Entitled to Embezzlement? The Case of Successful Executives Working for Rich Heirs

ABSTRACT

In family firms, there is a distinction between family members and nonfamily members. Research reviewed in this article indicates that family firms tend to be operated to enhance the well-being of owning families and their members. Nonfamily executives are often treated as second-class individuals in the organization. There is an asymmetrical distribution of power among family and nonfamily. From the theory of convenience, we apply equity theory in the motivational dimension, principal–agent theory in the opportunity dimension, and neutralization theory in the willingness dimension to shed light on deviant behaviors by nonfamily executives in family firms. We present two case studies from Norway – a former CEO and a former CFO in family firms – who both were sentenced to prison for embezzlement.

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Notes on contributors

Petter Gottschalk

Petter Gottschalk is a professor in the department of leadership and organizational behavior at BI Norwegian Business School in Oslo, Norway. He has been the chief executive officer (CEO) at several companies including ABB Datacables and Norwegian Computing Center. Dr Gottschalk has published extensively on internal investigations, knowledge management, fraud examination, financial crime, police investigations, organized crime, and white-collar crime.

Cecilie Asting

Cecilie Asting is a lecturer in the department of leadership and organizational behavior at BI Norwegian Business School in Oslo, Norway. She has experience from business life in several private companies before she started lecturing in different subjects within the field of organization and leadership. Asting has worked with how technology and media can give new approaches to teaching in higher education.