Minimal selfhood

Abstract

This Perspective article outlines a concept of minimal selfhood. A central claim is that minimal selfhood is not dependent on possession of a brain, a nervous system or neurons. It will be argued instead that minimal selfhood requires intrinsically reflexive activity, specifically taking the form of self-maintenance, self-reproduction and self-containment. The implications of this in thinking about animal behavior and consciousness will be briefly discussed.

Keywords:

• Minimal self
• intrinsic reflexivity
• organism
• consciousness

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Acknowledgements

I thank Bertram Gerber for reading and improving the manuscript. I am very grateful to Roland Borgards, Martin Heisenberg, Karl Mertens and the participants in my various courses on ‘The Phylogeny of the Self’ for fruitful discussions and feedback. Many thanks also go to Steve Taylor and to Carmen Canales. I should also like to express my gratitude to three anonymous reviewers for their helpful and insightful comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.