Problems with the ‘physical’ in physicalism

¹An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Congress of the Philosophical Society of Southern Africa in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, 12–14 January 2015. I would like to thank David Spurrett for his critical comments on drafts of this paper.

Abstract

Hempel's Dilemma is a challenge that has to be met by any formulation of physicalism that specifies the physical by reference to a particular physical theory. It poses the problem that if one's specification of the physical is ‘current’ physical theory, then the physicalism which depends on it is false because current physics is false; and if the specification of the physical is a future or an ideal physics, the physicalism based on it would be trivial as it would be tautologously true, or because very little (if anything at all) can be inferred from or about a physics that does not yet exist. I review the reasons for thinking that the dilemma is a perpetual problem for currentist specifications of the physical, then introduce the argument that the standard positions on the specification question are wanting because they lack a generality which physicalism is generally accepted to have. I end with a suggestion for a way forward for physicalism.

Notes

¹ An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Congress of the Philosophical Society of Southern Africa in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, 12–14 January 2015. I would like to thank David Spurrett for his critical comments on drafts of this paper.