ABSTRACT
This article explores how the idea of a canal connecting the Dead Sea with either the Red Sea or the Mediterranean Sea has evolved. It analyzes the proposals, the official interests, and the undeclared reasons. It provides a critical understanding of the discourses behind the complex hydro-political dynamics in a changing and contested topography within the context of a wider geopolitical conflict. This study sheds lights on the relations between interests, discourses, and the canal project. This study contributes to the literature on water history by shedding light on the evolving relations between interests, discourses, and the canal project.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. Page numbers of quotations from the book by William Allen refer to pages in the reprinted version in North American Review.
2. UNGA resolutions 36/150 (16/12/1981), 37/122 (16/12/1982), 38/85 (15/12/1983), 39/101 (14/12/1984), 40/167 (16/12/1985) and UNEP decision 11/4 of 8th meeting 23 May 1983, including vote declarations.
3. In 2005, the Palestinians also agreed to support this project. However, the Palestinian role, according to the terms of reference published in April 2005 by the World Bank for a feasibility study of the project, shows the different role of the three actors: the RSDSC ‘is one of the projects being promoted by Jordan and Israel, and indirectly by the Palestinian Authority’ (World Bank, Citation2005). The feasibility study would further investigate the preferred alignment of Wadi Arabah/Arava identified in the 1996-1998 pre-feasibility study.