Private practice: exploring the missing social dimension in ‘reflective practice’

Abstract

In professional education today, Schön's concept of ‘reflective practice’ underpins much thinking about learning at work. This approach – with its emphasis on the inner life of the professional and on her own interpretations of her learning experiences – is increasingly being challenged: often cited objections are that the model ignores factors like power and ideology and that it is too individualistic in its conception of learning. One line of criticism is that Schön's focus on reflection is too individualistic. Another possible fault is that Schön conceives of a practice in an overly individualistic fashion. This is the criticism that I will explore in this paper. Ultimately, a social view is need to explain wherein a practice consists; such a view also throws light on the limitations of relying on reflection to develop professional expertise.

Keywords:

• reflection
• Schön
• practice
• expertise

Notes

1. While there are interesting parallels between MacIntyre's and Searle's accounts, MacIntyre's views have shifted and are hard to interpret (Winch 2010, 11–3). The starting point in what follows will be Searle's interpretation.

2. For instance, he writes that ‘a professional's knowing-in-action is embedded in the socially and institutionally structured context shared by a community of practitioners’ (1987, 33); I thank an anonymous reviewer for Studies in Continuing Education. See below for further discussion.

3. The example is also mentioned in MacIntyre (1984), whose thought parallels Searle's here.

4. The list continues. See Searle (1995).

5. Newman (1999) also suggests the relevance of Wittgenstein for this debate, but does not notice that what Schön advocates is private practices. See Kenny (1973) for a good introduction to Wittgenstein's thought. For a discussion of the question whether language should properly be seen as ‘social’ or as ‘public’, see Malcolm (1989). Either interpretation rules out what Schön has in mind.

6. It is no good to say that you will remember that you did not call a dull headache ‘S’ yesterday, because you may remember wrong. Remembering is just another sort of seeming.

7. And book. Collins (2010).

8. Compare, in this regard, Saltiel's paper in Bradbury et al. (2010)

9. See Kotzee (2010) for a discussion of the problems around standards that constructivism throws up in the classroom.