Does “Good Governance” Matter? Civil Service Reform in China

Abstract

This article uses the concept of governance proposed to evaluate civil service reform in China. The article examines the objectives of the reform and queries the value of promoting the practices of “good governance.” While emphasizing good governance, the reform cannot achieve the ultimate objectives of “good governance” practices because the administration is not sufficiently insulated from political influence. Political considerations often prevail over sound personnel practices when important staffing decisions are made. The concern for reciprocity undermines a performance appraisal system with a feature of being more discriminating. It is argued that without a more comprehensive structural reform to improve the implementation structure of Chinese government, following doctrines of governance do not necessarily bring about high administrative efficiency and capacity.

Keywords:

• China
• civil service reform
• governance

Notes

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3. Administrative functions include four parts: national construction, economic management, welfare development, and environment protection. For detail, see Huang, D. Q.; Wang, M. G. Dictionary on Chinese Administration and Management (Chinese); Beijing Material Press: Beijing, 1993; 33.

7. Lam and Chan gave an excellent portrayal on how the CCP leaders reduced the scale of the reform in the policy formulation stage so that the reform could not undermine their personnel authority. See Lam, T. C.; Chan, H. S. The Civil Service System: Policy Formulation and Implementation. In China Review 1995, Chi-Kin Lo, C.-K.; Pepper, S.; Tsui, K.-Y., Eds.; The Chinese University Press: Hong Kong, 1995; 2.2–2.35.

16. Pynes, J. E. Human Resources Management for Public and Nonprofit Organizations; Jossey-Bass Publishers: San Francisco, 1997; 122; Klingner, D. E.; Nalbandian, J. Public Personnel Management: Contexts and Strategies; Prentice-Hall: Upper Saddle River, NJ, 1998; 275.

17. Liou, T. K. T. Managing Economic Reforms in Post-Mao China; Praeger Publishers: Westport, 1998; 99; Lee, H. Y. From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China; University of California Press: Berkeley, 1991; 47–76.

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19. Huang H. X. An Analysis of Application for Civil Servants. Outlook Weekly (Chinese) 2004, 47, 34.

21. Burns, J. P., 2004, op cit., p. 38.

28. Burns, J. P., 2004, op cit; 38.

30. Ibid; 13.

31. A Culture of Accountability Stormed the Officialdom of the CCP: Accountability to the Top Has Transformed into Accountability to the Bottom. Mingpao Daily (Chinese) April 24, 2004.

35. Appendix 2: The Method of the Establishment of Non-leading Positions in State Civil Service, the Notice of State Council Concerning Circulation of the Implementation Plan of State Civil Service System. In Law Committee of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (Ed.) Laws and Regulations of the People's Republic of China: Administrative Law Vol. 1 (Chinese); Law Committee of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Beijing, 1993; 3-4-1-IV.19.

38. Chou, B. K. P., 2003, op cit; 97–100.

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45. Chou, B. K. P. The Conflicts and Ambiguities in Implementing Compensation Reform in the Civil Service of China, 1993–2000. Third International Convention of Asian Scholars. Raffles City Convention Centre, Singapore, August 19–22, 2003.

49. Ibid.

56. Chou, K. P. Conflict and Ambiguity in the Implementation, op cit; 214.

60. Wang, G., op cit; 28–29.

61. Study Group of the Research Office of the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee. A Research Report on Stabilizing the Cadres in Bordering Regions and Minority Inhabited Regions. In, Research Office of the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee (Ed.) A Collection of Research Manuscripts of Organization Work Vol. 2. (Chinese); Party Building Readings Press: Beijing, 1999; 294.

62. Study Group of the Organization Department of the CCP Guangxi Autonomous Region Committee. A Research Report on Stabilizing the Cadres in Bordering Regions and Minority Inhabited Regions. In Research Office of the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee (Ed.), op cit; 347.

63. Study Group of the Organization Department of the CCP Qinghai Provincial Committee. A Research on Stabilizing the Cadres in Qingzhang Plateau. In Research Office of the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee (Ed.), op cit; 389.

64. Guo, B. S., op cit; 8.

69. Pynes, J. E. op cit; Klingner, D. E.; Nalbandian, J. op cit.

71. A copy of the regulations can be found in A Collection of Personnel Policies and Regulations (Chinese) 1998, 109 (Jan.), 20–23.

72. Edin, M. State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective. China Quarterly 2003, 173, 35–52; Zhong, Y. Local Government and Politics in China: Challenges from Below; M. E. Sharpe: New York, 2003; 94–127.

73. Chou, B. K. P., 2005, op cit; 54.

76. Chou, B. K. P., 2005, op cit; 52–54.

77. Xu, Q. X. On Value Outlooks Under the Conditions of A Socialist Market Economy (text) Beijing Renmin ribao in Chinese, May 11, 1995, 9. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service FBIS Daily Report―China, June 27, 1995, (PrEx7.10: FBIS-CHI-95-123; 49–51).

79. McGregor Jr., E. B.; Solano, P., op cit; 48.

80. Wen, H. Y., op cit; 6.

82. Tran, E., op cit; 35.

85. This argument is based on the observation of the author when he interviewed some trainees of this course in Shenzhen Institute of Administration in July 1999.

86. Painter, M., op cit; 84.