http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1717-6777
![Sample our Global Development journals, sign in here to start your access, latest two full volumes FREE to you for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5929/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Global-Development.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
China is a major investor in hydropower in mainland Southeast Asia. These investments have triggered substantial public concern, with anti-Chinese attitudes intensifying across the region. Yet, Chinese involvement varies across the region. We examine the “practices and perceptions” of Chinese hydropower investment in Vietnam and Myanmar, attending to the framing of dominant explanations of these investments. We caution against reinforcing xenophobic narratives about China, and urge scholars to consider what these narratives obscure. Our concern is that exceptionalising the role of Chinese investors overlooks foundational issues regarding local participation and environmental governance.
RÉSUMÉ
La Chine est un investisseur majeur dans le secteur de l’hydroélectricité en Asie du Sud-Est continentale. Ces investissements ont suscité des inquiétudes importantes et des attitudes antichinoises se sont intensifiées à travers la région. Toutefois, la présence chinoise varie à travers la région. Nous examinons les « pratiques et perceptions » de l’investissement hydroélectrique chinois au Vietnam et au Myanmar en insistant sur les explications dominantes de ces investissements. Nous mettons en garde contre le renforcement de récits xénophobes sur la Chine et encourageons les universitaires à analyser ce qu’occultent ces récits. Notre préoccupation est que l’exceptionalisation du rôle des investisseurs chinois passe sous silence des enjeux fondamentaux concernant la participation locale et la gouvernance environnementale.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the individuals and organisations who agreed to be interviewed for this work, in addition to Dr Peter Vandergeest for continued conversations on this and other work. We also appreciate the work of the organisers of the LDPI “Land Grab” Conference in Chiang Mai, and the special issue editors, particularly Dr Jun Borras for his continued support for this “outsider critique” of investment. Finally, thank you to Mr Michael Cook for his eloquent writing advice and editing support.
Notes on contributors
Vanessa Lamb (PhD, York University, 2014) is a lecturer in the School of Geogeraphy, University of Melbourne. She recently completed the inaugural Urban Climate Resilience in Southeast Asia (UCRSEA) research fellowship at the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto, Canada. Her current research focuses on accountability and decision-making processes of water governance in the Salween River Basin.
Nga Dao is co-founder and director of the Centre for Water Resources Conservation and Development (WARECOD), an environmental organisation in Vietnam. She holds a PhD in human geography from York University, Toronto, Canada. Her research focuses on the political ecology of water governance and agrarian transformations in upland Vietnam and mainland Southeast Asia.
ORCID
Vanessa Lamb http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1717-6777
Notes
1. In our assessment of China’s investment, two caveats pertain throughout. First, we recognise that China is not a homogenous entity, although the data we present sometimes treat it as such; second, we do not make an argument for increased Chinese investment.
2. http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2014/11/27/vietnam-yields-cautionary-tale-over-chinese-investment/
3. It is well established that Myanmar had a “xenophobia problem” before 2010. In a widely circulated opinion piece (Gecker Citation2008), Myanmar expert Sean Turnell was quoted explaining that the military leadership “is extraordinarily xenophobic. They are afraid of everything” (see also Lintner Citation2011). See also the portrayal of China in Thailand (Hodal Citation2012) and Vietnam (O’Flaherty Citation2011).
4. For example, power relations are only mentioned in only one section of Urban et al.’s (Citation2013, 320–321) analysis.
6. https://chinabystander.wordpress.com/2012/07/04/sinohydro-looks-to-restart-work-onmore-myanmar-dams/
7. While the Salween projects have both Chinese and Thai investment, China was the sole investor in the Myitsone project. Note also that “Tasang” was the previous name for the Mong Ton dam.
9. Since 2011, FDI in Myanmar has actually dropped (Gronholt-Pedersen Citation2013), and this has been linked to the stalling of the Myitsone project. While the removal of USD3.6 billion undoubtedly alters overall FDI statistics, because the Myanmar Investment Commission excludes from its data informal flows and some sensitive deals involving the military, the accuracy of the figures on Chinese investment may be questionable.
10. Matthews (Citation2012, 392) writes that Thai investments in Laos are driven by “the structure and politics of the Thai electricity sector, private-sector profiteering and a strong domestic civil society”, and that, similar to our case, they are “enabled by Laos’ weak enforcement of laws, a lack of capacity to regulate development, the existence of corruption and a tightly controlled state”.
11. This is indeed a different kind of “case” than the project-focused case of Hatgyi dam in Myanmar presented above, as it is focused on the particular theme of the workers. There are two reasons for this: first, the author, Dao – a Vietnamese national – was unable to carry out project-level interviews with the intended project due to security issues; and second, the issue of Chinese workers is a robust thematic “case” meant to bring to light concerns about hydropower, which are not necessarily unique to Vietnam.
12. According to reports, upon completion of these hydropower projects the Chinese workers will be expected to move to other ones in the region.
