Abstract
Discourse on common pool resources that are governed by common property regimes is commonly characterized by ‘tragedy’ and ‘threats’ to ‘community’ cooperation. This article questions the relevance of these notions in relation to changing rural reality in the hills of Nepal. Farmers individualize water tenure to overcome the shortcomings of common property regime irrigation for diversified crops. While cooperation in irrigation may decrease, new types of cooperation emerge that reflect a wider range of institutions suited to diversified and complex livelihood portfolios.
Notes
1. Common property regimes are social arrangements that denote structured modes of common pool resource governance and tenure.
2. Repeat-study methodology was chosen for this study because of the availability of a comparative base in the shape of monitoring studies collected by the author when, from 1992 to 1995, he was employed in the International Labour Organization’s Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project as a monitoring and evaluation officer.
3. Usually public goods, private goods, common pool goods and toll goods.