The Fewer Insider Poachers, the More Normative Compliance: Clues for Managing Poaching in the Shellfish Sector

ABSTRACT

Shellfish poaching is an act of noncompliance with the laws that regulate fisheries governance. In this paper we explored if compliance with shellfishing laws among Galician licensed shellfish-gatherers (NW Spain) is voluntary or motivated by coercive factors. The results reveal that in those communities with a greater degree of compliance, licensed shellfish-gatherers do not poach and comply with the rules voluntarily. The conditions in these communities favor the co-management of resources in such a way that the participation of gatherers in the governance processes, internal cooperation, self-government capacity or participation in enforcement are significantly greater than in communities where there is no compliance. Furthermore, we have explored the perception of the shellfish-gatherers to minimize poaching in their communities. The interviewees distinguished two types of poachers, depending on whether they belong to the shellfishing industry or not. We made recommendations regarding policy to reduce poaching, which combine coercive and normative strategies.

Notes

¹ Ballesteros and Rodríguez-Rodríguez (2018a) compiled a non-exclusive list of 19 types of poachers present along the Galician coast, who were identified by members of the Galician Fishermen’s Association: 1. Insider poachers, 2. Profit-motivated poachers, 3. Unemployed individuals, 4. Needy poachers, 5. Greedy poachers, 6. Poachers for self-consumptiom, 7. Local youths, 8. Family groups, 9. People at risk of or suffering social exclusion, 10. Drug addicts, 11. Bankruptees, 12. Recreational poachers, 13. Professional poachers, 14. Organized poachers, 15. Old-age pensioners, 16. Tourists or holidaymakers, 17. Retired fishermen, 18. Local residents, 19. House-wives.

² These data mean that in 72.7% of the interviewed associations there are individuals who practice insider poaching. Nevertheless, the data obtained do not identify to what degree or how often these practices take place.

³ At the time of the interview fieldwork, poaching was not considered a crime being ruled by administrative punishments as fines. At present, this measure is included in Article 335.2 of the Spanish Criminal Code, including the possibility of imposing legal sanctions for shellfish poaching by way of fines, bans and prison sentences of between 6 months and 2 years (BOE, 2015). However, as García-Mosquera (2019) points out, the Spanish sanctions regime against poaching should be revised to improve the efficacy of the current set of anti-poaching measures, both penal and administrative.

⁴ According to Ostrom (1990) the following conditions must be met for any collective action regarding the management of common resources to be successful: (1) the communities involved in the use of resources and its members must have clearly set out limits; (2) local conditions must be coherent with the appropriation and collaboration rules in place; (3) there must be agreements about collective decisions; (4) there must be internal control mechanisms; (5) there must be a system of progressive penalties; (6) there must be conflict resolution mechanisms; (7) a minimum right to self-organization must be acknowledged.

Additional information

Funding

Hugo M. Ballesteros work has been funded by a Postdoctoral Research Contract by the Xunta de Galicia, Project ED481B 2018/088.

Notes on contributors

Hugo M. Ballesteros

Hugo M. Ballesteros is Postdoctoral researcher at Department of Applied Economics of the University of Santiago de Compostela. He is member of the Fisheries and Natural Resource Economics Research Group. His main areas of interest are related whit fisheries management with emphasis on environmental issues forced by anthropogenic causes as poaching, IUU fishing or discarding. He has recently published in Marine Policy, Ocean & Coastal Management, Deviant Behaviour and Revista Galega de Economía.

Gonzalo Rodríguez-Rodríguez

Gonzalo Rodríguez-Rodríguez is a professor of in the Department of Applied Economics at the Faculty of Economics of Santiago de Compostela. He is Director of the Fisheries and Natural Resource Economics Research Group of Santiago de Compostela University. His primary research includes IUU fishing, market interactions between fisheries and aquaculture, fisheries discards and economic impact of fishing sector. He has recently published in Marine Policy, Fish and Fisheries, Ocean & Coastal Management, Deviant Behaviour, International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business.

Francisco Jesús Ferreiro-Seoane

Francisco Jesús Ferreiro-Seoane. Ph.D. in Economics, Professor of the Political Economy section of the Department of Applied Economics in the Faculties of Law and Political Science at the University of Santiago de Compostela (Spain). He is member of Fisheries Economics Research Group, University of Santiago de Compostela. His main areas of interest are related to political economy, public administration, and public policy.

Helena Martínez-Cabrera

Helena Martínez-Cabrera is Research Assistant at the Department of Applied Economics at the University of Santiago de Compostela and member of the Fisheries and Natural Resource Economics Research Group. She has been involved in two FP7 and one H2020 multidisciplinary research & innovation projects on transitions to sustainability. Specialized in the connections between socio-economic and natural systems, her research interests orbit around societal change, factors that trigger collective action and processes by which quality of life is derived.