Incentives for knowledge sharing among engineering partners based on engineering programs and contract designs

ABSTRACT

In the era of a knowledge economy, knowledge has become the primary source of value creation, replacing labor and capital, with knowledge sharing effectively amplifying the application value of knowledge. Therefore, this study investigates knowledge-sharing mechanisms and the adaptive mechanism that supports the execution and development of a model to determine the project duration while seeking out bids from engineering contractors. In view of this, the vibrant motivation model for knowledge sharing in engineering partnerships is proposed using differential game theory with three forms of agreements: zero risk distribution agreement (ZRDA), risk distribution agreement (RDA), and consolidated policy agreement (CPA). Parameter comparisons are made using a predictive model and a mathematical modeling strategy. The findings demonstrate that the maximum quantity of shared knowledge and the maximum reward are at their highest levels of knowledge sharing expenses with the consolidated policy agreement. Models developed in this research provide theoretical guidelines for designing knowledge-sharing incentives. This study will be helpful to the body of knowledge on engineering partnership by introducing the game theory concept, which validates the importance of incentives for knowledge sharing in partnership contracts.

KEYWORDS:

• Engineering partnership
• knowledge sharing
• knowledge management
• construction management

Nomenclature

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Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the National Social Science Fund of China [19BTQ035].