The Measure of a Nation: Lithuanian Identity in the New Century

Abstract

Using original and secondary survey data, the authors study the interaction of ethnic and civic factors that Lithuanians consider salient to their national identity. Factor analysis of the original survey data indicates that there are at least three coherent versions of Lithuanian national identity adhered to by young Lithuanians; two of these are ethnic in nature, while the third is civic. These findings challenge the broader scholarly discussion regarding so-called Eastern and Western nationalism. The analysis also indicates that the version of national identity demonstrated by an individual respondent is related to how that individual views Lithuanian national institutions, history, and character.

Keywords:

• nationalism
• Lithuania
• identity
• surveys
• eastern Europe
• small states

Acknowledgements

The authors owe a debt of gratitude to their research partners in Lithuania and Belarus. Special thanks go to Victor Shadurski and Ineta Dabašinskienė for establishing ties between the University of St. Thomas, Belarusian State University, and Vytautas Magnus University. The authors would also like to thank Regina Jasiulevičienė and Linas Venclauskas for their assistance with administering the surveys at Vytautas Magnus University. The quantitative empirical part of the research is an output of a research project implemented as part of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE). One of the authors (Marharyta Fabrykant) is also grateful for the support of the Laboratory for Comparative Social Research of the HSE. The author would like to thank Ronald Inglehart, Christian Welzel, Eduard Ponarin and Vladimir Magun for their useful comments.

Notes

¹ The particular survey results used in the factor analysis came from a survey of elite Lithuanian youth, and as such we can only attribute these three categories of national identity to that demographic. Nonetheless, comparisons with national-level data (derived from special Eurobarometer surveys on related topics) indicate that the general sentiments of Lithuanian youth are largely similar to the broader population. Exceptions to this finding are discussed in a later section of the paper.

² For more information on this topic, see Crawford, James, ed. 1992. Language Loyalties: A Source Book on the Official English Controversy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

³ Curiously, the great “Lithuanian” poet Adam Mickiewicz, whose work has fired the imaginations of many ardent Lithuanian nationalists, never wrote in Lithuanian. Instead all of his works, including Pan Tadeusz, were written in Polish. Yet, as Synder points out, “Although he never imagined a Lithuania separate from Poland, his images were used by Lithuanian activities ever more confident in their distinct ethnic and national identity” (2003, 29).

⁴ Due to the continued use of the Lithuanian language and demographic dominance of those with Lithuanian nationality in the state during and after the Soviet period, the impact of this law was less apparent and sudden than similar laws in the neighboring Baltic states, where a sizable share of the population with Russian nationality and language skills found themselves excluded (Laitin 1998; Brubaker 2011.)

⁵ For example, see Goujon, 1999; Leshchenko, 2004; Ioffe, 2007; Buhr, Shadurski, and Hoffman 2011; Bekus, 2010.

⁶ For example, Smolicz and Secombe (1985), Geertz (1963), Eastman (1984), and Edwards (1984) adopt this position as it pertains to the use of language as a marker of national identity. Where scholars today do indicate that language plays a bigger role than other potential unifying factors, they emphasize an indirect role for language, recognizing that language holds a number of advantages as a unifying mechanism. Heller (1987), for instance, indicates that a common language allows individuals to engage socially, and in doing so share experiences that promote camaraderie. Fishman (1991) argues that a group’s language is best suited to describe the artifacts and experiences of that particular society and that in this way it shapes the experiences of individuals who share a language in similar ways. Gellner (1983) and Anderson (1991) argue that the emergence of vernacular languages on a wider scale and in print media allowed for a shared identity among people that was not possible in feudal societies, whereas Billig (1995) and Bourdieu (1982) both indicate that national identity is reinforced in everyday “banal” experiences and that, very often, a part of that experience is language.

⁷ This topic is discussed in a forthcoming monograph currently under review. Venklauskas, Linas. “Modern Lithuanian Identity: Transformations and Continuity,” in Lithuanian and Belarusian National Identity in the Context of European Integration, edited by Steven Hoffman and Renee Buhr.

⁸ Scholars of Belarusian nationalism have found that in the 1990s two elite rhetorics predominated. The first was a Soviet-Russophile identity that maintained strong cultural and political ties to Russia (and the naturalness of such ties), due to ethno-linguistic ties between the Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian people, and was prominent among Belarusian leaders, such as President Lukashenka. The opposing elite rhetoric focused on the uniqueness of the Belarusian people, their European roots, and the importance of the Belarusian language to maintenance of a separate Belarusian identity. The public, however, appeared more comfortable with a so-called “Creole” identity that merged aspects of both elite versions. For further reading, see Goujon, 1999; Leshchenko, 2004; Ioffe, 2007.

⁹ De Munck explains the differences between the official version of identity and those held by individuals by distinguishing between their top-down or bottom-up sources. The official version comes from the top down, while the individual’s own notions come from their life experiences (what de Munck refers to as “secondary identities”). These secondary identities “fragment members of the nation into different subgroups” (2005, 213).

¹⁰ The categories of “ethnic” and “civic” in Table 1 were not included in the survey, so as to not prejudice respondents to choose a more or less “appropriate” choice, given the value typically placed on so-called “civic” markers (Brubaker 2004). The data are presented in the “ethnic” and “civic” categories in this table for ease of analysis and based on the understandings of the research team of what markers would generally fit a “civic” or “ethnic” version of identity. However, the research team recognizes that some elements are difficult to place into the ethnic/civic dichotomy, such as “feeling Lithuanian.”

¹¹ Special Eurobarometer surveys are requested by the European Commission in order to gauge public opinion on a particular issue of EU interest. The special Eurobarometers on discrimination in the EU were held in 2009 (with 1022 face-to-face interviews) and 2006 (with 1004 face-to-face interviews).

¹² The special Eurobarometer on attitudes of Europeans towards corruption was conducted in 2009 in Lithuania, and consisted of 1026 face-to-face interviews of Lithuanians.

¹³ The special Eurobarometer on Poverty and Social exclusion consisted of 1017 face-to-face interviews of Lithuanians.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Renee Buhr

Renee L. Buhr is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, MN. Her research interests include nationalism and the impact of EU integration on national identity and nationalist political party performance. She has published on these topics in Nationalities Papers and Government and Opposition.

Marharyta S. Fabrykant

Marharyta Fabrykant is a lecturer at the Chair of Psychology of the Belarusian State University in Minsk, Belarus, and an associate researcher at the Laboratory for Comparative Social Research of the Higher School of Economics in Saint Petersburg, Russia. Her research interests include nationalism, narrative analysis, and modernization vs. neo-traditionalism.

Steven M. Hoffman

Steven M. Hoffman is Professor and Chair of the Political Science department at the University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota. He has published books and articles on a wide range of topics, including energy and environmental policy and various developments in post-Soviet Europe, including energy policy in Belarus. He has also taught and lectured at a number of universities in Europe and the Pacific.