Abstract
The abrupt ending of the cold war has left a vacuum in our strategic thinking. Neither our institutions nor our ways of thinking about national strategy have kept pace with the stunning changes of recent history. Failure to recognize the profound effects of nearly a half‐century of bipolar confrontation has yielded many anachronisms and unresolved ambiguities in our national security strategies. Our instruments of statecraft continue to be influenced, if not guided, by obsolete paradigms and outmoded institutions that are wasteful and counterproductive. These cold war legacies prevent us from effectively managing change and from taking advantage of the unique opportunities offered by the evolving new world order. They particularly threaten to arrest the development of new relations with our former antagonists of the bipolar world order.
New ways of structuring our foreign relations and, particularly, our defense establishment must be found. The very concept of national security must be redefined, particularly its element of strategic nuclear deterrence. New roles and missions for our military forces are particularly needed, if they are to remain relevant and capable in a world that can no longer afford, but still requires, instruments of military power. Most importantly, we must find the leadership to formulate and articulate a new vision of America's role in the new world order.