China's “Guam Express” and “Carrier Killers”: The anti-ship asymmetric challenge to the U.S. in the Western Pacific

ABSTRACT

A new generation of stealthier, supersonic, autonomous, and increasingly survivable Chinese anti-ship missiles (ASMs) with extended ranges, payloads, and accuracy are increasingly adept at evading U.S. defenses, and undermine the effectiveness of its surface fleets and carrier strike groups in the West Pacific. This article conceptualizes the evolution of Chinese ASMs through a structural-realist theoretical lens. It argues that the development and diffusion of these asymmetric precision-strike weapons have in important ways intensified U.S.-China security-dilemma dynamics, which could portend a paradigm shift (or at least the perception of one) in the future military balance of power in Asia.

Notes on contributor

James Samuel Johnson ([email protected]) is an Honorary Visiting Fellow with the History, Politics & International Relations School, University of Leicester. James' research interests include security and strategic studies; East Asia security; China foreign policy; U.S.-China relations; and the impact of emerging military-technologies for future warfare and the military balance in Asia. James is fluent in Mandarin.

Notes

1. C. Pellerin, “Work: Guam is a Strategic Hub to Asia-Pacific Rebalance,” DOD News, Defense Media Activity, August 19, 2014, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/603091/work-guam-is-strategic-hub-to-asia-pacific-rebalance (accessed January 9, 2017).

2. The U.S. faces a similar threat in the Persian Gulf from Iran and in the Baltic Seas from Russia. See Pavel Feigenhauer, “Putin Declares His Defense Agenda for the Next Decade,” Eurasian Daily Monitor 38, no. 9, February 23, 2012, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39051&cHash=5ccec28ca8c50c06309e2ee0749774a9 (accessed January 5, 2017).

3. E. Hagt M. Durnin, “China's Antiship Ballistic Missile: Developments and Missing Links,” Naval War College Review 62, no. 4 (2009): 87.

4. A. S. Erickson and D. Yang, “On the Verge of a Game-Changer,” U.S. Naval Institute 135, no. 5 (2009): 53–86; M. Stokes, Missile Forces: The Second Artillery Force and the Future of Long-Range Precision Strike (Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012), 150; A. L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 2012), 15–20.

5. Cruise missiles are propelled by jet engines and fly toward their targets at similar flight paths to its targets—unlike ballistic systems that enter a ballistic trajectory—they have often been described as “pilotless airplanes.” See Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China's Cruise Missile Ambitions (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2014), 2; and Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (Washington, DC: U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2013) 26.

6. The additional range of the DF-26 will further complicate China's complex targeting challenge.

7. The “kill chain” is a military term to describe the sequence of events required for a missile system to successfully destroy or disable its intended target.

8. To date, the ability of China's C4ISR systems to provide the reconnaissance to support ASBMs (especially in ranges beyond China's first island chain) is considered to be work in progress. See J. Wilson, China's Expanding Ability to Conduct Conventional Missile Strikes on Guam (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2016), 12.

9. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, 2016 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2016), 25; A. S. Erickson, “Showtime: China Reveals Two ‘Carrier-Killer’ Missiles,” The National Interest, September 3, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/showtime-china-reveals-two-carrier-killer-missiles-13769 (accessed September 7, 2015). Beyond these observations, however, very little is known of the DF-26 and its variants.

10. China has possessed the capacity to target Guam with nuclear missiles for several decades. Prior to the development of the DF-26 ASBM, the PLA's conventional capabilities would be dependent upon air force and naval platforms to reach Guam. Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2016, 25 and 67.

11. The U.S.-Soviet INF Treaty required the prohibition of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. China's recent development of intermediate-range cruise and ballistic missiles has prompted debate on the durability of this treaty. See W. A. Reinsch and D. C. Shea, 2015 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Committee, 114th Congress, 1st session, November 2015 (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Committee, 2015), 370.

12. Until 1988, the U.S. possessed a ballistic missile capability with similarities to ASBMs. The U.S. Pershing II theater ballistic missile (TBM) was deployed in 1983, but subsequently withdrawn to comply with the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). The development the Chinese DF-21D ASBM was reportedly partially based on the U.S. Pershing II. See B. Perrett et al., “U.S. Navy Sees Chinese HGV as Part of a Wider Threat,” Aviation Week, January 27, 2015, http://aviationweek.com/awin/us-navy-sees-chinese-hgv-part-wider-threat (accessed August 25, 2015).

13. The “asymmetric” features of Chinese ASMs are conditioned by the tactical, operational, and strategic advantages of this relatively low-cost missile system compared with the overwhelming superiority of U.S. carrier strike groups (CSGs) and supporting fleets in the Western Pacific. In other words, ASBMs are only asymmetric in the context of U.S. military primacy, i.e., the presumed “target” of ASBMs.

14. A. S. Erickson, Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajectories and Strategic Implications (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2013), 1–5.

15. Ministry of National Defense, The People's Republic of China, China's Military Strategy, 2014 (Beijing, China: Information Office of the State Council, 2014).

16. Ministry of National Defense, The People's Republic of China, China's National Defense in 2008 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 2008).

17. The 1996 Taiwan Crisis has been frequently cited by Chinese analysts as one of the major drivers behind Chinese military modernization efforts—including its pursuit of ASBMs. See Hagt and M. Durnin, “China's Antiship Ballistic Missile,” 11.

18. For example, the PLA's boost-glide and hypersonic weapons (currently under development) could be used to evade Japan or South Korea's missile defense systems.

19. The “assassin's mace” (also referred to as “silver bullet” or “trump card” weapons) is a concept that has been frequently used in Chinese military writings to describe various asymmetric weapons including ASBMs, ASCMs, LACMs, ASATs, and C4ISR systems. See J. E. Bruzdzinski, “Demystifying the ‘Shashoujian’: China's ‘Assassin's Mace’ Concept,” in Civil-Military Changes in China: Elites, Institutes, and Ideas after the 16th Party Congress, edited by A. Scobell and L. Wortzel (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Institute), 309–363.

20. Erickson and Yang, “On the Verge of a Game-Changer,” 53–86.

21. Ibid., 6–-62.

22. The Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century (Washington, DC: The Office of Naval Intelligence), 16-19.

23. A. I. Johnston, “The Evolution of Interstate Security Crisis-Management Theory and Practice in China,” Naval War College Review 69, no. 1 (2016): 29–72.

24. Wilson, China's Expanding Ability, 5–6.

25. Ibid., 7. In 2014, the U.S. Navy announced plans to deploy a fourth submarine to Guam. This followed the deployment in 2013 of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems to Guam.

26. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy, 219–220.

27. Chinese analysts and policymakers have tended to characterize U.S. military and defense policies in Asia as designed to prevent China from achieving the kind of great-power status that it believes it deserves. See D. Shambaugh, “Sino-American Strategic Relations: From Partners to Competitors,” Survival 42, no. 1 (2000): 97–115.

28. For example, researchers at the PLA's Second Artillery Engineering College developed a series of theoretical models to modify and improve ASBMs maneuvering reentry vehicles systems (MaRVs) which could enhance the ability of ASBMs to defeat U.S. BMD interceptors. See M. S. Chase, “Second Artillery in the Hu Jintao Era: Doctrine and Capabilities,” in Assessing the People's Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era, edited by R. Kamphausen, D. Lai, and T. Tanner (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and the U.S. Army War College Press, 2014), 301–353.

29. The PLA's power-projection capacity continues to be constrained by several factors, including an underdeveloped blue-water naval capacity, minimal overseas bases, a lack of refueling aircraft (for air-to-air fueling), and an operational aircraft carrier fleet.

30. The Chinese “informationization” concept is best understood as an umbrella strategic concept that reflects a process of “moving toward greater collection, systematization, distribution and utilization of information.” See J. Mulvenon and J. McReynolds, “The Role of Informatization in the People's Liberation Army under Hu Jintao,” in Kamphausen et al., eds., Assessing the People's Liberation Army, 210–211.

31. Examples of these crises include the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis, the U.S. EP-3 aircraft collision in 2001, and the U.S. bombing of China's Belgrade Embassy in 1999.

32. Several U.S. analysts have argued that China's 2007 ASAT test indicated an inadequate appreciation by Beijing of the strategic implications a weapons test of this kind could have. See J. Lewis and G. Kulacki, “Understanding China's Antisatellite Test,” The Nonproliferation Review 15, no. 2 (2008): 335–347.

33. The majority of Chinese open-source literature pertaining to ASMs has centered on the general feasibility and of this weapon, such as the various technical challenges in the development of ASBMs, e.g., accurate targeting and terminal guidance challenges. See Erickson, Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Development, 58–59.

34. The use of ASBMs in multiple salvo operations, and especially in conjunction with other precision-strike missile systems capabilities, could compensate for the relatively wide margin of error associated with the successful terminal guidance of this missile system. See O. R. Cote, “Assessing the Undersea Balance between the U.S. and China,” in Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, Practice, edited by T. G. Mahnken (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 184–206.

35. H. J. Kazianis, “Is China's ‘Carrier Killer’ Really a Threat to the U.S. Navy?” The National Interest, September 2, 2015, http://www.nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-carrier-killer-really-threat-the-us-navy-13765?page=show (accessed September 7, 2015).

36. R. Work, R. “Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech, China Aerospace Studies Institute, as Delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, RAND Corporation, Arlington, VA, June 22, 2015,” U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, June 22, 2015, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606683/china-aerospace-studies-institute (accessed January 10, 2017).

37. A “fully operational” ASBM would need to be effectively fused with C4ISR systems, to supply real-time satellite imagery, accurate target-locating information, satellite reconnaissance, navigation, and a continued tracking ability. The U.S. DOD recently stated that it is “unclear whether China has the capability to collect accurate targeting information and pass it to launch platforms in time for successful strikes in sea areas.” Annual Report to Congress, 35.

38. According to U.S. DOD officials, China in 2015 deployed ASCMs on the disputed South China Sea Woody Island, and reportedly test fired the YJ-62 ASCM—that follows the deployment of an advanced air defense missile system (the HQ-9) on the same group of islands in the same year. B Gertz, “Pentagon Concerned by Chinese Anti-Ship Cruise Firing,” Freebeacon, March 30, 2016, http://freebeacon.com/national-security/pentagon-concerned-chinese-anti-ship-missile-firing/ (accessed January 5, 2017).

39. A recent RAND Corp. report estimated that with an inventory of only 50 IRBMs (e.g., the DF-26), Beijing could keep Anderson Base at Guam closed to large aircraft for more than a week, and with 100 IRBMs it could shut down these facilities for almost two weeks—assuming a 75% missile targeting reliability rate. E. Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2014 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation), 64–65.

40. J. J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

41. The U.S. DOD began to publicly discuss Chinese ASBMs as early as 2004. In 2005, a DOD report to Congress explicitly contextualized ASBMs with Chinese broader A2/AD missions and strategies. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China,2005 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2005), 4–33.

42. Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, (2008) Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China,2008 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2008), i.

43. Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China,2011 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2008), 29.

44. In 2015, the U.S. DOD stated that the PLA Navy “is improving its over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting capability … which can be used in conjunction with reconnaissance satellites to locate targets [i.e., U.S. CSGs] at great distances from China … thereby supporting long-range precision strikes, including employment of anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs).” Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China,2015 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2015), 46.

45. Erickson, Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Development, 8.

46. Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China,2015, 37.

47. The Pentagon's Air-Sea Battle operational concept emerged as one of the central U.S. countervailing measures to address the A2/AD ”military problem set” and preserve U.S. military power projection and navigation freedoms in the Western Pacific. Other DOD programs with similar strategic objectives have subsequently emerged, including the U.S. Defense Innovation Initiative (DII) and the Third Offset Strategy. These initiatives were designed to leverage U.S. advantages in emerging military technologies to counter the perception of declining U.S. dominance in several conventional military domains—especially precision-guided munitions, space, and cyber domains. R. O'Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities; Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 55.

48. Admiral Greenert described “hard-kill” measures as “knocking it [ASBM] down, a bullet on a bullet,” including improved versions of the missile defense SM-3 interceptors; the acceleration in the development of the electronic rail gun (EMRG); high-power free electron lasers (FELs), and solid state lasers (SSLs). “Soft-kill” measures included jamming, spoofing, and other confusion and decoy tactics as the missiles approach their targets—especially the use of EW. Ibid., 67–69.

49. E. Talmadge, “3-Star: Anti-Carrier Missile Won't Stop Navy,” Navy Times, February 15, 2011, http://archive.navytimes.com/article/20110215/NEWS/102150313/3-star-Anti-carrier-missile-won-t-stop-Navy (accessed September 15, 2015).

50. For example, China could launch an opening salvo of missile strikes to degrade or weaken U.S. air defenses, missile defenses, and its command and control centers as a precursor to a more intense round of precision air strikes. Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard, 153–200.

51. Analyst Roger Cliff highlighted the various technical challenges and time-sensitive issues associated with BMD (e.g., Aegis SM-3) interceptions of ASBMs. H. J. Kazianis, “Behind the China Missile Hype: Interview with Roger Cliff of RAND Corporation,” The Diplomat, January 20, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2012/01/behind-the-china-missile-hype/?allpages=yes (accessed May 8, 2015).

52. For example, during The Battle of Midway of 1942 the U.S., by subjecting Japanese naval forces to a multi-axis attack, was able to successfully overcoming Japan's air defenses.

53. The YJ-18 is reportedly capable of reaching supersonic speeds during the terminal phase of its flight; which would significantly inhibit the reaction time available to the U.S., compared to its sub-supersonic predecessors. See The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy, 19–21.

54. T. Yoshihara, “Chinese Views of Sea-Based Ballistic Missiles Defense,” in Chinese Aerospace Power: Evolving Maritime Roles, edited by A. S. Erickson and L. J. Goldstein (Washington, DC: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 343–359.

55. Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2014).61. Recent U.S. tests of a sophisticated layered missile defense system combining Aegis and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense systems—designed to simultaneously detect, track, and destroy ballistic and cruise missiles—have been considered by analysts as a direct response to heightened threat perceptions posed by the Chinese multi-axis A2/AD challenge.

56. For example, China's new YJ-12 long-range air-launched supersonic ASCM potentially more than doubles the ranges of the PLA's previous systems (estimated 400 kilometers) and, with its ability to perform evasive maneuvers as it approaches its target, poses new challenges to U.S. missile defenses—especially as China improves its bomber fleet in-air refueling capabilities. See M. Pilger, China's New YJ-12 Anti-Ship Cruise Missile: Capabilities and Implications for U.S. Forces in the Western Pacific (Washington, DC, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015), 5.

57. China is currently reported to possess several cruise missiles that are able to target Guam, including air-launched land attack cruise missiles (LACMs), air-launched anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and sea-launched anti-ship cruise missiles (SACMs). Technical upgrades made to China's bomber fleet (i.e., the H-6Ks) have increased the ranges the PLA's air-launched precision cruise missiles (i.e., the CJ-20 and the dual-payload CJ-10A LACM, and the new YJ-12 long-range supersonic ASCM), for missions that potentially reach Guam for the first time. R. D. Fisher, “China's H-6K Bomber Shows New Strike Capabilities,” IHS Jane's 360, January 9, 2017, http://www.janes.com/article/66779/china-s-h-6k-bomber-shows-new-strike-capabilities (accessed January 10, 2017).

58. R. Haddick, “China's Most Dangerous Missile (So Far),” War on the Rocks, July 2, 2014, https://warontherocks.com/2014/07/chinas-most-dangerous-missile-so-far/ (accessed January 2, 2017).

59. Gertz, “Pentagon Concerned by Chinese Anti-Ship Cruise Firing.”

60. Currently, the U.S. possesses sea-based skimming supersonics target vehicles to develop defenses for supersonic ASCMs, but presently lacks an equivalent supersonic ASCM capability.

61. The dynamic between two militaries that each has PGMs and precision defensive capabilities can be called a “‘salvo competition.” In this competition, both combatants seek to gain the advantage by improving their capabilities to attack with precision and/or defend against precision strikes.

62. In 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama announced a significant shift in the strategic direction of the Aegis ballistic missile defense (ABMD) program, which resulted in a so-called Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) in East Asia.

63. Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Nuclear Posture Review Report, 2010 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2010).

64. Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, 2010 (Washington, DC, U.S. Department of Defense, 2010), 3–9.

65. A. Entous and J. Barnes, “U.S. Plans New Asia Missile Defenses”, The Wall Street Journal, August 23, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444812704577605591629039400 (accessed January 1, 2017).

66. Chinese analysts have consistently criticized U.S. BMD for undermining its conventional missile deterrent against Taiwan, and potentially allowing the U.S. to subject China to “nuclear blackmail.” See S. Lawrence et al., Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia–Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June, 24, 2013) 1–21.

67. Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, 2013 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2013), 31–32.

68. Several recent initiatives by Washington to engage China in senior-level dialogue on nuclear and BMD issues resulted in limited success. The 2009–2016 rounds of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogues (S&ED) focused on cyber and maritime security issues, and avoided direct discussion on either nuclear or BMD issues.

69. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75.

70. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 167–214; K. A. Lieber, “Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security,” International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 71–04; A. Kydd, A. “Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other,” Security Studies 7, no. 1 (1997): 114–155.

71. S. Van Evera, S. Causes of War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).

72. Strategic ambiguities related to warhead ambiguity for escalation control featured heavily in U.S. debates surrounding the Pentagon's 2006 proposal to deploy a conventionally armed version of the nuclear Trident missile. As a result of these concerns, a proposal to deploy conventional missiles on U.S. Trident submarines was rejected by Congress. See J. Pollack, J. “Emerging Strategic Dilemma in U.S.-China Relations,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 65, no. 4 (2009): 53–63.

73. For example, China could use a nuclear-armed ballistic missile to create a high-altitude EMP attack intended (temporarily or permanently) to disable or destroy U.S. C4ISR systems—or other civilian or military systems.

74. Hypersonic weapons are able to maintain missile flight speeds of Mach 5 to Mach 10, and sustain these speeds for duration beyond the ability of any existing ballistic missiles It is unclear, however, whether Beijing intended to arm its hypersonic weapons with nuclear or conventional payloads—or both. See J. H. Pollack, “Boost-Glide Weapons and US-China Strategic Stability,” The Nonproliferation Review 22, no. 2 (2005): 155–164.

75. Due to the opacity associated with Chinese nuclear policy, little is known about how the PLA stores its nuclear warheads. Most foreign analysts assume that the PLA maintains separate stores for its nuclear warheads and missiles, or a “de-alerted” posture. See J. Lewis, J. “China's Nuclear Modernization: Surprise, Restraint, and Uncertainty,” in Strategic Asia 2012–13: China's Military Challenge, edited by A. Tellis and T. Tanner (Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2013), 76–77.

76. J. M. Acton, Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions about Conventional Prompt Global Strike (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), 1-4.

77. The PLA is understood to maintain shared command and control structures for both its nuclear and conventional arsenals. See Pollack, “Boost-Glide Weapons.”

78. Thomas J. Christensen, “The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China's Strategic Modernization and US-China Security Relations,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 35, no 4. (2012): 467.

79. R. P. Hallion, Hypersonic Weapons and US National Security: A 21st Century Breakthrough (Arlington, VA: The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies Air Force Association, 2016), 2–34; O'Rourke, China Naval Modernization, 70–72.

80. Christensen, “The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution,” 447–487. Several U.S. defense analysts have advocated investment in long-range strategic missiles programs such as the Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B), comprising heavy-stealth payloads that would allow the U.S. to operate beyond the ranges of Chinese missiles. See Wilson, China's Expanding Ability, 15.

81. The Chinese concept of “strategic deterrence” describes a broader and multifaceted version of deterrence that includes nuclear and conventional domains as well as cyber, space, and electronic warfare domains. China's dual-payload DF-26 has been officially described by Chinese state media as “a new weapon for strategic deterrence.” S. M. Chase and A. Chan, China's Evolving Approach to “Integrated Strategic Deterrence” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016).

82. M. McDevitt, “The PLA Navy's Anti-Access Role in a Taiwan Contingency,” in P. Saunders, C. Yung, M. Swaine, and A. En-Dzu Yang, editors, The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011), 209–210.

83. T. C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (London; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

84. P. C. Saunders and A. Scobell, eds., PLA Influence on China's National Security Policymaking (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 1–33.

85. Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 58–110.

86. F. E. Morgan et al., Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 7–45.

87. Ibid., 7–45.

88. G. Snyder, “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,” in The Balance of Power, edited by P. Seabury (San Francisco, CA: Chandler, 1965), 184–201.

89. Erickson and Yang, “On the Verge of a Game-Changer,” 53–86.

90. Avery Goldstein, “First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,” International Security 37, no. 4 (2013): 49–89.

91. Cote “Assessing the Undersea Balance.”

92. The INF treaty, in eliminating a class of strategic weapons, has been regarded as a milestone in U.S.-Russia security relations, and prohibiting Russia from deploying these missiles for “political coercion” purposes on Europe's boarders—as China has done in Taiwan since the 1990s. Wilson, China's Expanding Ability, 15.

93. Other states, notably India, North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, Israel, and Turkey have also expanded their ballistic and cruise-missile capabilities in the post–Cold War era. See D. Ghoshal, “China and the INF Treaty,” Comparative Strategy 35, no. 5 (2016): 363–370.

94. To date, China has not expressed any intention to join the INF Treaty. Ibid., 364.

95. M. Hallex, “China's Mighty Missile Threat: What Should America Do about It?' National Interest, September 13, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-mighty-missile-threat-what-should-america-do-about-it-11271 (accessed January 10, 2017).

96. From a technical perspective, a maneuverable medium-range ballistic missile system (such as the DF-21D ASBM) would not be too dissimilar from a “regional” version of the U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) program. Dennis M. Gormley, “US Advanced Conventional Systems and Conventional Prompt Global Strike Systems, The Nonproliferation Review 22, no. 2 (2015): 123–139.

97. Pollack, “Boost-Glide Weapons, 128.

98. E. B. Montgomery “China's Missile Forces Are Growing: Is it Time to Modify the INF Treaty?” National Interest, July 2, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-missile-forces-are-growing-it-time-modify-the-inf-10791 (accessed January 10, 2017).

99. Wilson, China's Expanding Ability, 13–15.