Determinants of Japanese Local Governments' Decisions Concerning Performance-Based Reward Systems for Teachers

Abstract

This exploratory study asks: What conditions have precipitated or slowed the adoption of a performance-based reward system for teachers by Japanese prefectural governments in charge of human resource management for teachers? Qualitative scrutiny of deliberation processes in two Japanese prefectures suggests that two institutional factors of educational administration—(1) reform orientation and (2) the lack of employee entrenchment—favor the adoption.

Keywords:

• performance-based reward systems
• education
• Japan
• subnational administration

Acknowledgments

This study is a part of my dissertation written at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. I am grateful to my dissertation committee members—Drs. Larry Schroeder, William Duncombe, Soonhee Kim, Robert Bifulco, and Sharon Kioko—and anonymous referees for their insightful comments and guidance.

Notes

¹Tokyo is a metropolis. For Tokyo, I replace prefectural with metropolitan and call its government the “Tokyo Metropolitan Government”—the official English name used by the government, and its assembly the “Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly.”

²The difference in the proportions of union membership in the total number of teachers was within 10 percent around 2000.

³Alternatively, educational administration can be said to be progressive with a high reform orientation and conservative with a low reform orientation.

⁴Fifty-eight comments in 51 Educational Committee meetings (since 1996) contained the phrase at least once.

⁵Some of those affiliated with teachers' unions argued critically that Governor Ishihara was responsible for a series of radical educational reforms in Tokyo (see, for example, Sawafuji, 2005; Kakinuma & Nagano, 2001), and a representative from Tokyo TU perceived that the adoption of a PBRS went quickly once the governor came into power (personal communication, June 29, 2009). In light of this, the governor could have been the reason Tokyo adopted a PBRS earlier than the other prefectures. Strictly speaking, however, the PBRS was not the governor's initiative, because Superintendent Nakajima set up his personal working group before Governor Ishihara came into power in April 1999. By July 1999, the BoE already had a plan to adopt a PBRS by April 2000.

⁶The Shizuoka TU gave credit to the BoE in its newsletter, stating that the BoE “has made efforts to improve the contents of the evaluation, simplifying the documents and procedures, etc., … we must think highly of this to some extent, unlike when the former evaluation system were to be adopted [as in the 50s]” ( Shizuoka Kyōshokuin Kumiai [Shizuoka TU], 2008, trans. by the author).