Hypersonic weapons and nuclear deterrence

Abstract

This study explores the relationships between hypersonic weapons and nuclear deterrence. This relationship is fraught with uncertainty because the velocity of innovation in hypersonics is difficult to forecast. Nevertheless, major nuclear powers are developing hypersonic weapons, including some that can be deployed on intercontinental launchers. Hypersonic glide vehicles or cruise missiles could threaten first strike stability by reducing the time for responsive decision making in the face of perceived threats, or by evading antimissile defenses otherwise competent to deflect attacks. Attacks on space based assets and cyberattacks, combined with hypersonic missiles, could pose unacceptable risks to assured retaliation based on an assumed number of survivable launch platforms. On the other hand, analysis suggests that, in the case of the United States and Russia, going forward, strategic nuclear deterrents with currently projected modernization plans should suffice to maintain deterrence and first strike stability, barring unforeseen developments in breakthrough technologies.

Notes

1 This study discusses two types of hypersonic weapons: hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) and hypersonic cruise missiles. HGVs are launched from ballistic missiles, aircraft, and submarines. Hypersonic cruise missiles are primarily launched from aircraft but can also be launched from ground launchers or shipboard. It is important to note that in the case of ballistic missile–launched HGVs that it is their maneuverability and flight path that separates them from a traditional ballistic missile, which also flies at hypersonic speeds.

2 See Ian Williams, Adapting to the Hypersonic Era (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2020), 3, https://defense360.csis.org/adapting-to-the-hypersonic-era/.

3 “Russia Demonstrates Avangard Hypersonic Missile System to US,” TASS New Service, November 26, 2019, https://tass.com/defense/1092885.

4 Dave Makichuk, “Russian Frigate to Test Fire Mach 9 ‘Ship Killer’ Missile,” Asia Times, July 20, 2020, https://asiatimes.com/2020/07/russian-frigate-to-test-fire-mach-9-ship-killer-missile/.

5 Anatoly Antonov, cited in Ed Adamczyk, “Russia Announces Successful Test of Hypersonic Missile,” Defense News, October 7, 2020, https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2020/10/07/Russia-announces-successful-test-of-hypersonic-missile/8771602092856.

6 Jen Judson, “Chinese Hypersonic Missile Test Unlikely to Trigger Arms Race, Experts Say,” Defense News, October 20, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2021/10/20/chinese-hypersonic-missile-test-unlikely-to-trigger-arms-race-experts-say/.

7 See Peter Suciu, “US Forging Ahead with Hypersonic Weapons Development Despite Failures,” Clearance Jobs, August 13, 2021, https://news.clearancejobs.com/2021/08/13/u-s-forging-ahead-with-hypersonic-weapons-development-despite-failures/; news release, “Lockheed Martin Successfully Tests Navy’s Hypersonic Strike System,” Lockheed Martin, May 27, 2021, https://news.lockheedmartin.com/navy-cps-hypersonic-strike-test?_ga=2.203616464.1519213393.1628879611-1133998297.1628879611&_gl=1*vguy1x*_ga*MTEzMzk5ODI5Ny4xNjI4ODc5NjEx*_ga_RN6SVSR76N*MTYyODg3OTYxMS4xLjAuMTYyODg3OTYxMS4w.

8 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), “Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) Achieves Successful Flight,” September 27, 2021, [email protected].

9 Steve Trimble, “USAF Errantly Reveals Research on ICBM-Range Hypersonic Glide Vehicle,” SDQuebec, August 19, 2020, https://sdquebec.ca/fr/nouvelle/usaf-errantly-reveals-research-on-icbm-range-hypersonic-glide-vehicle.

10 David A. Cooper, Arms Control for the Third Nuclear Age: Between Disarmament and Armageddon (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2021), 140–41.

11 Cooper, Arms Control for the Third Nuclear Age, 140.

12 Ibid. See John A. Tirpak, “Roper: Hypersonics Capability Less Than Two Years Away,” Air Force Magazine, February 7, 2019, http://www.airforcemag.com/Features/Pages/2019/February%202019/Roper-Hypersonics-Capability-Less-Than-Two-Years-Away.aspx.

13 Henry Sokolski, “What Missile-Driven Competition with China Will Look Like,” American Purpose, October 21, 2020, https://www.americanpurpose.com/.

14 Robert Scher, The US Nuclear Modernization Program (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 2017), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/263731.pdf.

15 Bill Gertz, “China Building Third Missile Field for Hundreds of New ICBMs,” Washington Times, August 21, 2021, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/aug/12/china-engaged-breathtaking-nuclear-breakout-us-str/.

16 David Vergun, “China, Russia Pose Strategic Challenges for U.S., Allies, Admiral Says,” U.S. Department of Defense, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2729519/china-russia-pose-strategic-challenges-for-us-allies-admiral-says/.

17 Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Washington, DC: US Department of State, April 8, 2010), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf.

18 Kelley Sayler, “Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 2021, 20–21.

19 Adam Lowther and Curtis McGiffin, “America Needs a ‘Dead hand’,” War on the Rocks, August 19, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/america-needs-a-dead-hand/.

20 Jack Goldsmith and Ben Miller-Gootnick, “A Presidential Succession Nightmare,” Lawfare, March 25, 2020, https://www.lawfareblog.com/presidential-succession-nightmare.

21 Steve Weintz, “How the U.S. Government Might Have Survived a Nuclear War,” The National Interest, June 20, 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/how-us-government-might-have-survived-nuclear-war-188160.

22 Fred Kaplan, The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020).

23 For an expert assessment, see: Herbert S. Lin, Cyber Risks in Nuclear Escalation Scenarios, Webinar, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, October 27, 2021, and Lin, Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, Stanford University, October 2021). See also: Peter Hayes, Benoy Kampmark, Philip Reiner, and Deborah St Gordon, “Synthesis Report NC3 Systems and Strategic Stability: A Global Overview,” Nautilus Institute, 2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/synthesis-report-nc3-systems-and-strategic-stability-a-global-overview/.

24 Michaela Dodge, “Missile Defense Reckoning Is Coming: Will the United States Choose to be Vulnerable to All Long-Range Missiles?” National Institute for Public Policy, August 20, 2020.

25 Missile Defense Project, “Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/gmd/.

26 US competitiveness in hypersonic weapons and missile defenses assumes future superiority in the electromagnetic spectrum and the ability to operate throughout the electromagnetic operational environment (EMOE). See US Department of Defense, Electromagnetic Spectrum for Superiority Strategy, October 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/29/2002525927/-1/-1/0/ELECTROMAGNETIC_SPECTRUM_SUPERIORITY_STRATEGY.PDF.

27 Valerie Insinna, “US Air Force Gears up for First Flight Test of Golden Horde Munition Swarms,” Defense News, July 13, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/07/13/air-force-gearing-up-for-first-flight-test-of-golden-horde-munitiion-swarms/.

28 For additional perspective see Deverrick Holmes, “Congress Is Not Asking the Right Questions about Missile Defense,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 25, 2019, https://thebulletin.org/2019/06/congress-is-not-asking-the-right-questions-about-missile-defense/; Joan Johnson-Freese and David T. Burbach, “The Best Defense Ever? Busting Myths About the Trump Administration’s Missile Defense Review,” War on the Rocks, February 6, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/the-best-defense-ever-busting-myths-about-the-trump-administrations-missile-defense-review/; and Thomas K. Hensley, Lloyd P. Caviness, Stephanie Vaughn, and Christopher Morton, “Understanding the Indications and Warning Efforts of US Ballistic Missile Defense,” Joint Force Quarterly 78, no. 3 (2015): 91–97.

29 Grateful acknowledgment is made to Dr. James J. Tritten for use of a model originally developed by him in this study. He is not responsible for its use here. For US force structures, see Congressional Budget Office, “Approaches for Managing the Costs of US Nuclear Forces, 2017 to 2046,” Congressional Budget Office, 2017, 33 and 44, http://www.cbo.gov/publications/53211.

30 Jeff Sexton, “Hypersonic Defense Overview,” Missile Defense Agency, 2020, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/SEXTON-MDAHypersonicDefense.pdf.

31 Kristin Huang, “China Boosts its Nuclear Arsenal as World’s Stockpile Shrink,” South China Morning Post, June 15, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3089130/china-boosts-its-nuclear-arsenal-worlds-stockpile-shrinks.

32 Paul W. Glimcher, Ernst Fehr, Colin F. Camerer, and Russell A. Poldrack, eds., Neuroeconomics: Decisionmaking and the Brain (New York: Elsevier, 2014), 111–27.

33 Cooper, Arms Control for the Third Nuclear Age, 163–72. See also: Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger and the New Power Politics (New York: Henry Holt – Times Books, 2012).

34 Barry Pavel and Christian Trotti, “New Tech Will Erode Nuclear Deterrence. The US Must Adapt,” Defense One, November 4, 2021, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/11/new-tech-will-erode-nuclear-deterrence-us-must-adapt/186634/.

35 Grateful acknowledgment is made to Dr. James J. Tritten for use of a model originally developed by him in this study. He is not responsible for its use here. For U.S. force structures, see U.S. Congressional Budget Office, “Approaches for Managing the Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2017 to 2046,” 2017, 33 and 44, http://www.cbo.gov/publications/53211.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Stephen J. Cimbala

Stephen J. Cimbala ([email protected]) is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine, Pennsylvania. An award-winning Penn State teacher, Dr. Cimbala has authored numerous works in the fields of international security and nuclear arms control. His publications include The United States, Russia and Nuclear Peace (Palgrave Macmillan: 2020). He lives in Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania with his wife Betsy, sons Christopher and David, and daughter-in-law Kelly.

Adam Lowther

Adam Lowther ([email protected]) is Director of Multidomain Operations and Professor of Political Science at the Army Management Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. He leads a multidisciplinary department of scientists that conducts research and education on the Army’s warfighting concept. Dr. Lowther served as the founding Director of the School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. He is the author of numerous books and articles.