf. Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Información, “Censo 2005: X de Población y V de Vivienda,” http://www.inei.gob.pe/cpv2005/ and Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, “Cien Años de Vida Censal,” http://www.inec.gob.ni/. As of May 2006, in any case, no new census data are available for either Peru or Nicaragua.

12. In this paper we will be discussing “period” TFRs rather than “cohort” TFRs. The latter track the actual childbearing patterns of a given group of women from their birth year through the end of their childbearing years; the former offers a sort of “snapshot” for a society at a particular year in time, creating a synthetic rate for the society as a whole by summing the current patterns of teens, twenty-year olds, thirty-somethings, etc.

13. The figure of 2.1 is only an approximation of the actual replacement fertility level (i.e. for one mother to replace herself with one grown daughter), since that depends technically upon both the mortality schedule for babies between birth and childbearing ages and also the sex ratio at birth for infants.

14. CONAPO, “Indicadores Demográficos Básicos,” available electronically at http://www.conapo.gob.mx/00cifras/00indicadores/00.xls, accessed November 15, 2005.

15. Cf. Rudolfo A. Bulatao and John B. Casterline, eds., Global Fertility Transition (New York: Population Council, 2001).

16. Chris Wilson and Gilles Pison, “More Than half the Population Lives Where Fertility is Below the Replacement Level,” Population and Societies, no. 405 (October 2004), 1–4.

17. Cf. David Bloom, David Canning and Jaypee Sevilla, The Demographic Dividend: A New Perspective on the Economic Consequences of Population Change (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., 2003).

18. To mention just a few of the many studies in this area: John G. Haaga, Mechanisms for the Association of Maternal Age, Parity, and Birth Spacing with Infant Health (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., Note N-2991-RF, 1991); Mark R. Montgomery and Cynthia B. Lloyd, “Fertility and Maternal and Child Health,” in D. A. Ahlburg, A. C. Kelley and K. Oppenheim Mason, The Impact of Population Growth on Well-Being in Developing Countries (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1996), pp. 37–65; and Ricardo Hausman and Miguel Szekely, “Inequality and the Family in Latin America,” in Nancy Birdsall, Allen C. Kelley, and Steven W. Sinding, eds., Population Matters: Demographic Change, Economic Growth, and Poverty in the Developing World, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 260–295.

19. To cite but a few important studies here: William Goode, World Revolution and Family Patterns (New York: Free Press, 1970); John C. Caldwell, Theory of Fertility Decline (New York: Academic Press, 1982); Nora Federici, Karen Oppenheim Mason, and Solvi Sogner, eds., Women's Position and Demographic Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); and Goran Therborn, Between Sex and Power: Family in the World, 1900–2000 (New York: Routledge, 2004).

20. Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics (Paris: OECD, 2003).

21. ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America (Santiago, Chile: United Nations, 2004), 163.

22. At the risk of belaboring the point, I reiterate that the driving force behind the fertility revolution in the southern security perimeter—as in all other societies that have witnessed secular and sustained fertility declines—is a widespread change in norms about desired family size. Despite all the hopes invested in them by population activists and others, voluntary family planning programs simply instrumentalize those parental preferences—typically with little independent effect on birth levels. This point is demonstrated by Lant Pritchett, “Desired Fertility and the Impact of Population Policies,” Population and Development Review, vol. 20, no. 1 (March 1994):1–55.

23. Cf. Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order (New York: Free Press 1999).

24. UNPD, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision Database, available electronically at http://esa.un.org/unup/; accessed November 15, 2005.

25. UNPD, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision—Data Tables and Highlights, Table A-1, available electronically at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wup2003/2003WUPHighlights.pdf; accessed November 15, 2005; Idem, Urban Agglomerations 2003, available electronically at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wup2003/2003UrbanAgglomeration2003_Web.xls; accessed November 15, 2005.

26. Sara Hilbert and Victoria Lawson, “Urbanization and Global Change,” in Global Change and Urbanization in Latin America (Association of American Geographers, 1997), available from http://www.aaag.hdgc/www/urban/toc.html.

27. Ellen Wratten, “Conceptualizing Urban Poverty,” Environment & Urbanization, vol. 7, no. 21 (April 1995): 19.

28. Caroline Moser, Ailsa Winton and Annalise Moser in Marianne Fay, ed., Directions in Development: The Urban Poor in Latin America (The World Bank, 2005), p. 127.

29. In 1994, nationwide homicide rates were 50–60 per 100,000 in Columbia and 164 per 100,000 in El Salvador. By way of comparison: the 1994 homicide rate for Washington D. C.—then infamously known as the “murder capital of the United States”—was 70.0. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1996, Table 313.

30. In Columbia, for example, state and private security forces were reportedly responsible for some 241 extrajudicial killings between October 2000 and September 2001. Moser et. al, 134.

31. T. R. Reid, “Church of Sweden Is Thriving On Its Own,” Washington Post, December 29, 2000, p. A24.

32. Phil Zuckerman, “Atheism: Contemporary Rates and Patterns,” in Michael Martin, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Atheism (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), available electronically at http://www.pitzer.edu/academics/faculty/zuckerman/atheism.html; accessed December 1, 2005.

33. For example, David Martin, Tongues on Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America (Cambridge, MA: B. Blackwell, 1990).

34. A recently published National Defense University monograph, for example, asserts that “close to 150,000 illegal Chinese immigrants” have “establish[ed] themselves in Panama” in the past several years. LTC Raul Rosado, United States National Security Strategy: Implications and Repercussions in Latin America (Washington, DC: Inter-American Defense College, May 2005), p. 25.

35. Cf. Stan Lehman, “Argentine Terror Alarms Brazilian Jews,” Associated Press, August 19, 1994. The estimate of 500,000 Muslims in Brazil has been around for some time: as far back as 1990, the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, a Saudi-funded research group, was using the figure of half a million Muslims in Brazil for the year 1980. “Latin America's Muslims: A Guide,” Latin America Research Report, WR-90-31 (August 16, 1990). Since then, Islamic activists have made even greater claims. See, for example, “Two Million Muslims In Brazil,” Malaysia General News, January 25, 1999. It is commonly stated that Brazil includes about 10 million people of Arab descent, although the overwhelming majority of these are considered Christians. Cf. Stan Lehman, “Arab Foods, Arab Roots Sink Deeply into South American Culture,” Associated Press, May 23, 2005.

36. “Saudis Building Mosque in Argentine Capital,” Reuters, January 22, 2000.

37. Raymond Chickrie, “The Afghan Muslims of Guyana and Suriname,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 22, no. 2 (October 2002), 382–399. Note also that where Figure 18 suggests roughly 8% of Guyana to be Muslim, alternative numbers from Muslim groups in the late 1990s placed the total at about 12%. Raymond Chickrie, “Muslims in Guyana: History, Traditions, Conflict and Change,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 19, no. 2 (October 1999): 181–195.

38. Interestingly enough, the World Christian Database suggests about two-fifths of Cuba's current inhabitants might be either nonbelievers or what it calls “spiritists”; slightly over half are said to be Christian.

39. Curtis C. Connell, “Understanding Islam and Its Impact on Latin America,” (Alabama: Maxwell Air Force Base, 2004): p.26.

40. Natascha Garvin, “Conversion & Conflict: Muslims in Mexico,” ISIM Review, vol.15 (Spring 2005): 18–19.

41. “Argentine Terror Alarms Brazilian Jews,” Following the 1992 and 1994 anti-Semitic attacks, an intercepted telephone call from Iranian Embassy demonstrated Tehran's involvement in the attacks and led to the expulsion of all but one member of the embassy's staff. See Curtis C. Connell, Understanding Islam and Its Impact in Latin America (Alabama: Maxwell Air Force Base, 2004), p. 30.

42. Jens Gluesing, “Islam is Gaining a Foothold in Chiapas,” Der Spiegel, May 28, 2005.

43. There are relatively limited data on the intensity of religious belief among self-professed adherents for the Latin American region, but such data as are available also seem consistent with this proposition. The Gallup International polling group, for example, conducted a worldwide opinion survey in late 1999, questioning over 57,000 adults in 60 different countries on a wide range of issues, including their religious beliefs. This “Gallup International Millennium Survey” reported that the proportion of respondents “belonging to any religious denomination” was slightly higher in Latin America than in North America (96% vs. 91%). No surprise there, one might argue. On the other hand, when interviewees were asked if they “attended religious services regularly,” a significantly higher proportion responded positively in North America than in Latin America (47% vs. 35%). [Gallup International, “Religion In The World At The End Of The Millennium,” available electronically at http://www.gallup-international.com/ContentFiles/millennium15.asp; accessed November 30, 2005.

By the same token: Zuckerman's study on contemporary patterns of global atheism observes that only four Latin American/Caribbean countries appear to make the global “top 50” with respect to proportion of agnostics and atheists in total population, according to survey data (Uruguay, #39 at 12%; Argentina, #46 at 7%; Dominican Republic, #48 at 7%. Cuba is ranked #49 at a guessed 7%. By way of comparison, the United States is ranked #44 at 3%-9%.) Yet while just 12% of Uruguay's population is said to be agnostic or atheistic, the same study cites a source that “claim[s] 30–50% of Uruguayans have no ‘religious allegiance.”’ “Atheism: Contemporary Rates and Patters.”

While such sounds are insufficient to establish this as fact, it may well be the case that religiosity may be rather less intense these days than North Americans are accustomed to assuming for a significant proportion of the populace of the “southern security perimeter.”

44. UNPD, “International Migration: 2002,” available electronically at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/ittmig2002/WEB_migration_wallchart.xls; accessed December 1, 2005.

45. ECLAC, “International Migration, Human Rights and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean: Summary and Conclusions,” March 2006, 15.

46. Nacional Migration Institute of Mexico; “Propuesta de Política Migratoria Integral en la Frontera Sur de México,” (Mexico City, Mexico, 2005).

47. Statistical Abstract of the United States 2003, Table 48.

48. OECD, SOPEMI 2001 edition, p. 209.

49. “Official Views Alarming Entry of Illegals Through Country's South,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS), February 4, 2001.

50. “Mexico: National Migration Institute To Issue ID Cards for Mexicans in US,” FBIS, November 24, 2001. In the year 2005, according to an announcement by President Vicente Fox, Mexico deported a total of 240,000 people, mainly back to Central America. Stephan Dinan, “Fox Vows Crackdown on Illegals,” Washington Times, April 2, 2006, p. A1.

51. “Nicaragua: Binational Meeting Studies Illegal Immigration,” FBIS, Thursday, May 15, 1997.

52. Ibid.

53. “Salvadoran President Lambastes Congress for Delay in Anti-Gang Law,” FBIS, August 16, 2003.

54. Notimex News Agency, May 6, 2003, translated as “Panama Deports More Than 500 Foreigners, Mostly Colombians, in Four Months,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, June 20, 2003.

55. El Nacional(Caracas), January 27, 2001, (via Access World News).

56. El Nacional (Caracas), March 16, 2001, (via Access World News).

57. Todd Benson, “Doing Brazil's Dirty Work: Immigrants Are Said To Exploit Immigrants” New York Times, December 3, 2004.

58. Mario Osava, “Population-Mercosur: Illegal Immigrants to See Status Normalized,” Inter Press Service, November 8, 2002.

59. Ibid.

60. “Ecuador: Police To Deport Unregistered Foreigners As Of January,” FBIS, December 23, 2002.

61. Marcela Valente, “Rights-Argentina: Attacks On Immigrants: Racism Or Real Estate?,” Inter Press Service, June 30, 2000.

62. Viviana Alonso, “Rights-Argentina: A Tough Policy On Deporting Immigrants,” Inter Press Service, January 21, 2003.

63. “Dominican Army on Alert; Undocumented Haitians' Deportation Plan Gains Momentum,” FBIS, December 3, 2004.

64. “Dominican Organizations Concerned About Anti-Haitian Xenophobia,” FBIS, September 2, 2005.

65. US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 11, 2003, available electronically at http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2003/21276.htm; accessed December 1, 2005.

66. Illena Gomez et al, “Religious and Social Participation in War-Torn Area of El Salvador,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 41, no. 4: 56.

67. Caroline Moser, Ailsa Winton, and Annalise Moser in Marianne Fay, ed., Directions in Development: The Urban Poor in Latin America (The World Bank, 2005), p.138.

68. Thomas Davidson, “Terrorism and Human Smuggling Rings in South and Central America,” Terrorism Monitor, vol.3, no 22 (November 2005): 2. Even more potentially troubling are the unproved accusations that former Argentine president Carlos Menem accepted a $10 million bribe to cover up Iran's involvement in the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires. Davidson, 4.

69. Davidson, p. 4.