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The conditions of realizability of two game-theoretic optimality principles are considered. The first generalizes the notion of core in cooperative games (the domination is considered only for coalitions from a certain set of player's sets). The second,
-stability, is defined for noncooperative games. A strategy vector is called
-stable, if it is stable for all coalitions of
. A correspondence between these principles is investigated.
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