The Continued Importance of Geographic Distance and Boulding's Loss of Strength Gradient

Abstract

The loss of strength gradient (LSG), which demonstrates the importance of geographic distance and the advantage of forward basing, has been under attack. Proximity is supposedly becoming less important for prevailing in war. It is a view that has been expressed not only by President George W. Bush but even by the person who devised the LSG, Kenneth Boulding. As a result, it is being used as reason for the withdrawal of U.S. forces back to the American homeland. However, this view is flawed. Distance is retaining its importance as a result of two factors: the competitive nature of war and the impermanence of great-power status. The United States cannot withdraw forward-positioned forces and expect to maintain permanently the same power projection capabilities.

Notes

Notes

1. Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New York and London: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 262.

2. President George W. Bush, speech at Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention, Cincinnati, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 16 August 2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases

3. Kenneth Boulding, The Meaning of the 20th Century: The Great Transition (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1965), p. 87.

4. Boulding, 1963, p. 5; Kenneth Boulding, Stable Peace (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978), p. 105.

5. General James Jones, Statement, Military Construction Subcommittee Hearing, United States Senate Committee on Appropriations, 29 April 2003, http://appropriations.senate.gov

6. President George W. Bush, 16 August 2004.

7. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Story of the War in South Africa 1899–1900 (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Company, 1900), p. 85.

8. Royal Commission on the War in South Africa (RCWSA), (London: HMSO, 1903), vol. 2, p. 258, Appendix No. 38a.

9. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 139.

10. Ibid., vol. 1. Evidence, pp. 269–71.

11. Ibid., vol. 2. Evidence, p. 357.

12. Lt-Col. Sir E. P. C. Girouard, History of the Railways During the War in South Africa, 1899–1902 (London: HMSO, 1903), pp. 53, 55.

13. Calculated from statistics in RCWSA, 1903, vol. 2, p 222, Appendix No. 33.

14. RCWSA, 1903, vol. 2. Evidence, p. 384; Girouard, 1903, p. 21.

15. James K. Matthews and Cora J. Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast: United States Transportation Command and Strategic Deployment for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2002), p. 13.

16. Ibid., pp. 13, 126.

17. Prince Khaled Bin Sultan, Desert Warrior (London: HarperCollins, 1995), pp. 286, 297–9.

18. Ibid., pp. 284–5, 287; Lt-Gen. William G. Pagonis, Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), pp. 113–5.

19. Khaled, 1995, p. 296; Brad Lafferty, Richard Huhn, Ghoneim Al-Shaibani, Todd Behne, and Margaret Curran, “Gulf War Logistics: Theory into Practice,” Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL, April 1995, p. 16.

20. Khaled, 1995, p. 302; Pagonis, 1992, pp. 203–4.

21. Khaled, 1995, pp. 294, 298–9, 301; Pagonis, 1992, p. 205.

22. James A. Winnefeld, Preston Niblack, and Dana J. Johnson, A League of Airmen: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), p. 232.

23. Matthews and Holt, 2002, p. 17.

24. Pagonis, 1992, pp. 70, 208.

25. Ibid., pp. 70–1.

26. Ministry of Defence (MOD), The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons (London: HMSO, 1982), p. 6.

27. Major General Julian Thompson, The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict (Oxford: Brassey's, 1991), p. 257; Gordon Smith, Battles of the Falklands War (London: Ian Allan, 1989), p. 80.

28. Thompson, 1991, pp. 253, 281.

29. Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War: Volume III, The Afghan and Falklands Conflicts (London: Mansell, 1990), p. 262.

30. Céline Carrère and Maurice Schiff, “On the Geography of Trade: Distance is Alive and Well,” 3 February 2004, World Bank Working Paper No. 3206, p. 40, Table 1, http://econ.worldbank.org/view.php?id=33022

31. David Hummels, “Have International Transportation Costs Declined?,” University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, November 1999, p. 5 & Figure 1, http://www.mgmt.purdue.edu/faculty/hummelsd/research/decline/declined.pdf

32. Girouard, 1903, pp. 8, 39–40.

33. RCWSA, 1903, vol. 2, p 187, Appendix No. 28.

34. Matthews and Holt, 2002, pp. 126, 281–2. Calculated on the figure given that 75 percent of shipments were derived from the Gulf region.

35. Major William L. Brame, “Building the Storm,” Army Logistician, January–February 1993, pp. 15–6.

36. Smith, 1989, p. 96.

37. Ibid., p. 53.

38. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers (London: Fontana, 1989), pp. 570–1.

39. “B-2 Spirit” fact sheet, Federation of American Scientists, Washington, DC, 30 November 1999, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/bomber/b-2.htm

40. Kennedy, 1989, pp. 570–1.

41. James L. Barefield, “The Heavy Bomber Industrial Base: A Study of Present and Future Capabilities,” Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, March 1997, p. 15, retrieved from www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/bomber97-0070.pdf

42. John Pike, “B-2 Production,” globalsecurity.org, 28 April 2005, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/b-2-production.htm

43. “Boeing v. Airbus: Nose to Nose,” Economist, London, 23 June 2005, http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=4102185

44. RCWSA, 1903, vol. 2. Evidence, p. 490.

45. Ibid., vol. 2. Evidence, p. 487.

46. Ibid., vol. 2. Evidence, p. 492.

47. Calculated from statistics in RCWSA, 1903, vol. 2, p. 219, Appendix no. 33.

48. RCWSA, 1903, vol. 1, p. 93.

49. Calculated from statistics in RCWSA, 1903, vol. 1, pp. 85–6.

50. General Norman Schwartzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero (New York: Bantam, 1993), p. 437.

51. MOD, 1982, p. 25.

52. Sun Tzu, The Art of Strategy, trans. by R. L. Wing, (London: Thorsons, 1997), p. 47.

53. Pagonis, 1992, p. 126.

54. Thomas Pakenham, Boer War (London: Abacus, 1992), p. 94.

55. Pagonis, 1992, p. 6, 125.

56. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (London: Pan MacMillan, 1997), pp. 80, 88, 114, 125, 167.

57. Admiral Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Days (London: HarperCollins, 2003), p. 331.

58. Richard P. Hallion, Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1992), p. 137.

59. “Resistance and Powering of Ships,” chapter 7, Course en200, Department of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering, United States Naval Academy (USNA), Annapolis, MA, 13 January 2003, pp. 7–19, http://www.usna.edu/NAOE/courses/en200/ch07.pdf

60. “Fast Sealift Ships—T-AKR United States Navy fact file, 22 September 2003, http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/ships/ship-takr.html.

61. “High-Speed Vessel—HSV,” United States Navy fact file, 19 February 2004, http://www.navy.mil/navydata; Harold Kennedy, “Navy Tests Coastal Warfare Systems Aboard New Catamaran,” National Defense Magazine, July 2004, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org

62. Duncan Haws, Merchant Fleets in Profile (Cambridge: Patrick Stephens, 1978–80), vol. 2, p. 190; “Prepositioning Ships,” Military Sealift Command, retrieved 13 May 2005, http://www.msc.navy.mil; Matthews and Holt, 2002, p. 267; Tony James, Royal Fleet Auxiliary 1905–85 (Liskeard, Cornwall: Maritime, 1985), pp. 87–125.

63. Calculated from statistics in Matthews and Holt, 2002, p. 13.

64. 94.4 percent of all cargo deliveries throughout the war were made by sea. Only 5.6 percent came by air. However, two thirds of the load sent by sea was fuel and, of that, three quarters was moved within Southwest Asia. That puts airlift responsible for approximately one tenth of the load moved from outside the region. But even if fuel is entirely excluded from the equation, the importance of transport on water remains overwhelming. Of dry cargo sent into theater, 84.9 percent was delivered by sea and just 15.1 percent by air. Matthews and Holt, 2002, pp. 13, 126.

65. Matthews and Holt, 2002, p. 201.

66. Using figures in Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990–1991 (London: Faber and Faber, 1993), p. 361.

67. Calculated from statistics in MOD, 1982, pp. 6, 26.

68. Calculated from statistics in Matthews and Holt, 2002, pp. 13, 126.

69. Calculated from statistics in MOD, 1982, p. 6.

70. Jones, 29 April 2003; Associated Press, “Pentagon to close 35 percent of overseas bases: Forward operating sites to replace Cold War-era bases,” 23 September 2004, retrieved from http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6078936/?displaymode=1006; David McKeeby, “U.S. Reducing Number of Overseas Military Bases,” Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, 22 June 2006, http://usinfo.state.gov

71. John Lund, Ruth Berg, and Corinne Replogle, Project Air Force Analysis of the Air War in the Gulf: An Assessment of Strategic Airlift Operational Efficiency R-4269/4-AF (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993), pp. 17–8.

72. Martin Libicki, “The Emerging Primacy of Information,” Orbis, 40 (1996), p. 261.

73. Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of Defense, “Prepared Testimony of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees regarding Iraq,” Washington, 18–19 September 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020918-secdef.html

74. Pakenham, 1992, p. 252.

75. Duncan Anderson, The Falklands War 1982 (Oxford: Osprey, 2002), pp. 86–7.

76. James R. Blaker, “Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs: A Guide to America's 21st Century Defense,” Defense Working Paper 3, Progressive Policy Institute, Washington, DC, January 1997, p. 25, http://www.ppionline.org/documents/Understanding_RMA.pdf

77. Cordesman and Wagner, 1996, pp. 44, 47.

78. Falkland Islands Review: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors (London: HMSO, January 1983), p. 73.

79. J.L.W. Edgell, S.K. Spangler, G.F. Dragoo, and L.W. Jackson, “Logistics in 2025: Consider It Done!,” Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 1996, pp. 26–28, http://www.au.af.mil/au/2025/volume2/chap01/vol2ch01.pdf

80. Ian Knight, The Zulu War (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 2003), pp. 31–2, 60, 215.

81. David Stephenson, 1914–1918 The History of the First World War (London: Penguin, 2004), pp. 192, 446–7.

82. Martin Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon (Washington: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1994), Chapter 2, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/mcnair/mcnair28/m028ch02.html

83. Ibid., pp. 268, 272.

84. See, for example, James P. Coyne, Airpower in the Gulf (Arlington, VA: Air Force Association, 1992), p. 178; or Hallion, 1992, p. 1.

85. Information provided to Winnefeld et al., 1994, p. 159.

86. Norman Friedman, Desert Victory (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p. 117.

87. Winnefeld et al., 1994, pp. 132–4.

88. John Keegan, “Please, Mr. Blair, never take such a risk again,” Telegraph, London, 6 June 1999, http://www.telegraph.co.uk

89. On Serb construction of decoys, see Associated Press, “NATO Attack on Yugoslavia Gave Iraq Good Lessons,” published in Globe and Mail, Toronto, 20 November 2002, http://www.theglobeandmail.com

90. Sebastian Ritchie, “Air Power Victorious? Britain and NATO Strategy during the Kosovo Conflict,” in Air Power History, eds. S. Cox & P. Gray (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 324.

91. Peter W. Gray, “The Balkans: An Air Power Basket Case,” in Air Power History, eds. S. Cox & P. Gray, (London: Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 339–40.

92. Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, November 2002, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/afghan.pdf

93. Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, pp. 184–5.

94. Martin Middlebrook, The Falklands War 1982 (London: Penguin, 2001), pp. 118–20.

95. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (Washington: Department of Defense, April 1992), pp. F-16, F-30.