The INF Treaty, the Alliance, and the Failure of Strategic Realism

Abstract

This paper traces the evolution of the intermediate‐range nuclear forces (INF) proposal for deep arms reductions from the alternatives proposed by strategic realists in the face of growing sentiment for disarmament stemming from the incipient nuclear arms race and the U.S. policy of massive retaliation. The concept of stable strategic deterrence was first put forward, which became the basis for the construct of “mutual assured destruction,” which was, in turn, the rationale for the SALT negotiations. Owing to the unsatisfactory outcomes of the SALT process, the strategic realists regrouped and argued for a new approach of deep and equitable reductions in strategic forces. Rejected by the Soviets under the Carter Administration, the principle of deep reductions was later surprisingly accepted by Gorbachev at Reykjavik. By accepting the realists’ position, Gorbachev forestalled fundamental criticism of disarmament solutions from the realist camp. This paper argues that disarmament is an inherently flawed approach because the security requirements of a nation cannot be subject to common yardsticks of military means. This is illustrated by a short history of the Alliance since 1949. The destabilizing ramifications of INF now necessitate a comprehensive rethinking of the Alliance's strategy of deterrence and defense.