The Utopianism of Hamilton's State of Needs: on rights, deliberation, and the nature of politics

Abstract

This article explores the role and conception of politics in Lawrence Hamilton's The Political Philosophy of Needs (Cambridge, 2003), including his critique of the 'rights-preference couple' and of rights in general; his critique of deliberation; and his view regarding the role of political philosophy. It argues that his theory rests on a remarkably high epistemic, moral and political confidence in the state, or rather in what states might be capable of becoming; equally, it rests on an underexplored understanding of the nature of politics itself. The article also criticizes Hamilton's approach to needs by comparing it to the needs approach of Wiggins and the capabilities approach of Alkire, arguing that the difference is not as great as Hamilton believes. Finally, it is suggested that Hamilton needs additional elements to his argument to show how a state of needs could be psychologically and politically self-sustaining.