https://orcid.org/0009-0001-5394-0229
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ABSTRACT
This paper contributes to the critical hydropolitics literature by introducing the power–interests–identity nexus framework and addresses how it shapes decisions and (re)actions to transform or maintain water conflicts. The framework is investigated using the Helmand/Hirmand river basin, shared by Afghanistan and Iran. It elucidates which factors led to the transformation of Iran–Afghanistan water conflicts and the signing of the 1973 Treaty, as well as the influential factors that have contributed to its maintenance in the 2020s. The results demonstrate using the framework provides comprehensive insight by identifying the influential latent factors of transboundary water arrangements.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to extend their sincere appreciation to the editorial team and the reviewers for their valuable guidance, insightful feedback and support throughout the publication process.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Correction Statement
This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Notes
1. Although both realism and constructivism in international relations acknowledge the importance of interests in shaping state behaviour, they differ in their understanding of how interests are formed.
2. The PIIN framework would mostly be grouped under the constructivism school of thought but given the state-centricity and importance of power, it could denote bridging structural realism and constructivism.
3. There are several advantages to adopting Lukes’ (Citation2005) power framework for the PIIN analysis. First, Luke’s framework provides a comprehensive understanding of power that goes beyond traditional views of power as simply the ability to influence others. Second, it emphasizes the importance of discourse in shaping power relations. However, some critics argue that discourse analysis, which is a key component of Luke’s framework, can be overly subjective and lacks empirical rigour (Dowding, Citation2006).
4. Interests are beliefs about the mode of fulfilling needs (Wendt, Citation1999; ideological and material) and needs can be constructed, and are changeable.
5. The state of being other or different.
6. For example, the politician’s identity constitutes a need for votes and an interest in getting re-elected; the identity of a professor constitutes a need for teaching and publishing and an interest in getting tenure (Wendt, Citation1999). Thus, actors cannot know what they ‘need’ until they know who they are.
7. ‘The hydraulic mission entails that the state, embodied in an autonomous hydrocracy, takes the lead in water resources development to capture as much water as possible for human uses’ (Wester et al., Citation2009).
8. In international relations, negative and positive security are both recognized (Gjorv, Citation2012). Negative security refers to the absence of threats to the state, individual and ecosystem, whereas positive security is the desired state where all stakeholders are satisfied.
9. This strategy is illustrated by the 1947 statement by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (adopted from Nagheeby and Rieu-Clarke, Citation2020):
‘The United States and Great Britain are keenly aware of this Soviet interest, which may threaten the strong traditional British influence in Afghanistan and adjacent areas. It is an important part of American policy in the Middle East that no state in the area shall have its independence and integrity endangered and that American influence be maintained and strengthened wherever possible. A dispute such as the one between Iran and Afghanistan over the Helmand River threatens this policy.’
10. Typically, donors from around the world are reluctant to fund water-storage initiatives situated in river basins fraught with conflict.
11. Consequently, in September 1974, Iran and Afghanistan signed a five-year agreement on transit in Kabul.
12. Generally, environmental awareness and the importance of protecting its rights emerged in the 1980s with the ‘Reflexive Modernity–Green’ paradigm. Thus, the neglect of Hamoun’s water rights in the 1973 Helmand Water Treaty contradicts this paradigm.
13. In the 21st century, the USA, Canada, Denmark, India, China, Turkey, and international organizations have invested in Helmand Valley projects.
14. The reason for constructing an identity around water is that Afghans can gain power from it.
15. Although they believe that water can be sold to Iran, this highlights that water has been constructed as an Afghan identity. In reality, water is simply a natural resource and not an identity to Afghans.
16. Introduced by Wendt (Citation1994).
17. During Ghani’s presidency, Iran was assumed to be the USA’s adversary due to Iran’s peaceful nuclear activity, and Afghanistan attempted to create an enemy from Iran to become a friend of the USA.
18. The presence of contradictions between claims and realities strengthens the argument that naturalization is being utilized in the HRB. Zeitoun et al. (Citation2020) refer to it as a scapegoat tactic, where climate change is blamed for human-manufactured issues, which are then justified under the guise of natural events. Consequently, naturalization appears to be a sanction discourse strategy for the upstream country to justify the HRB’s reduced water level in terms of climate change and low precipitation, while avoiding cooperation for monitoring the treaty’s implementation and fact-finding for the disappearing Hamoun wetlands.
19. Adopted from Andik (Citation2023).