Nicolas de Condorcet as a forerunner of John Rawls

ABSTRACT

John Rawls proposed two criteria for the delimitation of acceptable inequalities. The universal gain principle requires inequalities to be beneficial for all, and the difference principle requires them to be beneficial for the least advantaged. These principles are commonly believed to have originated in Rawls’s work, but they were both clearly expressed in the writings of Nicolas de Condorcet. Contrary to Rawls, Condorcet did not imbed them in the framework of a social contract, but instead sought their foundations in natural rights. Whereas Rawls recommends us to find out what social arrangements rational reasoners would choose in a hypothetical pre-social situation, Condorcet proposes that we ask the underprivileged in our society whether or not they consider themselves to benefit from the prevailing social and economic inequalities. Thus, Condorcet’s original version of the difference principle puts social inequalities to a different test than its latter-day, hypothetical version.

KEYWORDS:

• Nicolas de Condorcet
• John Rawls
• John Stuart Mill
• difference principle
• universal gain principle
• inequality

1. Introduction

In articles published in 1957 and 1968, John Rawls argued that inequalities should only be accepted if they work out to everyone’s advantage. In his Theory of Justice (1971), this requirement was replaced by a closely related one, according to which inequalities have to benefit the least advantaged members of society (the difference principle). In particular the latter of these principles has given rise to an extensive literature, in which it is commonly taken to have originated in Rawls’s writings. In fact, both these principles were clearly formulated in the late eighteenth century by Nicolas de Condorcet. This historical precedent does not detract from Rawls’s achievements in developing and applying the two principles. However, Condorcet’s use of the principles, which differs from Rawls in being non-contractual and focused on actual acceptance, opens up ways to conceive and apply these principles that may be relevant also in current discussions on equality and fairness.

Section 2 briefly introduces the two Rawlsian principles for the acceptability of inequalities. Section 3 provides the crucial textual evidence from Condorcet, and shows how he applied the principles in concrete discussions of what types of social and economic inequalities are acceptable. Section 4 discusses Condorcet’s rejection of social contract theory and shows how he instead appealed to natural rights theory as a foundation for his delimitation of acceptable inequalities. Section 5 is a brief digression on similar ideas expressed by John Stuart Mill, who might have been influenced by Condorcet. Section 6 begins with a brief discussion of why these historical precedents of central ideas in John Rawls’s theory do not seem to have been discussed in the previous literature. This is followed by a brief summary of how Condorcet’s approach to the two principles differs from that of John Rawls. Section 7 concludes.

2. Rawls’s principles of admissible inequality

As John Rawls himself noted, his theory of justice consists of two main parts. One is his derivation of rational choices in a hypothetical initial situation, and the other a set of principles of justice. Although he deduced the second part from the first, he conceded that one might accept the first part and not the other, or conversely.¹ Our focus will be on the second part, which he presented in a series of versions. The first of these was an article that he published in abbreviated form in 1957 and in full the year after. Here, the principles of justice referred to practices, rather than complete structures of societies:

The first principle is that each person participating in a practice, or affected by it, has an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all; and the second is that inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that they will work out for everyone's advantage and unless the offices to which they attach, or from which they may be gained, are open to all.²

This was repeated with small modifications in an article that he published a decade later.³ In the first edition of A Theory of Justice, the principles were first stated in much the same way as in these articles.⁴ They were then carefully reworked, and finally presented in the following form:

First Principle

Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.

Second Principle

Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:

(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and

(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.⁵

Here, ‘everyone’s advantage’ was replaced by ‘the greatest benefit of the least advantaged’. This modification was retained in all subsequent versions of his principles of justice, including his final restatement in 2001.⁶

1. Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; and

2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle).⁷

The difference principle is commonly recognized as one of John Rawls’s major achievements.⁸ In what follows, the focus will be on the difference principle and its closely related precursor in his articles from 1957, 1958, and 1968. The precursor lacks an established name, but here it will be called the ‘universal gain principle’. The two principles both concern ‘what sorts of inequalities are impermissible’⁹:

• Inequalities are unacceptable unless all members of society benefit from them (the universal gain principle).

• Inequalities are unacceptable unless the least advantaged members of society benefit from them (the difference principle).

In his 1958 paper, Rawls made it clear that he claimed no originality for his principles of justice. They were, he said, ‘well-known in one form or another and appear in many analyses of justice even where the writers differ widely on other matters.’¹⁰ He mentioned three texts as proposing ideas similar to his own principles of justice: a chapter in W.N.D. Lamont’s The Principles of Moral Judgment, a paragraph in Mill’s Utilitarianism, and a paragraph in Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature.¹¹ However, none of these three sources refer to anything that is at all similar to either the universal gain principle or the difference principle. Lamont says that ‘considerable inequalities’ are acceptable, but only if they are necessary for ‘the common good’.¹² However, he does not identify the common good with advantageousness for everyone or for the least advantaged. In the cited paragraph in Utilitarianism, Mill recognizes that everybody has ‘an equal claim to all the means of happiness, except in so far as the inevitable conditions of human life, and the general interest, in which that of every individual is included, set limits to the maxim’.¹³ The ‘general interest’ is usually interpreted as an aggregation of individual interests, and therefore this statement is a far cry from requiring inequalities to be in everyone’s interest, or in that of the most disadvantaged people. In the cited paragraph in his Treatise, Hume said that ‘even every individual person must find himself a gainer’ from ‘the whole system of actions, concurr’d in by the whole society’ (which is consonant with previous social contract theory). He did not apply this criterion specifically to inequalities; but rather focused on property rights and ‘the stability of possession’.¹⁴

In his 1968 article, Rawls referred to a formulation from George Santayana’s Reason in Society (1906), which he also quoted verbatim in both editions of Theory of Justice.¹⁵ According to Santayana, ‘an aristocratic regimen can only be justified by radiating benefit and by proving that were less given to those above, less would be attained by those beneath them.’¹⁶ The statement is vague, does not specifically mention inequality, and is directly followed by a passage that supports a wide range of non-egalitarian social arrangements.¹⁷ Nevertheless, this is, as van Parijs indicates, the closest that Rawls gets to a reference to a previous statement of his difference principle (or, rather, his universal gain principle).¹⁸

3. Condorcet’s statements of the ‘Rawlsian’ principles

Equality is one of the central themes in the writings of Nicolas de Condorcet (1743-1794). Already in his pre-revolutionary writings, he advocated a development of society towards as much equality as possible. In Vie de Turgot (1786), one of his most widely read texts, he discussed how a change in the system of taxation could be performed ‘in a way that restores as much equality as possible.’¹⁹ In an essay on provincial assemblies from 1788, he espoused a general distribution of social goods with ‘as far-reaching equality as possible’.²⁰ His writings during the Revolution reflect an intensified fervour for equality. For instance, he wrote in 1793 that ‘there can be neither true liberty nor justice in a society unless there is true equality’.²¹ In another text from the same year he claimed that ‘the existence of large fortunes is in itself harmful’, and that without economic equality, ‘even the equality of rights cannot be complete and real’.²² In the Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain (published posthumously in 1795), he said that human rights should be maintained ‘with the most complete equality and the most extensive scope.’²³

He expressed the universal gain principle very clearly at least twice. In his 1788 essay on the provincial assemblies, he wrote:

Fortunately it has finally been recognized that all humans have the same rights, that all privileges are unjust unless they are useful for those who do not possess them … ²⁴

In the Esquisse he proposed that social inequalities should gradually give way to:

… this real equality, the ultimate goal of the social art, which even reduces the effects of the natural differences in abilities, does not allow the continued existence of any inequality unless it is useful for everyone’s interest … ²⁵

The first of these two quotes was followed a comparison between a three estate system, which he found objectionable, and a national assembly, on which said:

The same objection cannot be raised against a form in which no distinction is established, since no authority is needed to let people remain in their natural equality, whereas to the contrary, an authority is needed to establish among them an inequality that is not legitimate unless it is necessary for the well-being of the individuals that it places in the lowest rank, and also consented to by them.²⁶

This is a clear statement of the difference principle. In spite of its brevity it has at least three remarkable features. First, it sets the bar high by stating that inequalities can only be legitimate if they are necessary for the welfare of the least advantaged. This means that unequal arrangements that benefit the least advantaged are illegitimate if those benefits could instead have been obtained with less inequality. Secondly, even this is not sufficient, unless the least advantaged themselves actually consent to the unequal arrangements. Assessments by others, such as rulers or scholars, of what is in their interest are not enough. Thirdly, he identifies the lowest rank in society as the social group that is so placed by the specific inequality under discussion, in contradistinction for instance to the group that had the lowest rank prior to the new policy. The distinction might seem unimportant, but it can rise to importance in situations when a previously underprivileged group seizes power.²⁷

These abstract principles were not enough for Condorcet. He went into considerable practical detail concerning the delimitation of acceptable inequalities. He produced several versions of a list of three types of inequalities, which he considered to exhaust the types of inequalities that should be accepted.²⁸ In 1792 he described them as follows:

But suppose that a constitution or the law has brought about the most complete equality. There will still remain three types of inequality whose cause is in nature itself.

First, the inequality of natural abilities … Talents will be useful without ever being dangerous; scholars will serve to enlighten people, not to deceive them … 

The inequality of wealth would exist between isolated families, unless they were composed of bandits. Bad laws increase this inequality, whereas good laws can easily reduce it to stay within just limits … 

Finally, society as a whole is necessarily divided into two classes, those who govern and those who are governed.²⁹

On other occasions he referred to the third category more broadly as ‘certain social functions, which extend beyond what public opinion freely bestows on certain individuals’.³⁰ He wrote extensively on these three limits to equality, in particular the first two of them. His writings on education and on economic arrangements have both been extensively analyzed.³¹ However, by relating them to the universal gain and difference principles for equality, we can see them in a new, unifying perspective.

The first item on his list of acceptable inequalities was the difference in abilities that follows from variations both in inborn talents and in education. Education could reinforce inborn differences, since it was ‘impossible even for an equal instruction not to increase the superiority of those whom nature has endowed more generously.’³² Education would have an equalizing effect,³³ but there were limits to that effect, such as ‘the necessary limits to expenditure, the distribution of people in the territory, and the longer or shorter time that children can devote to education.’³⁴ He regretted that in the existing system of education only ‘a very small number of individuals receive in their childhood an education that would allow them to develop all their natural faculties’, and strongly advocated ‘a form of public instruction that does not let a single talent go unnoticed, but offers them all the help that has up to now been reserved for the children of the rich.’³⁵ However, practical obstacles would prevent such policies from fully achieving their purpose. In particular, the children of some citizens were ‘destined for tough occupations’ and had to start their apprenticeships early in life in order to earn money for the family. They could not receive an as extensive schooling as those destined for other occupations.³⁶ Condorcet saw this as an unavoidable effect of children growing up in families with different resources and traditions. He mentioned the radical remedy of removing all children from their families and raising them together, but concluded that such an ‘absolute equality in education’ could only exist in a slave society.³⁷ The best possible solution was to offer ‘an education that is as equal and universal, and also as complete as the circumstances allow’. It was ‘necessary to provide all equally with the instruction that it is possible to extend to all, but not deny any group of citizens the more advanced instruction which it is impossible to supply to the whole mass of individuals.’³⁸

It would not be unreasonable to consider such an unavoidable inequality as a disadvantage for those who received the shortest education. But Condorcet had a more optimistic view. He was convinced that the resulting inequality would bring advantages also to those who received less education:

The equality of minds and that of education are chimerical. One therefore has to try to make this necessary inequality useful. Now, is not the best way to achieve this to guide the minds to the occupations where they educate others, defend them against errors, contribute to their security, their prosperity, their relief, their happiness, doing this in the exercise of public functions or learned professions; in other words: by replacing skilful people who claim that they govern by educated people who want to do nothing else than to enlighten or serve?³⁹

Importantly, the role of the more educated citizens should be to educate and instruct, not to rule and domineer. This required first and foremost that the less educated citizens were in no need to be ruled, that they ‘may wish to be educated by others, but do not have to be led by them.’⁴⁰ This could not be achieved if they were completely uneducated. They should have ‘an education common to all citizens’, which ‘provides them with the knowledge needed to be free from all dependence in their ordinary actions in civil or political life’. Sufficiently educated citizens would be able to make good use of the instruction and advice offered by an intellectual elite, without subduing to it. Under this condition, inequality in education and competence ‘cannot produce real harms’.⁴¹ On several occasions, Condorcet expressed this view in terms that confirm his adherence to the principle of universal gain and the difference principle:

So, the superiority of some people is very far from being an evil for those who have not received the same advantages. It contributes to the good of everyone, and the talents and the scholars will become a common resource for society.⁴²

As a result, there will no doubt be a larger difference in favour of those with more natural talent … but if this inequality does not subdue one person to another, if it offers the weakest a support, without giving him a master, it is neither an evil nor an injustice … ⁴³

This superiority becomes an advantage even for those who have no part in it, and that is why it exists for them, not against them.⁴⁴

The second of these quotations is particularly interesting since it points in the direction of the difference principle, rather than the universal gain principle.

The second type of inequalities that Condorcet defended as useful for all, even the least advantaged, was the economic inequality that originates in the successful use of economic freedom in trade and industry. It was necessary for ‘the common prosperity’ that individuals could gainfully engage in ‘the acquisition of a new piece of land, the investment of a new capital’ and other such activities.⁴⁵ This would lead to the accumulation of riches, which was not necessarily a bad thing.

The inequality of riches is not contrary to natural law; it is a necessary consequence of the right to property, since this right includes the free use of property and therefore also the liberty to accumulate it indefinitely.⁴⁶

In 1793 he devoted an essay to showing that the inequality in property that resulted from economic freedom and accumulation was to everyone’s advantage. A person who had to work for a living, he said, had an interest in a well-functioning economy. Therefore, the unequal economic structure worked to his advantage:

He has an equal interest that no social trouble, no disruptions of the fortunes, disarranges the order of things that provides him with work, or disturbs the competition that sustains or raises the salary.

It is therefore in his interest that he who can live without working, from a revenue he has procured or received, can use his revenue and his capital, may it be for his expenses, may it even be to increase his fortune by means that are useful for industry, and that fear of losing his property does not make him conceal or hoard his wealth.⁴⁷

In the last two paragraphs of the essay he defended economic inequality by referring both to the interests of all and more specifically to the interests of the less well off:

And this progress, which is due to the property owners, the farmers and the richest capitalists, is useful and even necessary for the prosperity of the less well-off farmers, and the small merchants … 

It is in everyone’s interest that the fortunes are divided; but also that everyone can increase his own fortune without hoarding, and above all that he can be confident that he retain it and benefit from it.⁴⁸

However, he recognized that economic inequalities had disadvantages, which would make them indefensible if allowed to grow too large. The existence of large fortunes was ‘in itself harmful’, and would result in a society where ‘even the equality of rights cannot be complete and real’.⁴⁹ It would be ‘absurd to pretend that it is a source of great happiness to have nothing, provided that one has at one’s side someone who has a lot’.⁵⁰ Although changes would have to be gradual, in the long run

the large fortunes are not necessary for that activity of industry, that favourable distribution of work, that exchange, that growth of capital and riches, which allow the soil to be covered by a more numerous population and which augments, for each generation, the means for affluence and well-being.⁵¹

Therefore, ‘this is not a matter of maintaining a large inequality’. Wise policies would assist ‘nature’s bent, which tends towards equality but halts at the point where it becomes harmful’.⁵²

Before the revolution he claimed that free trade, liberated from the old-fashioned system of privileges, would be sufficient to keep economic inequalities within proper limits.⁵³ Even in 1789 he maintained that although ‘the inequality of fortunes’ was ‘a large evil’, it could be removed with measures of this nature: ‘the liberty of commerce, the simplification of taxes, the division of inheritance, and marriage laws that conform with nature are going to destroy the inequality of riches.’⁵⁴ Writing on the same subject in 1792, he recommended additional measures to keep inequalities within proper bounds, such as ‘that salaries become larger in comparison to the prices of staple foodstuffs’,⁵⁵ distributing ‘among the poor families the means that give them the talents for achieving affluence’, and ensuring that ‘accumulation funds provide destitute citizens with economic resources’.⁵⁶ Similarly, in 1788 he proposed extensive sales of Church lands as a means to obtain money for paying off the public debt, seemingly without any worries about the distributional effects of such measures.⁵⁷ Two years later, he opposed a proposal that the state should sell church lands against paper money (assignats). One of his arguments against this scheme was that it would lead to inflation, another that it would ‘deter the farmers, rural residents, and economizing owners of small properties from making any purchase’, since people with small resources would be unwilling to take the risks involved.⁵⁸ Throughout his life he warned against drastic changes in the economic system, since ‘sudden destruction, the displacement of these fortunes, and even an instantaneous change in their use’ could have disastrous consequences for the economy and ‘condemn several generations to misfortune’. A better strategy would operate ‘by destroying the inequality of fortunes with more gentle means, which would also be more efficient.’⁵⁹

The third type of inequality that Condorcet considered to be admissible was that of certain social functions, primarily the necessary functions of governing. In Idées sur le despotisme (1789) he wrote:

The superiority that a person entrusted with such a function has above those who are subordinated to him by the nature of that function is not contrary to natural law, since it derives from the necessity that certain persons exercise that authority and that others obey. But that superiority becomes contrary to [natural] law if it is made hereditary, if it is extended beyond what is necessary for these functions to be well exercised.⁶⁰

In his pre-revolutionary writings he even claimed that property requirements for franchise were an admissible form of inequality.⁶¹ During the revolution, he changed his mind, and strongly opposed all property or taxation requirements for franchise.⁶²

In 1792 he returned to the topic of equality between governed and governing citizens. He now added several restrictions to those he had mentioned three years earlier. Not only should the ruling functions be non-hereditary, they should also be subject to rotation through frequent elections.⁶³ Furthermore, the distinction between rulers and ruled had to be ‘independent of wealth’.⁶⁴ Thus developed, his third type of admissible inequality appears to refer, essentially, to the time-limited difference in decision-making power between elected officials and their electors.

4. Natural rights rather than a social contract

Condorcet rejected the common assumption that a social contract preceding the formation of a society could be binding for coming generations. He strongly objected both to ideas of an undissolvable contract between a people and a royal family and to

this less servile but not less absurd opinion that a people is chained up to the constitutional forms that were once established, as if the right to change them were not the primary guarantee of all the others, as if human institutions, which necessarily have faults and may be improved anew according as people make themselves more enlightened, could be condemned to eternally remain in their infancy.⁶⁵

Instead of a social contract he often referred to a ‘social pact’, which he described as depending on ‘the immediate majority of the people’.⁶⁶ This was a pact between each individual and the society in which (s)he actually lived. It referred to the current state of the society, not to some historical state.⁶⁷ He repeatedly emphasized that the foundational social arrangements have to be subject to the people’s sovereign decision-making power. For instance, he wrote in 1792 that in each state, ‘the right to establish a constitution and to change it belongs essentially to the people as a whole, and they cannot give up the right to exercise it by any contract or convention.’⁶⁸ His proposed declaration of human rights said: ‘A people always has the right to reexamine, reform and change its constitution. A generation does not have the right to subdue future generations to its own laws.’⁶⁹

Instead of a social contract, Condorcet referred to natural rights as guidelines for the delimitation of acceptable inequalities. In Idées sur le despotism (1789) he said:

The equality among humans which natural law requires excludes any inequality that does not follow necessarily from the nature of humans and of things and which, consequently, is the arbitrary product of social institutions.⁷⁰

He maintained that this delimitation of permissible inequality coincided with his delimitation in terms of the three types of inequalities that we explored in the previous section.⁷¹ However, his views on the relationship between naturalness and necessity are not always easy to disentangle. On the one hand, he frequently referred to the naturalness of certain inequalities as reasons to accept them:

All humans have the same rights, and in this respect equality should be absolute and rigorous, but it is impossible for them to have an equal part of the advantages of society. Nature itself has not wanted it: they are not born with the same organs, the soil where they live is not equally favourable; they cannot all receive the same education; they cannot all make the same use of their strength; they cannot all have an equal part of property, without depriving the human species of all the enjoyments that emanate from a felicitous alliance of knowledge, strength and industry.⁷²

On the other hand, he also maintained that policies should reduce these natural inequalities. The previous quote continues as follows:

The bad laws strengthen the effects of natural inequality; the good laws correct them but do not destroy them.⁷³

Possibly, a stronger emphasis on pushing back the limits set by nature can be discerned in his later writings.

Condorcet’s reflections on how strivings for equality could play out on the international scene were characterized by much more idealism than Realpolitik. In an essay published in 1786 he affirmed that the American Revolution would have positive influence in Europe. It would set a positive example and show the possibility of reform, including a more equal distribution of the work needed to produce the means of welfare and ‘above all through a larger equality in the distribution of these means among the members of society’. With his characteristic unwillingness to see a conflict between commercial liberty and social equality, he described the political task as that of ‘maintaining or creating this equality among the members of a nation, without harming the right of property or restricting the legitimate exercise of freedom’. In this way, ‘far from being reinforced by the misfortune or the weakening of its neighbours, the happiness of a people should to the contrary grow due to the prosperity of the other peoples’.⁷⁴ In a short text from 1792 or 1793, he reiterated the message in more general terms, maintaining that each people was sovereign on its own lands. Despots had to be dethroned, but there was no justification for wars or other conflicts between nations.⁷⁵

5. A digression: John Stuart Mill – inspired by Condorcet?

Although John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) wrote much less than Condorcet on admissible inequalities, on several occasions he advanced the universal gain principle, and arguably also the difference principle. In a newspaper article on the Société des Droits de l'Homme, published in 1834, he summarized his views on inequalities of wealth as follows:

Society will then only be on the most desirable footing, when the proprietary class shall feel compelled to make a clear case to the world in favour of the existing institutions of society; when they shall act under an habitual sense of the necessity of convincing the non-proprietary multitude, that the existing arrangement of property is a real good to them as well as to the rich; and shall feel that the most effectual way to make them think it so, is to make it more and more so in fact.⁷⁶

This can be read as a simplified version of the difference principle, assuming that society is divided into only two classes, the proprietary class and the ‘non-proprietary multitude’.⁷⁷ Notably, he did not consider it to be sufficient that the disadvantaged gain ‘in fact’ from unequal social arrangements. They would also have to be convinced that these arrangements worked to their advantage. In this respect, Mill is closer to Condorcet than to Rawls.

Mill expressed similar views in two passages in his Principles of Political Economy (1848). The first of them is part of an argument about landed property. The second is part of a comparison of a competitive economic system with one requiring strict equality of property.

But it is some hardship to be born into the world and to find all nature’s gifts previously engrossed, and no place left for the new-comer. To reconcile people to this, after they have once admitted into their minds the idea that any moral rights belong to them as human beings, it will always be necessary to convince them that the exclusive appropriation is good for mankind on the whole, themselves included.⁷⁸

It is an abuse of the principle of equality to demand that no individual be permitted to be better off than the rest, when his being so makes none of the others worse off than they otherwise would be.⁷⁹

Both of these statements can be read as expressions of the universal gain principle. The second differs from the versions proposed by Condorcet and Rawls in only requiring that those who receive less in the unequal distribution do not fare worse, not that they fare better.

Finally, in a letter to Arthur Helps, probably written in 1847, Mill emphasized that inequality is in itself an evil, which should be limited as far as possible.

As much inequality as necessarily arises from protecting all persons in the free use of their faculties of body & mind & in the enjoyment of what these can obtain for them, must be submitted to for the sake of a greater good: but I certainly see no necessity for artificially adding to it, while I see much for tempering it, impressing both on the laws & on the usages of mankind as far as possible the contrary tendency.⁸⁰

The restriction of admissible inequality to what is necessary for ‘protecting all persons’ can be seen as an expression of the principle of universal gain.

Mill was thoroughly versed in French philosophical traditions, and well acquainted with Condorcet’s thinking. In his writings, he referred to four of Condorcet’s works.⁸¹ One of them was the Esquisse, which he quoted in 1843 but may very well have read much earlier. As we saw above, it contains a clear statement of the universal gain principle. It is possible that Mill’s views on admissible inequalities were influenced by his reading of Condorcet, but no evidence substantiating such a connection seems to be available.

6. Discussion

Condorcet’s endorsement of the universal gain principle and the difference principle do not seem to have been discussed previously.⁸² This is probably due to the fact that studies of Condorcet and Rawls have been separated both by a language barrier and by a barrier between different branches of philosophy (history of philosophy vs. modern moral and political philosophy).⁸³ It is also remarkable that Mill’s endorsements of the universal gain principle do not seem to have been commented on previously, not even by authors who have set out to compare Mill’s and Rawls’s thinking.⁸⁴ A plausible explanation of this is that studies of Mill’s moral thinking tend to have a strong focus on a selection of his writings that does not include his texts on economics. As we saw above, his most clear formulations of the universal gain principle can be found in Principles of Political Economy.

Arguably, the most important difference between Condorcet’s and Rawls’s uses of the universal gain and difference principles is that whereas Rawls applies the two principles to a hypothetical choice, Condorcet proposes that we apply them directly to concrete contemporary choices in the society we live in. The difference between these two approaches is dramatic. If we follow Condorcet, then we should dismiss the Rawlsian impartial reasoners who were tasked with choosing a social order without knowing what social position they would have in the chosen society. Instead, we should engage the most underprivileged members of our society, who most certainly know what social position they inhabit and what this means in practice, and ask them whether they consider themselves to benefit from the social arrangements that have put them at the bottom.

7. Conclusion

Rawls’s two criteria for acceptable inequalities, the universal gain and difference principles, are both clearly expressed in Condorcet’s writings. From a historical point of view, this finding can improve our understanding of Condorcet’s thought. He applied the two principles in his writings on different topics, in particular education, economics and government. The unity of his views in these different fields comes out more clearly if we consider the general principles for the admissibility of inequalities that he applied to all of them. From the viewpoint of political philosophy, Condorcet provides a way to apply the two principles that differs substantially from Rawls’s proposal. The differences between the two approaches are well worth further analysis, both in terms of their theoretical underpinnings and their practical implications.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971),15. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1999), 14.

2 Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness’ (1957), 653–4. Repeated with minor linguistic changes in Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness’ (1958), 165.

3 Rawls, ‘Distributive Justice’ (1968), 51.

4 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), 60.

5 Ibid., p. 302.

6 Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not metaphysical’ (1985), 227. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 4–5. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1999), 53 and 266.

7 Rawls, Justice as Fairness (2001), 42.

8 The difference principle has often been called a “maximin principle”. (Cf. Rawls, Justice as Fairness (2001), 43n.) See, as examples of a huge literature on the difference principle: Hohm, ‘Formulating Rawls's principles of justice’; Cohen, ‘Democratic Equality’; Van Parijs, ‘Difference principles’; Freeman, ‘Rawls on distributive justice and the difference principle’.

9 Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness’ (1958), 167.

10 Ibid., 166n.

11 Ibid., 166n and 168n-169n.

12 Lamont, The Principles of Moral Judgment, 159.

13 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (1861), CW 10:258. A similar statement can be found in a manuscript written jointly by Mill and Harriet Taylor, CW 21:380.

14 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 319 and 315.

15 Rawls, ‘Distributive Justice: Some Addenda’ (1968), 60n; Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), 74n; Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1999), 64n.

16 Santayana, ‘Reason in Society’, 69.

17 “Such reversion of benefit might take a material form, as when, by commercial guidance and military protection, a greater net product is secured to labour, even after all needful taxes have been levied upon it to support greatness. An industrial and political oligarchy might defend itself on that ground. Or the return might take the less positive form of opportunity, as it does when an aristocratic society has a democratic government. Here the people neither accept guidance nor require protection; but the existence of a rich and irresponsible class offers them an ideal, such as it is, in their ambitious struggles. For they too may grow rich, exercise financial ascendancy, educate their sons like gentlemen, and launch their daughters into fashionable society.” (Santayana, ‘Reason in Society’, 69-70.)

18 van Parijs, ‘Difference principles’, 201.

19 Condorcet, Vie de Turgot (1786), OC 5:129. [“de manière à rétablir le plus d'égalité qu'il est possible”] – Even before the revolution, Condorcet was in favour of a far-reaching tax reform that would have had considerable distributional effects. The tax system under the ancien régime was in his view unfair and inefficient, not least since the nobility and clergy had huge and costly privileges (OC 4:533 and 11:61-97). A large part of the government revenue was collected through indirect taxes, such as the gabelle (salt tax), which were in practice “taxes on the consumption of the poor”. Condorcet, Essai sur la constitution et les fonctions des assemblées provinciales (1788), OC 8:301. [“impôts sur la consommation du pauvre”] He proposed that all taxes should be replaced by a single new tax on the dominant form of capital in France at the time, namely land (OC 8:401-406). This was essentially what Quesnay, Turgot, and other physiocrats had since long advocated.

20 Condorcet, Essai sur la constitution et les fonctions des assemblées provinciales (1788), OC 8:533. [“la plus grande égalité possible”] – Cf. OC 4:619.

21 Condorcet, Journal d'instruction sociale. Prospectus (1793), OC 12:612. [“il ne peut y avoir ni vraie liberté, ni justice, dans une société, si l'égalité n'y est pas réelle”]

22 Condorcet, Sur l'impôt progressif (1793), OC 12:631. [“l'existence des grandes fortunes est nuisible par elle-même”; “l'égalité même des droits ne peut être entière et réelle”]

23 Condorcet, Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain, OC 6:176. [“avec la plus entière égalité comme dans la plus grande étendue.”]

24 Condorcet, Essai sur la constitution et les fonctions des assemblées provinciales (1788), OC 8:231. [“Heureusement on a reconnu, enfin, que tous les hommes avaient les mêmes droits; que tout privilège est injuste, à moins qu'il ne soit utile à ceux qui n'en jouissent pas … ”]

25 Condorcet, Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain, OC 6:237. [“ … cette égalité de fait, dernier but de l'art social, qui, diminuant même les effets de la différence naturelle des facultés, ne laisse plus subsister qu'une inégalité utile à l'intérêt de tous … ”]

26 Condorcet, Essai sur la constitution et les fonctions des assemblées provinciales (1788), OC 8:231-232. [“On ne peut faire la même objection contre une forme où aucune distinction ne serait établie, parce qu'il n'est besoin d'aucune autorité pour laisser les hommes dans leur égalité naturelle, et qu'au contraire il en faut une pour établir entre eux une inégalité qui n'est légitime qu'autant qu'elle est nécessaire au bien-être des individus placés par elle au dernier rang, et consentie par eux-mêmes.”]

27 Rawls had the same standpoint, stating that “the worst off under any scheme of cooperation are simply the individuals who are worst off under that particular scheme.” (Rawls, Justice as Fairness (2001), 59n.)

28 OC 6:244-246, 8:557-558, 9:101-102, and 9:227.

29 Condorcet, De la nature des pouvoirs politiques dans une nation libre (1792), OC 10:603-604. [Mais, en supposant une constitution où la loi ait maintenu l'égalité la plus entière, il reste toujours trois genres d'inégalité dont la cause est dans la nature même.

D'abord, l'inégalité des facultés naturelles … Les talents seront utiles sans jamais être dangereux; les lumières serviront à éclairer les homes, et non à les tromper … .

L'inégalité des richesses existerait entre des familles isolées, si elles n'étaient pas composées de brigands; les mauvaises lois l'accroissent, les bonnes peuvent aisément la réduire à de justes bornes … 

Enfin, toute société se partage nécessairement en deux classes, ceux qui gouvernent, et ceux qui sont gouvernés.]

30 Condorcet, Essai sur la constitution et les fonctions des assemblées provinciales (1788), OC 8:557. [“certaines fonctions sociales, qui s'étend au delà de ce que l'opinion accorde librement à certains individus”]

31 Vial, Condorcet et l’éducation démocratique; Duce, Condorcet on Education; Waldinger, Condorcet; Trénard, ‘Un provincial éclaire’; Rieucau, Nature et diffusion du savoir dans la pensée économique de Condorcet, Les entreprises où les hommes s'exposent à une perte; Whyte, The evolution of Condorcet's ideas during the revolution; Rothschild, Economic Sentiments; Menudo and Rieucau, ‘Une apologie des physiocrates par Condorcet’; Pisanelli, Condorcet et Adam Smith.

32 Condordet, Sur l’instruction publique (1791-1792), OC 7:170. [“impossible qu'une instruction même égale n'augmente pas la supériorité de ceux que la nature a favorisés d'une organisation plus heureuse.”]

33 Condordet, Sur l’instruction publique (1791-1792), OC 7:192. Condorcet, Rapport et projet de décret sur l’organisation générale de l’instruction publique (1792), OC 7:496.

34 Condordet, Rapport et projet de décret sur l’organisation générale de l’instruction publique (1792), OC 7:453. [“les limites nécessaires de la dépense, la distribution des hommes sur le territoire, et le temps, plus ou moins long, que les enfants peuvent y consacrer”]

35 Condordet, Sur l’instruction publique (1791-1792), OC 7:179. [“un très-petit nombre d'individus reçoivent dans leur enfance une instruction qui leur permette de développer toutes leurs facultés naturelles”; “une forme d'instruction publique qui ne laissât échapper aucun talent sans être aperçu, et qui lui offrît alors tous les secours réservés jusqu'ici aux enfants des riches.”]

36 Condordet, Sur l’instruction publique (1791-1792), OC 7:199. [“destinés à des occupations dures”]

37 Condordet, Sur l’instruction publique (1791-1792), OC 7:197-198. [“égalité absolue dans l'éducation”]

38 Rapport et projet de décret sur l’organisation générale de l’instruction publique (1792), OC 7:451. [“d’un côté, l’éducation aussi égale, aussi universelle; de l'autre, aussi complète que les circonstances pouvaient le permettre; qu'il fallait donner à tous également l'instruction qu'il est possible d'étendre sur tous, mais ne refuser à aucune portion des citoyens l'instruction plus élevée, qu'il est impossible de faire partager à la masse entière des individus.”]

39 Condorcet, Rapport et projet de décret sur l’organisation générale de l’instruction publique (1792), OC 7:478n-479n. [“L'égalité des esprits et celle de l'instruction sont des chimères. Il faut donc chercher à rendre utile cette inégalité nécessaire. Or, le moyen le plus sûr d'y parvenir n'est-il pas de diriger les esprits vers les occupations qui mettent un individu en état d'enseigner les autres, de les défendre contre l'erreur; de contribuer à leur sûreté, à leur prospérité, à leur soulagement, à leur bonheur, soit dans l'exercice des fonctions publiques, soit dans les professions qui exigent des lumières; de substituer, en un mot, à des hommes habiles qui prétendraient gouverner, des hommes instruits qui ne veulent qu'éclairer ou servir?”] For similar statements, see OC 7:173 and 7:440-441.

40 Condorcet, Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain, OC 6:249. [“peuvent avoir le désir d'être instruits par les autres, mais n'ont pas besoin d'être conduits par eux.”]

41 Condorcet, De la nature des pouvoirs politiques dans une nation libre (1792), OC 10:603. [“une instruction, commune à tous les citoyens”; “leur donne les connaissances nécessaires pour être affranchis de toute dépendance, dans les actions ordinaires de la vie civile ou politique”; “ne peut produire des maux réels”] See also OC 7:170 and 7:441-442. He also saw education as a remedy against the negative consequences of the division of labour in facturies, which would introduce “both a humiliating inequality and the seeds of dangerous troubles, unless a more extensive education provides the individuals of this class with a resource against the infallible effect of the monotony of their daily activities”. Condorcet, Rapport et projet de décret sur l'organisation générale de l'instruction publique (1792), OC 7:463. [“et une inégalité humiliante, et une semence de troubles dangereux, si une instruction plus étendue n'offrait aux individus de cette même classe une ressource contre l'effet infaillible de la monotonie de leurs occupations journalières”]

42 Condorcet, Sur l’instruction publique (1791-1792), OC 7:170. [“Alors, bien loin que la supériorité de quelques hommes soit un mal pour ceux qui n'ont pas reçu les mêmes avantages, elle contribuera au bien de tous, et les talents comme les lumières deviendront le patrimoine commun de la société.”]

43 Condorcet, Sur l’instruction publique (1791-1792), OC 7:174. [“Il en résultera sans doute une différence plus grande en faveur de ceux qui ont plus de talent naturel … mais si cette inégalité ne soumet pas un homme à un autre, si elle offre un appui au plus faible, sans lui donner un maître, elle n'est ni un mal, ni une injustice … ”] See also Coutel, ‘Condorcet et la question de l'égalité', 682, and Williams, Condorcet and modernity, 284.

44 Condorcet, Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain, OC 6:250. [“C'est alors que cette supériorité devient un avantage pour ceux même qui ne le partagent pas, qu'elle existe pour eux, et non contre eux.”]

45 Condorcet, Sur l’impòt progressif (1793), OC 12:632. [“la prospérité commune”; “l'acquisition d'une nouvelle portion de terre, le placement d'un nouveau capital”] See also OC 4:234.

46 Condorcet, Idées sur le despotism (1789), OC 9:166. [“[L]'inégalité des richesses n'est pas contraire au droit naturel; elle est une suite nécessaire du droit de propriété, puisque ce droit renfermant l'usage libre de la propriété, renferme par conséquent la liberté de les accumuler indéfiniment.”]

47 Condorcet, Que toutes les classes de la societé n’ont qu’un meme intérêt (1793), OC 12:647. [“Il est également intéressé à ce qu'aucun trouble dans la société, aucun bouleversement dans les fortunes, ne dérange ni l'ordre des choses, qui lui assure du travail, ni la concurrence qui en maintient ou en élève le salaire. Son intérêt est donc que celui qui peut vivre sans travail, d'un revenu acquis ou reçu, puisse employer son revenu et ses capitaux, soit pour sa dépense, soit même pour augmenter sa fortune par des moyens utiles à l'industrie, et que la crainte de perdre sa propriété ne le détermine pas à dissimuler sa richesse, ou à thésauriser.”]

48 Condorcet, Que toutes les classes de la societé n’ont qu’un meme intérêt (1793), OC 12:649-650. [“Et ces progrès, dus aux propriétaires, aux cultivateurs, aux capitalistes plus riches, sont utiles, sont nécessaires à la prospérité des cultivateurs moins aisés, et des petits commerçants … L'intérêt de tous est que les fortunes se divisent; mais il l'est aussi que chacun puisse accroître la sienne autrement que par la thésaurisation, et surtout qu'il puisse se croire sûr de la conserver et d'en jouir.”] See also OC 5:359.

49 Condorcet, Sur l'impôt progressif (1793), OC 12:631. [“nuisible par elle-même”; “l'égalité même des droits ne peut être entière et réelle”]

50 Condorcet, Que toutes les classes de la societé n’ont qu’un meme intérêt (1793), OC 12:648. [“absurde de prétendre que c'est un grand bonheur de ne rien avoir, pourvu qu'on ait à côté de soi un homme qui ait beaucoup”] On his criticism of large economic inequalities, see also OC 4:235, 7:388-389, 9:93 and 12:631.

51 Condorcet, Sur l'impôt progressif (1793), OC 12:631. [“les grandes fortunes ne sont point nécessaires à cette activité d'industrie, à cette heureuse distribution de travaux, à cette circulation, à cet accroissement de capitaux, de richesses, qui permet au sol de se couvrir d'une population plus nombreuse, et qui augmente, pour chaque génération, les moyens d'aisance et de bien-être”]

52 Condorcet, Que toutes les classes de la societé n’ont qu’un meme intérêt (1793), OC 12:649-650. [“[i]l ne s'agit pas ici de maintenir une grande inégalité”; “la pente de la nature, qui tend à l'égalité, mais qui l'arrête au point où elle deviendrait nuisible”]

53 Condorcet, Notes sur Voltaire (1784-1789), OC 4:234.

54 Condorcet, Examen sur cette question: Est-il utile de diviser une assemblée nationale en plusiers chambres? (1789), OC 9:351. [“[l]'inégalité des fortunes”; “un grand mal”; “la liberté du commerce, la simplification des impôts, des partages de successions, des lois sur les mariages, conformes à la nature, détruiront l'inégalité des richesses.”] Cf. OC 9:458 and 6:245-246. Similarly, the young John Stuart Mill wrote in 1836 that a “commercial civilization” had “a tendency to equalization” (CW 18:192; cf. CW 18:50). He does not seem to have repeated that claim in later years.

55 Condorcet, Sur les troubles relatifs aux subsistances (1792), OC 12:316. [“que les salaires deviennent plus forts par rapport au prix des denrées”]

56 Condorcet, De la nature des pouvoirs politiques dans une nation libre (1792), OC 10:604. [“dans les familles pauvres, les moyens que donnent les talents pour acquérir de l'aisance”; “des caisses d'accumulation offrent des ressources à l'économie des citoyens indigents”] Cf. OC 12:421.

57 Condorcet, Essai sur la constitution et les fonctions des assemblées provinciales (1788), OC 8:442-443 and 8:647-648.

58 Condorcet, Sur la proposition d'acquitter la dette exigible en assignats (1790), OC 11:495. [“éloigner des acquisitions les cultivateurs, les habitants des campagnes, les petits propriétaires qui économisent sur leur revenu”] On Condorcet’s views on the assignats and the national debt see Whatmore ‘Commerce, Constitutions' and Whyte, The evolution of Condorcet's ideas.

59 Condorcet, Sur l’impòt progressif (1793), OC 12:631. [“la destruction subite, le déplacement de ces fortunes, et même le changement instantané de leur emploi”; “condamner plusieurs générations au malheur”; “en détruisant l'inégalité de fortunes par des moyens plus doux, qui même seraient plus efficaces”] Cf. OC 8:533 for a similar statement in 1788.

60 Condorcet, Idées sur le despotism (1789), OC 9:166-167. [“[L]a supériorité qu'un homme chargé d'une telle fonction a sur ceux qui lui sont subordonnés par la nature de cette fonction, n'est pas contraire au droit naturel, parce qu'elle dérive de la nécessité que certains hommes exercent cette autorité, et que d'autres y obéissent. Mais cette supériorité devient contraire au droit, si on la rend héréditaire, si elle s'étend au delà de ce qui est nécessaire pour que ces fonctions soient bien exercées.”]

61 OC 8:128-130, 9: 167, and 11:170.

62 Alengry, Condorcet, guide de la révolution française, 434–52. Condorcet’s pamphlet against property and taxation requirements for suffrage, Sur le marc d’argent (1791), can be found in OCC 20: 69-88. It was not included in OC.

63 Condorcet, De la nature des pouvoirs politiques dans une nation libre (1792), OC 10:605.

64 Condorcet, De la nature des pouvoirs politiques dans une nation libre (1792), OC 10:604. [“indépendante de la richesse”]

65 Condorcet, Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain, OC 6:177. [“cette opinion moins servile, mais non moins absurde, qui enchaînait un peuple aux formes de constitution une fois établies, comme si le droit de les changer n'était pas la première garantie de tous les autres; comme si les institutions humaines, nécessairement défectueuses et susceptibles d'une perfection nouvelle à mesure que les hommes s'éclairent, pouvaient être condamnées à une éternelle durée de leur enfance”] See also OC 10:51-52, 12:109, 12:195-204 and 12:284.

66 Condorcet, Plan de constitution, présenté à la convention nationale les 15 et 16 février 1793, OC 12:366. [“pacte sociale”; “la majorité immediate du people”] For other uses of the term “pacte sociale”, see OC 6:262, 6:427, 12:271, 12:417, 12:499, and 12:620. The distinction that he made between “contrat social” and “pacte sociale” was not generally made. For instance, Rousseau used the two phrases as synonyms (Mintzker, ‘A Word Newly Introduced into Language’).

67 Alengry, Condorcet, guide de la révolution française, 382 and 794–6, Niklaus, Condorcet et Montesquieu, esp. p. 402, and Williams, Condorcet and modernity, 56–7 and 69–75. Condorcet has often been claimed to be an advocate of social contract theory, but such claims lack textual support. For instance Albertone, ‘Enlightenment and revolution’, 132 and 142 claims that he subscribed to social contract theory, and refers to OC 8:169-173 in support of this. However, no reference to a social contract is made, either there or in OC 7:169-173 where the intended text can be found.

68 Condorcet, La République française aux hommes libres (1792), OC 12:109. [“le droit d'établir une constitution et de la changer, appartient essentiellement à l'universalité du peuple, qui même ne peut aliéner par aucun contrat, par aucune convention, le pouvoir de l'exercer.”]

69 Condorcet, Plan de constitution, présenté à la convention nationale les 15 et 16 février 1793, OC 12:244. [“Un peuple a toujours le droit de revoir, de réformer et de changer sa constitution. Une generation n'a pas le droit d'assujettir à ses lois les générations futures.”] See also OC 9:271 and 12:203. In his pre-revolutionary writings, Condorcet emphasized that the legislative power was always restricted by natural law; see OC 5:464 and 11:162.

70 Condorcet, Idées sur le despotism (1789) OC 9:166. [“L'égalité que le droit naturel exige entre les hommes, exclut toute inégalité qui n'est pas une suite nécessaire de la nature de l'homme et des choses, et qui, par conséquent, serait l'ouvrage arbitraire des institutions sociales.”]

71 Condorcet, Lettres d'un gentilhomme à messieurs du tiers état (1789), OC 9:227. Cf. OC 10:603-604.

72 Condorcet, Sur le préjugé qui suppose une contrariété d’intérêts entre Paris et les provinces (1790), OC 10:146. [“Les hommes ont les mêmes droits et, à cet égard, l'égalité doit être absolue et rigoureuse; mais il est impossible qu'ils aient une part égale dans les avantages de la société. La nature même ne l'a pas voulu: ils ne naissent pas avec les mêmes organes; le sol où ils vivent n'est pas également favorisé; tous ne peuvent recevoir la même éducation; tous ne peuvent pas faire le même usage de leurs forces; tous ne pourraient avoir une part égale de propriété, sans priver l'espèce humaine entière de toutes les jouissances qui naissent d'un heureux concert de lumières, de forces, d'industrie.”]

73 Condorcet, Sur le préjugé qui suppose une contrariété d’intérêts entre Paris et les provinces (1790), OC 10:146-147. [“Les mauvaises lois augmentent les effets de l'inégalité naturelle; les bonnes lois les corrigent, mais ne les détruisent pas.”] For additional examples of the tension between naturalness and social improvement, see OC 6:246-247 and 12:375-376.

74 Condorcet, De l'influence de la révolution d'Amérique sur l'Europe. (1786) OC 8:9. [“surtout par une plus grande égalité dans la distribution de ces moyens entre les membres de la société”; “à maintenir ou à rétablir cette égalité entre les membres d'une nation, sans nuire au droit de propriété, sans gêner l'exercice légitime de la liberté”; “le bonheur d'un peuple, loin de s'accroître par le malheur ou l'affaiblissement de ses voisins, doit augmenter, au contraire, par la prospérité des autres peuples”]. Cf. OC 8:19 and 8:39.

75 Condorcet, La république française aux hommes libres, OC 12:109-119. This text is dated 1792 in OC, but Alengry (Condorcet, guide de la révolution française, 186) argues that it is probably from early 1793.

76 John Stuart Mill, “Fontana and Prati’s St. Simonism in London” (1834), CW 23:674.

77 Under this idealized assumption, the difference principle and the universal gain principle will coincide.

78 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy (1848), CW 2:230.

79 Ibid, CW 3:980.

80 John Stuart Mill, letter to Arthur Helps (1847?), CW 17:2002.

81 Life of Turgot (CW 1:115, 117, 7:18. Cf. CW 16:1497), Vie de Voltaire (CW 20:66, 26:341), Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain (CW 8:832), and Rapport et projet de décret sur l’organisation générale de l’instruction publique (CW 23:519).

82 His endorsement of the universal gain principle was briefly mentioned in Hansson, ‘Introduktion till John Rawls’, 12, and Hansson, ‘Equity, Equality, and Egalitarianism’, 534.

83 There is no reason to believe that Rawls had any detailed knowledge of Condorcet’s views on equality. However, he was aware of Condorcet’s work on social choice. He mentioned Condorcet’s jury theorem in A Theory of Justice (Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), 358, A Theory of Justice (1999), 314–5), but only with an indirect citation (Black, Theory of Committees and Elections, 159–165). As pointed out by an anonymous referee, his close colleague Judith Shklar wrote and probably also taught about Condorcet (Shklar, After Utopia, Review of KM Baker, Condorcet).

84 One example is West, ‘Mill and Rawls’.