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Research Articles

Blue homelands and red strongholds: The Libyan Civil War in Turkish and Russian strategy

 

Abstract

Libya’s geopolitical importance stems from its vast energy resources, its position in relation to Southern Europe, and its position at the entrance to the Eastern Mediterranean. Over the last two years, Libya’s civil war has provided an opportunity for Russia and Turkey to compete for long-term strategic gains in the Eastern Mediterranean. This article examines the geopolitics of Libya and the involvement of Russia and Turkey in the Libyan Civil War in the context of their interests and strategies in the Eastern Mediterranean, arguing that Russian and Turkish involvement in Libya broadly follows a deeper pattern of Russian and Turkish strategy in the Mediterranean that began in the 18th Century.

Notes

1 Asli Aydıntaşbaş, “Leverage, for Now: Turkey’s Deal with Russia on Northern Syria,” European Council on Foreign Relations, October 30, 2019. https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_leverage_for_now_turkeys_deal_with_russia_on_northern_syria/.

2 John P. LeDonne, The Grand Strategy of the Russian Empire, 1650-1831 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004), 168.

3 See William Persen, “The Russian Occupations of Beirut, 1772-74,” Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 42, no. 3-4 (1955): 275–86.

4 Roderic H. Davison, "“Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility”: The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered," Slavic Review 35, no. 3 (1976): 464.

5 See Edgar Hösch, “Das sogenannte „griechische Projekt“Katharinas II. Ideologie und Wirklichkeit der russischen Orientpolitik in der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts. In: Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas,” Neue Folge 12 (1964): 168–206.

6 See Norman E. Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean, 1797-1807 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 100–93.

7 See Jay Mens, ""From the Indus to Constantinople": The Napoleonic Wars and the Evolution of a "Middle East", 1798-1809," Asian Affairs 51 (2020): 795–816.

8 See Wolfram Sieram, Metternich: Statesman and Visionary (Harvard University Press, 2019), 197, 230–2, 258, 410–12.

9 Brian E. Vick, The Congress of Vienna: Power and Politics after Napoleon (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 196–225.

10 Charles de Fretcinet, La Question D’Égypte (Calmann-Lévy, 1905), 213.

11 G. D. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli (London: White Lion Publishers, 1974), 71–8.

12 State Department Bulletin, 31 December 1951, In Yaacov Roʼi, From Encroachment to Involvement: A Documentary Study of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1973 (New York: Wiley, 1974), 93.

13 The Berlin Conference, Vol. 2, 302–4. In Ibid., 15.

14 Boris Toucas, “The Geostrategic Importance of the Black Sea Region: A Brief History,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2, 2017. https://www.csis.org/analysis/geostrategic-importance-black-sea-region-brief-history (accessed July 16, 2020).

15 Mens, "From the Indus to Constantinople."

16 A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848–1918 (Oxford University Press, 1954), 61.

17 Seton R. W. Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Eastern Question (New York: Norton Library, 1972), 21.

18 Aimee M. Genell, “Empire by Law: Ottoman Sovereignty and the British Occupation of Egypt, 1882-1923” (PhD thesis, Columbia University, 2013): 19–90.

19 Öncü Edip, “The Beginnings of Ottoman-German Partnership: Diplomatic and Military Relations between Germany and the Ottoman Empire before the First World War” (Master’s thesis, Bilkent University, 2003): 11.

20 Nicola degli Esposti, “An Impossible Friendship: Differences and Similarities between Fascist Italy’s and Kemalist Turkey’s Foreign Policies,” Diacronie 22, no. 2 (2015).

21 Dilek Barlas, “Friends or Foes? Diplomatic Relations between Italy and Turkey, 1923–36,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 36, no. 2 (2004): 239.

22 Degli Esposti, “An Impossible Friendship.”

23 Ibid., 47–55.

24 Ibid.

25 FO 424/285 R6703 G (Halifax to Hugessen, July 5, 1940) cited in Ibid., 11.

26 Recep Tayyep Erdogan, “Turkey Has Become a Powerful Regional Actor,” Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, July 4, 2020. https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/120571/-turkey-has-become-a-powerful-regional-actor-.

27 See Avigdor Levy, “Military Reform and the Problem of Centralization in the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century,” Middle Eastern Studies 18, no. 3 (1982): 227–49.

28 Fehim Tastekin, “Ankara Backs Some Turkmens in Iraqi Politics, Shuns Others,” Al-Monitor, May 30, 2019. https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/05/turkey-iraq-new-conundrum-turkmens.html. The Arab Weekly, “Turkish Intelligence Chief Pushes Ankara’s Interests in Iraq,” June 13, 2020. https://thearabweekly.com/turkish-intelligence-chief-pushes-ankaras-interests-iraq.

29 Eyal Pinko, “Turkey’s Maritime Strategy Ambitions: The Blue Homeland Doctrine (Mavi Vatan),” International Institute for Migration and Security Research, April 10, 2020. https://iimsr.eu/2020/03/31/turkeys-maritime-strategy-ambitions-the-blue-homeland-doctrine-mavi-vatan/.

30 Ibid.

31 Susan Frazer, “Turkey Accuses Five Nations of Forming ‘Alliance of Evil’,” Associated Press, May 12, 2020. https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/turkey-accuses-nations-forming-alliance-evil-70631714.

32 Frederic Wehrey, The Burning Shores: Inside the Battle for the New Libya (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2019), 78–81.

33 Mary Fitzgerald and Mattia Toaldo, “A Quick Guide to Libya’s Main Players,” European Council on Foreign Relations, May 19, 2016. https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_libya_conflict/.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Egyptian State Information Service, “Sisi Reveals ‘Cairo Declaration’ to Resolve Libyan Crisis,” June 6, 2020. https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/147494/Sisi-reveals-Cairo-Declaration-to-resolve-Libyan-crisis?lang=en-us.

37 Emil Aslan Souleimanov, “Russia’s Policy in the Libyan Civil War: A Cautious Engagement,” Middle East Policy 26, no. 2 (2019): 96. https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12424.

38 Market Observatory for Energy, “Registration of Crude Oil Imports and Deliveries in the European Union,” Market Observatory for Energy. European Commission Directorate-General for Energy, 2011. https://web.archive.org/web/20110429003412/https://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/oil/doc/import/coi/eu-coi-from-extra-eu-2010-01-12.pdf.

39 Kemal Kirişci, “As EU-Turkey Migration Agreement Reaches the Five-Year Mark, Add a Job Creation Element,” Brookings Institution, March 18, 2021. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/03/17/as-eu-turkey-migration-agreement-reaches-the-five-year-mark-add-a-job-creation-element/.

40 Marwa Mohamed, “Locked Up with No Escape: Refugees and Migrants in Libya Face Bombs, Virus and Everything in Between,” openDemocracy, May 18, 2020. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/locked-no-escape-refugees-and-migrants-libya-face-bombsvirus-and-everything-between/.

41 The Economist, “Africa’s Population Will Double by 2050.” The Economist, March 26, 2020. https://www.economist.com/special-report/2020/03/26/africas-population-will-double-by-2050.

42 Norman Myers, “Environmental Refugees: An Emergent Security Issue,” 13th Economic Forum, Prague, May 22, 2005. http://www.populationmedia.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/03/norman-myers-environmental-refugees-an-emergent-security-issue.pdf.

43 A common route for migrants from West Africa passes through in Agadez in Niger, then northward to the oasis city of Sabha in Libya’s Fezzan region. Another meets in Gao in Mali, then into Algeria past Tamranasset into Libya. From Western Libya, Italy is the common destination, while from Eastern Libya, migrants travel to Greece, landing on Crete or the Greek mainland. From East Africa, Khartoum in Sudan is a central meeting point which cuts into Libya from its south-East. In Western Libya, the GNA capital at Tripoli is roughly 180 miles to the Italian island of Lampedusa; in Eastern Libya, Derna is roughly 180 miles from Crete and about 240 miles from the Greek mainland.

44 Ismaeel Naar, “Satellite Images, Videos Prove Turkey Violated UN Arms Embargo to Libya: BBC,” Al Arabiya English, May 20, 2020. https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2020/03/26/Turkey-sent-military-tanks-weapons-to-Libya-violating-UN-arms-embargo-BBC.html.

45 Borzou Daragahi, “Turkey Sends Troops and Electronic Warfare Tools to Libya,” The Independent, January 6, 2020. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/turkey-libya-troops-uae-erdogan-haftar-tripoli-a9272116.html.

46 Jemai Guesmi, “Rafale Attacks on Turkish Targets in Al-Watiya Airbase: Egyptian or French?: Jemai Guesmi.” The Arab Weekly, July 6, 2020. https://thearabweekly.com/rafale-attacks-turkish-targets-al-watiya-airbase-egyptian-or-french.

47 Ufuk Necat Tasci, “Ankara: Turkey-Libya Deal in ‘Complete Accordance with International Law,” TRT World, December 5, 2019. https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/ankara-turkey-libya-deal-in-complete-accordance-with-international-law-31910.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Deutsche Welle, “Turkey’s Strategic Play in Libya to Help Reap Economic Gains: DW: 03.07.2020,” July 3, 2020. https://www.dw.com/en/turkeys-strategic-play-in-libya-to-help-reap-economic-gains/a-54037623.

51 Reuters. “Turkey Ready for Fast Reconstruction in Conflict-Torn Libya, Official Says,” Ahram Online, June 19, 2020. http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/372519/World/Region/Turkey-ready-for-fast-reconstruction-in-conflictto.aspx.

52 Samuel Ramani, “Outsiders’ Battle to Rebuild Libya Is Fueling the Civil War There,” Foreign Policy, August 22, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/22/outsiders-battle-to-rebuild-libya-is-fueling-the-civil-war-there/.

53 Orhan Coskun, “Turkey Ready for Fast Reconstruction in Conflict-Torn Libya, Official Says,” Reuters, June 19, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/turkey-libya-security/turkey-ready-for-fast-reconstruction-in-conflict-torn-libya-official-says-idUSL8N2DW37O.

54 Ibid.

55 Jay Mens, “Footing the Bill: Russian and Iranian Investment and American Withdrawal in Syria,” (U.S. Air Force) Journal of European, Middle Eastern, and African Affairs 1, no. 2 (2019): 75–87.

56 Lolita C. Baldor, “US: Russian Jets in Libya Present Broader Worries for Region,” Associated Press, May 29, 2020. https://apnews.com/ff658a981ad679368ccde2a39af679fa.

57 Eric Schmitt, “Russian Attack Jets Back Mercenaries Fighting in Libya,” The New York Times, September 11, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/11/us/politics/russian-jets-mercenaries-libya.html/. Sergey Sukhankin, “Wagner Group in Libya: Weapon of War or Geopolitical Tool?,” Jamestown Foundation, June 26, 2020. https://jamestown.org/program/wagner-group-in-libya-weapon-of-war-or-geopolitical-tool/.

58 Sudarsan Raghavan and Robyn Dixon, “Pentagon Accuses Moscow of Sending Fighter Jets to Back Libyan Warlord,” The Washington Post, May 26, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/pentagon-accuses-moscow-of-sending-fighter-jets-to-back-libyan-warlord/2020/05/26/f26e6446-9f4f-11ea-be06-af5514ee0385_story.html; Ibid.

59 Brian Katz and Joseph S. Bermudez, “Moscow’s Next Front: Russia’s Expanding Military Footprint in Libya,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 13, 2020. https://www.csis.org/analysis/moscows-next-front-russias-expanding-military-footprint-libya. Anna Borchevskaya, “Russia’s Growing Interests in Libya,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 24, 2020. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/russias-growing-interests-in-libya.

60 Ibid.

61 Jakub Bornio, “Deepening Polish-Turkish Cooperation,” Eurasia Daily Monitor (Jamestown Foundation) 18, no. 90. https://jamestown.org/program/deepening-polish-turkish-cooperation/; Sinem Cengiz, “Defense Is Not the Only Driving Force in Turkish-Polish Relations,” Arab News, May 29, 2021. https://www.arabnews.com/node/1866581.

62 Lawrence Freedman, Ukraine and the Art of Strategy (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019), 15.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Jay Mens

Jay Mens ([email protected]) is Managing Director and a Senior Fellow at the Cambridge Middle East and North Africa Forum, a think-tank researching the MENA region at the University of Cambridge. Jay is a regular contributor to Foreign Policy, The Spectator, and The National Interest, among other publications. He is writing a diplomatic history of British and American foreign policy in the Middle East, from 1798 to the present. Jay holds a BA in Politics with Double First Class honors and MPhil in History, both from the University of Cambridge, and is fluent in Arabic, Hebrew and Persian.

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