The Congressional Strategic Posture Commission Report and a Brief Assessment of Developments in U.S. Strategic Policy

Abstract

The bipartisan Congressional Strategy Posture Commission offered numerous recommendations to reduce what it labeled “the nuclear danger.” The Obama Administration has pursued some of these recommendations via its policy documents, such as the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, its budgets, and plans. There is reason, however, for several concerns in this regard. These involve the high priority placed on nuclear force reductions at the potential expense of other national goals, including deterrence and assurance; the maintenance of the flexibility and resilience of the U.S. force posture necessary to meet deterrence and assurance requirements now and in the future; continued support for U.S. strategic defensive capabilities given Russian opposition; and apparent interest among some in the Administration to move increasingly toward what has been termed a policy of Minimum Deterrence.

Acknowledgments

This article is based on testimony presented by Dr. Keith B. Payne before the United States House of Representatives, House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, March 2, 2011. In addition, portions of this testimony also appear in “Maintaining Flexible and Resilient Capabilities for Nuclear Deterrence,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Summer 2011.

Notes

1. William J. Perry et al., America's Strategic Posture (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 17. Hereafter, America's Strategic Posture.

2. Ibid., 23.

3. Ibid., 23–24.

4. Ibid., 22–23, 29.

5. Flexibility meaning U.S. possession of a spectrum of possible threat options suitable to a wide range of opponents and contingencies, and resilience meaning the U.S. capability to adapt to changes in threats and contexts, including rapid and unanticipated changes.

6. See the discussion in Keith B. Payne, The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice From the Cold War to the 21st Century (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2008), Chap. 5.

7. Department of Defense, United States Strategic Command, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0, December 2006, pp. 3, 8, 17, 40. See also Nuclear Posture Review: From 1995 SecDef Annual Report to Congress, available at http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr95/npr_.html.

8. See Kurt Guthe, Continuities in U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, Strategy, Plans, and Forces (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, 2008). Also available at http://nipp.org/Publication/Downloads/Publication%20Archive%20PDF/N-Continuities%20Draft_Rev%202.1.pdf.

9. America's Strategic Posture, 26.

10. Ibid., 25–26, 29.

11. Ibid., 23.

12. Ibid., 31.

13. Ibid., 31–33.

14. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April, 2009, p. vi (italics added); also see p. v.

15. Ibid., xiv.

16. America's Strategic Posture, 29, 67, 94.

17. See Julian Ryall, “Japan Should Develop Nuclear Weapons to Defend Itself,” February 4, 2011, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/8303366/Japan-should-develop-nuclear-weapons-to-defend-otself.html.

18. See, for example, the statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in “RF Keeps Right to Withdraw From START if US ABM Creates Risks,” ITAR-TASS, May 19, 2010. See also, Greg Thielmann, “Strategic Missile Defense: A Threat to Future Nuclear Arms Control?” Threat Assessment Brief, Arms Control Association, January 26, 2011.

19. Dmitriy Rogozin, quoted in, BBC Monitoring: Proliferation Digest (in English), February 22, 2011.

20. See for example, Bruce Blair, “Trapped in the Nuclear Math,” New York Times, June 12, 2000.

21. See Hans Kristensen, “Obama and the Nuclear War Plan,” Federation of American Scientists Issue Brief, February 10, 2010; Hans Kristensen et al., From Counterforce to Minimum Deterrence: Briefing to MORS Nuclear Online Workshop, Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council, May 5, 2009.

22. Akira Kawasaki, “Point of View,” Asahi Shimbun Online, October 9, 2010. See also, “RIA Novosti Interview with Alexi Fenenko,” RIA Novosti, October 11, 2010.

23. As recommended in Gareth Evans et al., Eliminating Nuclear Threats (Canberra: International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, 2009), 171, 187, 191; and Hans Kristensen, Robert Norris, and Ivan Oelrich, From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons, Federation of American Scientists and The Natural Resources Defense Council, Occasional Paper, No. 7 (April 2009), p. 43.

24. America's Strategic Posture, 24.