A Failure of Imagination: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and International Security

Abstract

This article analyzes recent advances in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology and draws three conclusions. First, conventional military forces are highly vulnerable to armed UAVs. A small force of UAVs could decimate entire divisions of soldiers, armor, and artillery, eliminate the ability to resupply and sustain armies in the field, destroy all aircraft in a given theater, and put Nimitz-class carriers out of action. Second, urban population centers are highly vulnerable to UAVs controlled by terrorists. Third, enormous cost savings could be achieved by replacing highly vulnerable and expensive weapon systems with UAVs.

Notes

1. Swift Engineering, “KB4 UAV,” 2010, available at http://www.killerbeeuas.com/features.shtml (accessed March 7, 2010); Swift Engineering, “KB Overview Video,” 2010, available at http://www.killerbeeuas.com/video-overview.shtml (accessed March 7, 2010).

2. Stephen Trimble, “AUVSI: Northrop Lifts Veil on Bat UAV Strategy, Settles Dispute over Raytheon Killerbee,” 2009, available at www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/08/12/330959/auvsi-northrop-lifts-veil-on-bat-uav-strategy-settles-dispute-over-raytheon.html (accessed March 17, 2010).

3. Frank Colucci, “Preferred Payloads: Unmanned Aircraft Are Platforms for Increasingly Capable Payloads Containing Radar, Cameras and Infrared Sensors, Laser Rangefinders,” 2009, available at www.aviationtoday.com/av/categories/military/Preferred-Payloads_36861.html (accessed March 17, 2010).

4. Alison K. Brown and Dale Reynolds, “Precision Targeting Using GPS/Inertial-Aided Sensors,” (paper presented at the Proceedings of the Institute of Navigation 55th annual meeting, Cambridge, MA, 1999).

5. See, for example, FLIR Government Systems, “Cobalt 190: Compact Seven Payload EO/IR/Laser Designation System Developed for Unmanned Applications,” 2009, available at www.gs.flir.com/uploadedFiles/GS/datasheets/A_LTR_COBALT_190.pdf (accessed March 11, 2010).

6. Jane's, “MEI 40 mm LV Hellhound HE and HEDP Grenades (United States), 40 X 46 LV HE Grenades,” 2009, available at www.janes.com/articles/Janes-Ammunition-Handbook/MEI-40-mm-LV-Hellhound-HE-and-HEDP-grenades-United-States.html (accessed July 26, 2010).

7. Maxim Popenker, “Device ‘D’ Noiseless Grenade Launcher/Pistol (USSR/Russia),” undated, available at world.guns.ru/grenade/gl52-e.htm (accessed March 7, 2010).

8. GlobalSecurity.org, “Enhanced Grenade Launcher Module EGLM,” 2005, available at www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/eglm.htm (accessed March 4, 2010).

9. Defense Update, “Multifunction Self Protection System (MUSS),” 2006, available at defense-update.com/products/m/muss.htm (accessed March 15, 2010).

10. Christopher Drew, “Cost of F-35 Has Risen 60% to 90%, Military Says,” The New York Times, March 12, 2010; Christopher Hellman, “Fact Sheet: The F/A-22 ‘Raptor’ Fighter,” National Priorities Project, 2009, available at www.nationalpriorities.org/F-22_Fact_Sheet (accessed March 12, 2010); Federation of American Scientists, “B-2 Spirit,” 2010, available at www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/uswpns/air/bombers/b2.html (accessed March 12, 2010).

11. John Stillion and David T. Orletsky, “Airbase Vulnerability to Conventional Cruise-Missile and Ballistic Missile Attacks: Technology, Scenarios, and U.S. Air Force Responses,” RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1999, pp. 15–16.

12. Ibid., 59.

13. Photos of bombs stored on carts in the hanger bays of two Nimitz-class carriers, the USS John C. Stennis and USS Harry S. Truman, illustrate the danger. In one photo, 25 munitions are visible, with an open aircraft hanger door clearly visible in the background. A UAV flown through the hanger door and detonated above the munitions would trigger multiple explosions. See AirWarriors, “Tribute: IYAOYAS,” 2010, available at www.airwarriors.com/forum/showthread.php/154092-Tribute-IYAOYAS (accessed December 4, 2010).

14. Steven J. Dunn, “Stark Significance,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, vol. 10 (August 1987): 166; Robert H. Stoner, “R2D2 with Attitude: The Story of the Phalanx Close-in Weapons System (CIWS),” 2009, available at www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-103.htm.

15. Fletcher Gibson, “Big E Sailors Run Point Defense in Combat Systems,” United States Navy, 2003, available at www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=11253 (accessed March 15, 2010). The record of the Phalanx gun system is poor. On May 17, 1987, the system failed to prevent an attack by an Iraqi F-1 Mirage jet that fired an Exocet missile at the USS Stark. The Phalanx system was expected to react to anything approaching the ship through the air, especially since the Stark was on heightened alert status, its radar had tracked the plane from Iraq, it should have seen the missile launch on radar, and a Pentagon spokesman stated that all of the ship's weapons systems were working. The attack killed 37 seamen, left the Stark dead in the water, and set a fire that was still burning a day later. The Navy's internal investigation blamed the captain of the ship for keeping the system in standby mode. However, a CBS investigation revealed that a problem with the Phalanx's electronic circuitry resulted in so many blown circuit cards that the crew decided to protect the weapon by not powering it up. It appears that problems with the electronic circuitry are endemic to the system. Former General Dynamics employee Jason Madden stated that the defense contractor employed fraudulent testing procedures: “We cheat the testing from the bottom, the start, to the finish, all the way to the product going out the door,” implying that no Navy ship can rely on the Phalanx gun system (or SeaRAM, which uses the same electronics) to prevent an attack. The problems have not been corrected. In 2007, a land-based version of Phalanx failed to destroy a rocket fired at a military base at Iraq's Basra airport. In 2006, Phalanx failed to protect an Israeli Sa'ar 5 corvette, apparently because the system was not in automatic engagement mode to ensure that it would not fire at the Israeli gunboats that the corvette was escorting. Once again, this underlines the fundamental limitation of Phalanx, SeaRAM, Sea Sparrow, or any other automated weapon system—it must be in manual or standby mode when operating near friendly or civilian aircraft or ships.

16. Ibid.

17. Philip J. Hilts, “Aegis System Has Been Controversial from the Start,” The Washington Post, July 7, 1988.

18. John J. Fialka, “Two Tests of Navy's New Aegis Cruiser Give Widely Disparate Marks to Ship's Abilities,” The Wall Street Journal, November 4, 1983.

19. Philip J. Hilts, “GAO Says Weapons Tests Too Easy, Data Misused; Crew Had Advance Details in Aegis Trials,” The Washington Post, July 18, 1988.

20. From January 20, 2001 through September 10, 2001, President Bush and his top advisors received 40 warnings regarding the threat from al Qaeda. U.S. leaders were warned of bin Laden's specific threat to hijack U.S. aircraft nearly three years before the events of September 11, 2001, but this warning was characterized as “sensational,” then ignored by the president, CIA director, and national security advisor in August 2001, five weeks before the events of September 11.

21. Project on Government Oversight, “The Politics of Contracting,” Washington, DC, 2004, available at www.pogo.org/pogo-files/reports/government-corruption/the-politics-of-contracting/gc-rd-20040629.html#Appendix_A (accessed March 5, 2010).

22. Ibid.

23. General Accounting Office, “Defense Contracting: Post-Government Employment of Former DOD Officials Needs Greater Transparency,” Washington, DC, 2008, p. 4.

24. Abdolrahim Mousavi, “Iranian Joint Chief of Staff,” 2006, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=b9aTxgFcABw&search=Iran%20military (accessed March 7, 2010).

25. Yahya-Rahim Safavi, “IRGC General Commander Yahya-Rahim Safavi: We Have Shown the Americans Their Warships Are Vulnerable,” 2006, available at www.memritv.org/clip/en/1266.htm (accessed March 7, 2010).

26. Iran State Television, “Iranian Drone Spying US Aircraft Carrier in Persian Gulf,” 2006, available at video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-324294841727623684&pr=goog-sl# (accessed March 11, 2010).

27. U.S. Carriers, “USS Ronald Reagan: CVN 76,” 2010, available at www.uscarriers.net/cvn76history.htm (accessed March 15, 2010).

28. Mark H. Gaffney, “Myth of US Invincibility Floats in the Persian Gulf,” 2005, available at www.rense.com/general64/fore.htm (accessed March 8, 2010).

29. Sean D. Naylor, “War Games Rigged? General Says Millennium Challenge 02 ‘Was Almost Entirely Scripted,’” Army Times, 2002, available at www.armytimes.com/legacy/new/0-292925-1060102.php (accessed March 9, 2010).

30. Julian Borger, “Wake-up Call,” Guardian News and Media, 2002, available at www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/sep/06/usa.iraq (accessed March 9, 2010).

31. Ibid.

32. Naylor, “War Games Rigged?”

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. PBS, “Battle Plan Under Fire,” 2004, available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/wartech/nature.html (accessed March 12, 2010).

37. William F. Kernan, “Gen. Kernan and Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” U.S. Department of Defense, 2002, available at www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3653 (accessed March 9, 2010).

38. Ibid.

39. George C. Wilson, “Navy Missile Downs Iranian Jetliner,” The Washington Post, 1988, available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/flight801/stories/july88crash.htm (accessed March 12, 2010).