Can Democratic Governance Be Achieved in Egypt?

Abstract

This article contributes to our understanding of whether democratic governance can be achieved in post-revolution Egypt. It explores the status of three key pillars of democratic governance in the context of the January 2011 People’s Revolution and subsequent political developments through August 2013: (1) inclusive participation, (2) responsive institutions, and (3) adherence to international practices and principles. Available evidence suggests that none of the democratic governance pillars has been realized so far as a result of political instability in Egypt. The article argues that the current political environment is not favorable to achieving democratic governance in Egypt.

Keywords:

• democratic governance
• Arab Spring
• Egypt
• inclusive participation
• revolution

Notes

¹ Beattie (2000) notes that the parliamentary elections took place in Egypt during the late 1800s, and historians have identified two significant periods of multiparty politics in the country. The first occurred following the promulgation of the 1923 constitution after the British declared an end to the Protectorate and Egypt became an independent state. The second began in 1976 under President Sadat and continued until the end of the Mubarak regime (Blaydes, 2011). Tavana (2011) describes that Egypt’s first post-revolutionary political party was established by President Nasser with the decree of the National Charter in 1962. The Charter launched the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) as the country’s premier political party. President Sadat, upon Nasser’s death in 1974, adopted some steps to pluralize the policies and practices of the ASU. The party was split into three groups: the NDP, the National Progressive Unionist Grouping (Tajamu’/Tagammu), and the Ahrar (Liberal) Party.

² The emergency law was first introduced during the June 1967 war. With a brief respite from May 15, 1980, to October 6, 1981, the law has been in force until it was repelled after the 2011 Revolution. It was again imposed, although temporarily, on August 12, 2013, and then lifted after a few months.

³ The political and social dynamics that led to Kefaya’s decline can be divided into four groups: first, Kefaya’s struggle against the state over misuse of power, the manipulation of law, and the control of the media; second, Kefaya’s relationship with Islamists; third, the role of the ruling elites in propagating antidemocratic messages; and fourth, Kefaya’s own internal organizational problems (Oweidat et al., 2008).

⁴ In the wake of the revolution, many youth activists of the MB moved away from the organization and formed a new political party, the Egyptian Current Party (Hizb al-Tayyar al-Masry) (Alexander, 2011).