Government intervention to combat the dynamics of terrorist organizations

Abstract

A model is developed where a government intervenes through time to combat a terrorist organization which usually consists of three labour stocks, that is, committed ideologues for purpose and direction, criminal mercenaries to generate money, and captive participants for support. A government chooses which labour stock to intervene against, and whether to intervene against capital sponsoring. The government’s instantaneous and time accumulated utility is determined. The interdependencies between the three labour stocks and capital sponsoring is modelled with four differential equations. The government weighs the benefits against the costs of intervention. The article illustrates the challenges of determining which labour stock or capital to intervene against. Consequences of the intervention over time are illustrated, how the terrorist organization’s composition is altered, and whether the organization continues to grow, gets constrained, or dies. For example, targeting one labour stock may be beneficial short term, but not long term. Alternatively, targeting capital sponsoring may be counterproductive if the intervention could be more cost effectively directed against the ideologues. Also, eliminating mercenaries may encourage sponsors causing growth of an ideologically committed terrorist organization. The article provides an instrument for how a government may influence and curtail how a terrorist organization evolves through time.

Keywords:

• Terrorism
• ideologues
• mercenaries
• captive participants
• sponsors
• evolution
• government
• intervention
• differential equations
• utility

Acknowledgement

We thank two anonymous referees of this journal for useful comments.

Disclosure statement

No funding was received. No conflict of interest exists. No financial interest or benefit has arisen from the direct applications of the research.