The three ages of modern Western special operations forces

Abstract

Troops with special skills have typically played strategic and tactical roles as valuable components of conventional military organizations. The start of World War II marked a change, wherein special forces (SF, as they were referred to in Britain, and special operational forces [SOF] in the United States) were separated and played roles distinct from conventional military forces. Recently, Finlan (2019) advanced the notion that since the start of World War II, three unique, punctuated ages of SOF have existed, reflecting various political-military needs and realities. First-age SOF were largely restricted to operations behind enemy lines, aiding the conventional forces. Second-age SOF fought in proxy wars, with and against guerrilla forces, and engaged in aiding political ends when nuclear realities rendered direct military confrontations between world powers too risky to contemplate. The advent of extremist ideology-related terrorism initiated a rethinking of the role of SOF and their initial mobilization to combat this growing threat. Third-age SOF became invaluable in the global fight against terrorism. This paper advances this theory by further delineating differences between the three ages and providing in-depth evidence supporting the soundness of the construct.

Notes

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Additional information

Notes on contributors

Yair Ansbacher

Yair Ansbacher ([email protected]) has been serving in the IDF’s Special Operations Forces for two decades. He is a senior research associate for defense at the Kohelet Policy Forum in Israel. A postgraduate student at Bar-Ilan University, Mr. Ansbacher’s doctoral thesis is on the impact of SOF on the modern battlefield.

Ron Schleifer

Ron Schleifer ([email protected]) is a senior lecturer at the School of Communication, Ariel University of Samaria, and has authored books and articles on psychological warfare and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. He taught at the IDF Tactical Command College, and lectures and trains defense organizations on issues of information warfare in Israel and Europe. His book Psychological Warfare in the Arab-Israeli Conflict was published by Palgrave Macmillan.