Nuclear Arms in Asia: Theory and Policy Issues

Abstract

Neither a balance of power model nor a balance of terror model can predict with assurance whether nuclear Asia will be stable or unstable. Even if fewer than eight states in Asia become nuclear weapons states, the problems of crisis management and escalation control, growing out of clashes between conventional armed forces, becomes harder to manage. As well, nuclear weapons have psychological effects on their owners, and not always predictable ones. Classic balance of power theory, written prior to the nuclear age, anticipated the use of small wars for intrasystemic adjustments without the elimination of major actors. Balance of terror theory regards small nuclear wars as possible escalators into larger ones. Europe's nuclear experience may be a misleading guide for twenty-first century Asia—with regard to the effects of both power and terror relationships.

Notes

1. Realist theory is ably presented and evaluated in John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), and in Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). For critiques and rejoinders on realist international systems theory, see the collection in John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman, eds., Realism and the Balance of Power: A New Debate (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 2003).

2. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 335 and passim.

3. Peter Douglas Feaver refers to this requirement for nuclear command and control systems as the “always-never” problem. See Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 12 and passim.

4. On the concept of the first and second nuclear ages, see Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999), and Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1996).

5. My division of the Cold War corresponds closely to Paul Bracken's distinction between two cold wars from 1947 to 1967 and from 1968 to 1991. See Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age (New York: Harper Collins, 1999), p. 100.

6. Iran is an important conjectural conundrum. Expert assessments differ considerably with regard to present, let alone future, Iranian capabilities. Intelligence estimates made public by Israel stated that Iran could have a nuclear weapon by 2008. According to a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate of 2005, Iran could have a nuclear weapon by “early to mid-next decade”. See Orly Halpern, “Iranian Nukes: New Estimates for the Bomb”, The Jerusalem Post, August 1, 2005, p. 3, and Dafna Linzer, “Iran is Judged 10 Years from Nuclear Bomb”, The Washington Post, August 2, 2005, p. A1, cited in Michael Eisenstadt, “Deter and Contain: Dealing with a Nuclear Iran”, ch. 10 in Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, eds., Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, October, 2005), pp. 225–256, reference p. 250.

7. India presents an interesting case in this regard. Some prominent scholars and government security experts now anticipate an eventual all-azimuth Indian strategic nuclear force with land-and sea-based missiles and bomber-delivered weapons: perhaps 350–500 warheads in all, aimed at parity with other medium nuclear powers such as China and France. At least some Indian missiles, presumably ICBMs, would have intercontinental range. See bharat Karnad, “India's Force Planning Imperative: The Thermonuclear Option”, ch. 5 in D. R. SarDesai and Raju G. C. Thomas, Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002), pp. 105–138, esp. p. 127 on projected force structures.

8. The author gratefully acknowledges Dr. James Scouras for use of his AWSM@ model for making calculations and drawing charts. He is not responsible for modifications or applications in this study. For additional information, see Stephen J. Cimbala and James Scouras, A New Nuclear Century: Strategic Stability and Arms Control (New York: Praeger Publishers, 2002), pp. 25–73.