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Abstract
President Nelson Mandela was confronted with a vexing foreign policy problem immediately upon taking power in 1994 – how to balance South Africa’s formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC) – a state of affairs inherited from the apartheid government – with the demand of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) that it be acknowledged as the sole government of China. This article draws on archival records and interviews with officials in the Mandela administration to shed light on the texture and timing of the Mandela administration’s China choice. This analysis reveals the range of historical, economic, personal and political factors that contributed to the Mandela administration’s initial effort to adopt an unprecedented two Chinas policy. It then explains why South Africa abruptly abandoned this dual China approach and switched recognition from the ROC to the PRC.
Acknowledgements
This paper benefitted from the recollections and insights of many of the key South African decision-makers involved in their country’s China choice. The authors would like to thank the following officials for generously agreeing to research interviews: Iaan Basson, PJ Botha, Pierre Dietrichsen, Leo ‘Rusty’ Evans, Nina Karen Human, Pallo Jordan, Aziz Pahad, Zola Skweyiya, and Max Sisulu. The authors also benefitted from Ronel Jansen van Vuuren’s assistance at the archives of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, and the help of Mosanku Maamoe at the University of Fort Hare’s Liberation Archives. Hung-ting Teng was invaluable in helping to translate sections of the memoirs of Loh I-Cheng from Mandarin to English. Dr Gary Song-Huann Lin provided several important insights, and Professors Michelle Small and Arianna Lissoni suggested many helpful revisions.
Notes
1 University of Fort Hare (hereafter UFH), National Heritage Cultural Studies Centre (NAHECS), Nelson Mandela Papers (NMP), Box 245, File 2, Letter from J. Duarte (Office of the President) to ANC Department of International Affairs (hereafter DIA), 6 August 1991.
2 S. Wei, ‘Some Reflections on the One-China Principle’, Fordham International Law Journal, 23 (1999), 1169–1178.
3 G. Lin, ‘The Relations between the Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa’ (PhD thesis, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, May 2001), 121.
4 Editorial, ‘Comment: One China’, Business Day, 19 August 1993; ‘SA and the two Chinas’, The Natal Mercury, Editorial, 23 August 1993; P. Jordan, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 14 March 2017; J. Viljoen, ‘Between the ROC and a Hard Place’, in P. Wolvaardt, T. Wheeler and W. Scholtz, eds, From Verwoerd to Mandela: South African Diplomats Remember, Vol. 2 (Johannesburg: Crink Books, 2010), 164. Viljoen was posted as South Africa’s Ambassador to Taiwan in 1993 but recalls ‘Since Taiwan was a strong supporter of the Apartheid government it was generally expected that an ANC-led government would abrogate diplomatic ties with Taiwan …’. This led him to believe that he ‘would probably not serve a full term’.
5 Department of Foreign Affairs (hereafter DFA), South African Foreign Policy: Discussion Document, June 1996, http://www.gov.za/documents/foreign-policy-south-africa-discussion-document, accessed December 2016.
6 SAPA-AFP, ‘Taiwan Gratified by SA’s Stance’, The Citizen, 28 August 1996.
7 ‘Shocking’, The Citizen, Editorial, 28 November 1996.
8 Very few of the works in the current body of research on South Africa’s China choice use primary source material with the exception of Lin’s dissertation on the subject. Some of the most relevant works on the subject include: W. Breytenbach, ‘The Chinese Dilemma: Dual Recognition is the Ultimate Solution’, South African Journal of International Affairs 2, 1 (1994); 50–61; D. Geldenhuys, South Africa and the China Question: A Case for Dual Recognition, Vol. 6, East Asia Project (EAP), Dept. of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, 1995; T. Sono, ‘The Case for Dual Recognition’, in SAIIA Research Group, ed., South Africa and the Two Chinas Dilemma (Johannesburg: SAIIA and Foundation for Global Dialogue, 1995), 72–80; S. Singh, ‘Sino-South African Relations: Coming Full Circle’, African Security Review, 6, 2 (1997), 52–59; C. Alden, ‘Solving South Africa’s Chinese Puzzle: Democratic Policy-Making and the “Two Chinas” Question’, in J. Broderick, G. Burford and G. Freer, eds, South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Dilemmas of a New Democracy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 133–134; J. Daniel, ‘One China or Two? South Africa’s Foreign Policy Dilemma’, in The Taiwan Experience: Implications for South Africa (Johannesburg: The Consulate-General of the Republic of China, 1995), 157–174; M. Havenga, ‘The Dilemma of the Two Chinas: An Economic Perspective’, in SAIIA, South Africa and the Two Chinas Dilemma, 32–46; G. Mills, ‘South Africa and the Two Chinas’, South African Yearbook of International Affairs (Johannesburg: SAIIA, 1996), 165–172; I. Taylor, China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise (New York: Routledge, 2006), 127–152; R. Suttner, ‘Dilemmas of South African Foreign Policy: The Question of China’, in SAIIA, South Africa and the Two Chinas Dilemma, 4–9.
9 E. Sisulu, Walter & Albertina Sisulu: In Our Lifetime (Claremont: David Philip, 2002), 112. See also N. Mandela, Original Robben Island Manuscript (ORIM) (n.p. 1976), 142–143; Nelson Mandela Foundation, https://www.nelsonmandela.org/images/uploads/LWOM.pdf, accessed 28 August 2016.
10 The Sino-Soviet division, along with personal rivalries, led to Pillay’s marginalisation within the SACP. See V. Padayachee and J. Sender, ‘Vella Pillay: Revolutionary Activism and Economic Policy Analysis’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 44: 1 (2018), 154–155.
11 S. Ellis, External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960–1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 12–13, 27–29. Raymond Mhlaba recalls that when he first met Mao Tse-Tung the Chinese leader ‘was curious to know our [the ANC’s] stand with regard to the differences between the Chinese and Soviet Union Communist parties’. Mhlaba diplomatically ‘indicated to him that we did not want to take sides’: R. Mhlaba, Raymond Mhlaba’s Personal Memoirs, narrated to T. Mufamadi (Pretoria and Robben Island: HSRC Press and Robben Island Museum, 2001), 115. For another perspective on this mission see N. Naidoo, ‘The “Indian Chap”: Recollections of a South African Underground Trainee in Mao’s China’, South African Historical Journal, 64, 3 (2012), 712–717.
12 Mandela, ORIM, 429, 538, 576; Ellis, External Mission, 28–29; S. Thomas, The Diplomacy of Liberation: Foreign Relations of the ANC since 1960 (London: I.B Tauris, 1995), 156. For a good overview of Chinese support during the early 1960s see Z. Weiyun and X. Sujiang, ‘China’s Support for and Solidarity with South Africa Liberation Struggle’, in South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET), ed., The Road to Democracy in South Africa, 3, (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2008), 1221–1224.
13 P. Roberts, S.I. Levine, P. Vámos, D. Kaple, J. Friedman, D.A. Stiffler and L. Luthi, ‘Forum: Mao, Khrushchev, and China’s Split with the USSR, Perspectives on the Sino-Soviet Split’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 12, 1 (2010), 120–165.
14 E. Pahad, cited in C. Alden and Y. Wu, ‘South Africa and China: The Making of a Partnership’, SAIIA Occasional Paper 199 (Johannesburg: South African Institute for International Affairs, August 2014). See also Weiyun and Sujiang, ‘China’s Support for and Solidarity’, 1216.
15 A. Pahad, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 7 March 2017. For more on PRC–ANC relations during this period see Taylor, China and Africa 128–135; Ellis, External Mission, 57; L. Callinicos, Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains (Cape Town: David Philip, 2004, 2015), 296–299; V. Shubin, ANC: A View from Moscow, 2nd ed. (Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2008), 119, 160–161; Thomas, The Diplomacy of Liberation, 161–169; Weiyun and Sujiang, ‘China’s Support for and Solidarity’, 1221–1224.
16 M. Sisulu, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 28 February 2017.
17 Pahad interview; Jordan interview.
18 R. Kasrils, Armed and Dangerous, 2nd ed. (Belleville: Mayibuye Books, 1998), 68–69. For a comment on how the split within the ANC impacted the China recognition questions see ‘Recognition Duel’, Financial Mail, 5 April 1996.
19 Z. Skweyiya, interview by C. Williams, Pretoria, 30 June 2017.
20 Weiyun and Sujiang, ‘China’s Support for and Solidarity’, 1225–1227; Taylor, China and Africa, 136–138; V. Shubin, ANC: A View from Moscow (Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2nd edition, 2009), 246.
21 Jordan interview.
22 Weiyun and Sujiang, ‘China’s Support for and Solidarity’, 1252.
23 B. Seery, ‘Apartheid South Africa had Secret Dealings with Communist China, Says Businessman’, The Sunday Independent, 23 June 1996; A. Hutchison, China’s African Revolution (London: Hutchison, 1975), 196–198; Thomas, The Diplomacy of Liberation, 162–168; H. van Vuuren, Apartheid Guns and Money (Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 2017), 390–392; Lin, ‘The Relations between the Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa’, 122–123; Weiyun and Sujiang, ‘China’s Support for and Solidarity’, 1250.
24 Van Vuuren, Apartheid Guns and Money, 393–405; R. Manning, ‘The Nuclear Wild Card’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 January 1982.
25 ANC DIA press release, 11 November 1994, cited in Sono, ‘The Case for Dual Recognition’, 78. See also, I.-C. Loh, Valiant but Fruitless Endeavors: The Memoirs of Loh I-Cheng (微臣無力可回天––陸以正的外交生涯) (Taipei: Commonwealth Publication, 2002), 391.
26 G. Davis, ‘Nzo’s Visit to China Didn’t Reflect GNU’, Mail & Guardian, 3 April 1996.
27 For a thorough description of ROC–RSA ties see Lin, ‘The Relations between the Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa’; van Vuuren, Apartheid Guns and Money, 465–468.
28 J. Pickles and J. Woods, ‘Taiwanese Investment in South Africa’, African Affairs, 88, 353 (1989), 514. For a contrary view see Lin, ‘The Relations’, 4–5, 147–156.
29 Havenga, ‘The Dilemma of the Two Chinas’, 35.
30 UFH, NAHECS, Japan Mission, Box 6, File 16, ANC-Tokyo Office Press Release, ‘Taiwan Withdraws Visa for ANC Chief Representative to Japan’, 26 May 1990.
31 UFH, NAHECS, Secretary General’s Office, Box 22, Folder 186, Letter from I-.C. Loh to N. Mandela, 30 January 1992.
32 UFH, NAHECS, NMP, Box 294, Folder 21, Letter from F. Chien to N. Mandela, 27 July 1992.
33 UFH, NAHECS, NMP, Box 294, Folder 21, Letter from N. Mandela to F. Chien, n.d.
34 Chinafrica, no. 23, November 1992, 24, cited in Taylor, China and Africa, 141.
35 J. Kohut, ‘Mandela Tarnishes His Image’, South China Morning Post, 11 October 1992.
36 UFH, NAHECS, Walter Sisulu Papers (WSP), Box, 13, Folder 55, ‘Report: Visit of the President of the ANC, Comrade Nelson R Mandela to Pakistan and China’, n.d. The individuals referred to in the report are Pallo Jordan, the ANC's head of communications and the ANC's Treasurer-General Thomas Nkobi. The Chinese official mentioned was the country's Premier, Li Peng.
37 UFH, NAHECS, WSP, Box 20, Folder 69A, Letter from T. Nkobi to the Chinese Centre for South African Studies, ‘Donation to ANC by Government of People’s Republic of China’, 1 March 1993.
38 Q. Qian, Ten Episodes in China’s Diplomacy (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), 210–211.
39 Loh, Valiant but Fruitless Endeavors, 392.
40 Qian, Ten Episodes, 210–211.
41 Weiyun and Suijiang, ‘China’s Support for and Solidarity’, 1228.
42 Qian, Ten Episodes, 211; J. Kohut, ‘Mandela Finds Firm Assurances Elusive’, South China Morning Post, 7 October 1992.
43 Kohut, ‘Mandela Finds Firm Assurances Elusive’.
44 Ibid.; Sapa-Reuter, ‘No Promises as ANC Visit to China Ends’, The Citizen, 7 October 1992.
45 I. Wetherall, ‘Beijing’s Eager to Get Close to Pretoria’, The Mail & Guardian, 6–12 August 1993.
46 C. Basson, in email exchange with C. Williams, 15 March 2017.
47 Qian, Ten Episodes, 212. Loh, the ROC Ambassador, also points out at the PRC was eager to establish relations with South Africa before the transition in 1994: Loh, Valiant but Fruitless Endeavors, 393–394.
48 U. Schmetzer, ‘Mandela’s Plaudits Perplex the Chinese’, Chicago Tribune, 7 October 1992.
49 Sapa-Reuter-AP, ‘Mandela Sells Freedom in China’, Cape Times, 6 October 1992.
50 Kohut, ‘Mandela Finds Firm Assurances Elusive’.
51 ANC, DIA, ‘Foreign Policy in a new Democratic South Africa: A Discussion Paper’, October 1993, http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Govern_Political/ANC_Foreign.html, accessed 20 June 2017.
52 UFH, NAHECS, NMP, Box 294, Folder 21, Chinese Centre for South African Studies, Letter from X. Zhiheng to T. Mbeki, 7 December 1992.
53 UFH, NAHECS, NMP, Box 246, Folder 6, ANC Office of the Secretary General Internal Memorandum from M. Sparg to C. Ramaphosa, 4 June 1993, 5.
54 Qian, Ten Episodes, 211.
55 UFH, NAHECS, NMP, M. Sparg to C. Ramaphosa. For the problem of the PRC’s donation to the ANC see UFH, NAHECS, WSP, Box 20, Folder 69A, ANC Office of the Treasurer General, ‘Donation to ANC by Government of People’s Republic of China’ Letter from T. Nkobi to the Chinese Centre for South African Studies, 1 March 1993.
56 J. Matjila, ‘ANC Official Delegation to People’s Republic of China: May 16–20, 1993’; Letter from X. Zhiheng to T. Mbeki; Qian, Ten Episodes, 211–212.
57 UFH, NAHECS, NMP, Box 294, Folder 22, Facsimile transmission from T. Ditshego to B. Masekela ‘President’s Visit to R.O.C. on Taiwan’, 28 July 1993.
58 Jordan interview.
59 I. Lagardien, ‘Mandela on the Spot in Taiwan’, Sowetan, 2 August 1993.
60 E. Sithole, ‘Mandela’s Visit to Taiwan: What it Did, What it Didn’t’, Sunday Nation, 8–14 August 1993; Lagardien, ‘Mandela on the Spot in Taiwan’.
61 Sapa, ‘Mandela: New ANC–ROC Chapter Opened’, The Citizen, 3 August 1998; Viljoen, ‘Between the ROC and a Hard Place’, 165.
62 Lagardien, ‘Mandela on the Spot in Taiwan’.
63 E. Waugh, ‘African Treat for Taipei Admirers’, The Star, 2 August 1993.
64 Sithole, ‘Mandela’s Visit to Taiwan’.
65 E. Waugh, ‘Taiwan to Fund Centre in SA’, The Star, 2 August 1993; Sapa, ‘More than R50-m in loans and aid given to SA’, The Citizen, 17 August 1993; Jordan interview.
66 Sithole, ‘Mandela’s Visit to Taiwan’; UFH, NAHECS, NMP, Box 294, Folder 21, n.a. ‘Programme for the Visit of President Nelson R. Mandela to the Republic of China, July 30–August 2’, n.d.
67 At the time the donation was not explicitly acknowledged although Mandela did say the ANC had found ‘a readiness to assist’ that ‘made the mission to this country [the ROC] successful from all aspects’: Waugh, ‘Taiwan to Fund Centre in SA’. It was only in December 1995 that Mandela explicitly acknowledged what he called as a $10 million dollar ‘donation’. (See section, ‘1995: Checkbook Diplomacy and Diplomatic Delay’ below.)
68 Lagardien, ‘Mandela on the Spot’; P. Kuo, ‘ANC “Source” on South African–PRC Ties’, The China Post, Taipei, 1 August 1993.
69 Lagardien, ‘Mandela on the Spot’.
70 Xinhua News Service, ‘Mandela Reiterates position of “One China”’, Xinhua, 17 August 1993.
71 Sapa-Reuter, ‘Mandela’s Alleged Promise on ROC is “Corrected”’, The Citizen, 19 August 1993.
72 L. Li, ‘Remembering Joe Slovo’s Third Visit to China’, The Thinker, 67 (2016), 58–60.
73 More evidence that the ANC was confused (if not duplicitous) in respect to its approach to the Chinas come from the Chinese diplomat, Lu Miaogen, who recalls that on 9 August 1993, just after he had returned from Taiwan, Mandela told a PRC delegation that ‘as international organizations such as the UN and the Organization of African Unity did not have official relations with Taiwan, that the ANC would also keep the same policy on the issue’: M. Lu, ‘Nelson Mandela in My Eyes’, Beijing Review, 19 December 2013, 16.
74 Loh, Valiant but Fruitless Endeavors, 400.
75 UFH, NAHECS, NMP, Box 294, Folder 22, L.C. Mabasa, ‘Report on the Deputy President’s visit to the People’s Republic of China (29 September–8 October 1993) and the Republic of China on Taiwan 8–16 October 1993)’, 27 October 1993.
76 Qian, Ten Episodes, 212.
77 Pahad interview.
78 ROC Ambassador Loh I-Cheng closely studied ANC public pronouncements to tailor assistance offers to ANC priorities. For an example of Loh’s customised aid offers (in this case assistance on land reform) see his letter to Cyril Ramaphosa after the latter’s speech on land redistribution: UFH, NAHECS, Papers of the Secretary General’s Office, Box 22, Folder 186, Loh letter to C. Ramaphosa, 2 November 1993. For building relationships see UFH, NAHECS, WSP, Box 20, Folder 69A, Loh letter to Walter Sisulu, 6 December 1993.
79 The events of the meeting were recounted to the South African Ambassador to the ROC, Johan Viljoen, by Chien once he returned from the meeting. Viljoen then forwarded Chien’s description back to the DFA in Pretoria.
80 S. WuDunn, ‘China and South Korea Planning To Establish Diplomatic Relations’, The New York Times, 22 August 1992.
81 DIRCO Archives, Folder 1/24/3, J. Viljoen, ‘Talks with Foreign Minister Frederick Chien’, 19 May 1994.
82 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, ‘Notes on the People’s Republic of China: Meeting between Minister A. Nzo and Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen: 28 September 1994’.
83 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, N.a ‘Policy Position on the Two China’s’, May 1994.
84 An October 1993 ANC foreign policy document indicated the party would follow international norms on ‘issues or recognition’: ANC, DIA, ‘Foreign Policy in a new Democratic South Africa’.
85 Jordan interview.
86 The importance and history of the One China principle is explored in detail in Wei, ‘Some Reflections on the One-China Principle’, 1169.
87 L. Evans, interview by C. Williams and C. Hurst, Pretoria, 2 March 2017.
88 Pahad interview.
89 J. Carlin, ‘Nelson Mandela: My Life’, Independent, 6 December 1998, http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/nelson-mandela-my-life-1189483.html, accessed 17 June 2017.
90 Pahad interview.
91 Mandela’s confidence in his persuasiveness is a characteristic that is often noted, including by Mandela himself. Richard Stengel, who worked on Long Walk to Freedom, writes that Mandela ‘regards himself not so much as the Great Communicator but as the Great Persuader’: see R. Stengel, Mandela’s Way (London: Virgin Books, 2010), 5–6. And in Long Walk to Freedom Mandela, in a moment of self-reflection, commented that he had ‘perhaps too high a regard for the importance of face-to-face meetings’ and of his ‘own ability in such a meeting to persuade men to change their views’: N. Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom (London: Abacus Publishing Imprint, 1994, reprint 2013), 606.
92 Jordan interview. Jordan attempted to point out to Mandela important differences between the PRC and USSR, including that the Red Army had enforced Moscow’s writ throughout the Soviet Union, while in the PRC an indigenous Chinese communist movement had swept to power.
93 Skweyiya interview. See also Loh, Valiant but Fruitless Endeavors, 386.
94 Jordan interview; Skweyiya interview.
95 In the sequel to his autobiography Mandela argued that he was not an ideal choice to become president because what was needed was a ‘Far younger person […] who had been out of prison, met heads of state and government, attended meetings of world and regional organizations, who had kept abreast of national and international developments, who could, as far as was possible, foresee the future course of such developments’: N. Mandela, Conversations with Myself (New York: Picador, 2010), 354 ; see also Pahad interview.
96 F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man Standing (New York: Avon Books, 2002).
97 L. Evans, interview by C. Williams, Pretoria, 23 February 2015.
98 The most dramatic illustration of this division was a ‘blow up’ during a DFA Heads of Mission Conference held as Espada Ranch near Pretoria. At this ‘acrimonious’ meeting advocates of a quick switch to Beijing clashed with those who hoped to retain ties with Taiwan: Botha, interview. See also Human, who recalls there were ‘fireworks’ over the China issue: N.K. Human, typed notes given to C. Williams and C. Hurst, Pretoria, 15 December 2016.
99 Evans interview, 2 March 2017. Before November 1994 the Beijing office had been under orders from Evans to restrict their interaction with Chinese officials to economic issues: Basson email exchange; DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, N.K. Human, ‘The People’s Republic of China: Expansion of Field Operations of the South African Centre in Beijing’, 9 November 1994; DIRCO, Letter from DFA Director General R. Evans to Dr ZZR Rustomjee, Director-General of the Department of Trade and Industry, ‘SA/PRC: The Conclusion of a Most Favored Nation Trade Agreement between South Africa and the People’s Republic of China’, 7 December 1994. For a sense of Evans’ approach see E. Waugh, ‘Absence Could Cost MP’s R100’, The Star, 28 June 1994, in which Evans describes the two Chinas situation as a Chinese problem rather than a South African problem.
100 P. Dietrichsen, interview by C. Williams, Pretoria, 9 June 2017. This point was also made by Evans (in interview).
101 Human typed notes.
102 C. Basson, interview by C. Williams, phone conversation, 20 January 2017.
103 N. K. Human, interview by C. Williams and C. Hurst, Pretoria, 5 December 2016.
104 P. J. Botha, interview by C. Williams, Cape Town, 17 February 2017.
105 Botha (in interview) recalls that ‘within our directorate [Asia], we were very, very keen to come into line with the rest of the international community because we had been out of line with them for so long, so it was a no-brainer for us’.
106 Dietrichsen interview. This is a clear example of Graham Allison’s governmental politics model, which includes the postulate that where you stand on an issue depends on where you sit in the government: see G. Allison and P. Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational, 1999), 307.
107 For the division between pro-PRC and pro-ROC members of the cabinet see Loh, Valiant but Fruitless Endeavors, 410; Lin, ‘The Relations between the Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa’, 290. According to these sources ‘pro-ROC’ ministers included F.W de Klerk, Roelof Frederick ‘Pik’ Botha, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, and Joe Modise, as well as the DG of Foreign Affairs, Leo ‘Rusty’ Evans.
108 For a detailed analysis of South Africa’s economic relations with the two Chinas see Havenga, ‘The Dilemma of the Two Chinas’, 32–46.
109 The ‘Hong Kong Factor’ later became important in discussions within the South African government. Aziz Pahad (interview) recalls: ‘Hong Kong was always our argument […] we used to say the reality is not just now Mainland but also Hong Kong, at that time we had very strong economic and other relations. And that was exactly why the timing was brought in.’
110 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, Cabinet Memorandum, ‘The Possibility of Establishing Formal Diplomatic Relations with the People’s Republic of China’, n.d.
111 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, N.K. Human, ‘The People’s Republic of China: Recent Courtesy Call on Deputy President Thabo Mbeki by Mr. Ji Peiding, director of the Chinese Centre’, 13 February 1995.
112 Loh, Valiant but Fruitless Endeavors, 397.
113 Pahad interview.
114 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, L.B. Labuschagne, ‘China/RSA Relations: Discussions with Ji Peiding: Director’, 13 March 1995.
115 Botha interview.
116 J. Radebe, ‘Keynote Address to the Conference’, The Taiwan Experience, 7–11. Sapa-Reuter, ‘Mandela Reaffirms Ties with Taiwan’, The Star, 25 April 1995.
117 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, N. K. Human, ‘Minutes: Briefing Session: The Deputy-Director General: MDDG on 11 October 1995: South Africa and the Greater China Region’, n.d.
118 Botha and Jordan (interviews). For a similar description of these parliamentary junkets see Viljoen, ‘Between the ROC and a Hard Place’, 166.
119 G. Davis, ‘MP’s Feted with Taiwan Holiday’, The Weekly Mail & Guardian, 9 February 1995. For an example of how Loh targeted his relationship building efforts see his letter to ANC Secretary-General Cyril Ramaphosa in which he follows up on a previous conversation with Ramaphosa on anti-corruption legislation in the ROC by sending the Secretary-General a translated copy of the law: UFH, NAHECS, Papers of the Secretary General’s Office, Box 22, Folder 186, Letter from Ambassador Loh to Secretary General C. Ramaphosa, 5 May 1995.
120 J. Radebe, ‘Keynote Address to the Conference’, The Taiwan Experience, 7–11.
121 P. de Ionno, ‘South Africa’s Chinese Puzzle’, Sunday Times, 11 June 1995.
122 I-C. Loh, ‘Small-scale Agriculture Needs to be Developed’, Business Day, 1 November 1995.
123 G. Davis, ‘For Sale SA’s Diplomatic Relations’, Mail & Guardian, 8 December 1995.
124 N. Chandler, ‘R146-m Boost for Training of Demobbed SA Soldiers’, The Star, 8 December 1995.
125 Botha interview. This feeling seems to have been shared amongst many in the DFA including Basson (interview) and Human (interview). In 1996 a report in The Star on ROC plans to build a petrochemical plant in the Eastern Cape quoted an anonymous (and dubious) South African official that the project was ‘all smoke and mirrors’: J. Rosenthal, ‘Taiwan Accuses SA of Dragging Heels Over Joint Venture’, The Star, 30 October 1996. However, at least some of Taiwan’s assistance was real. The Cape Times reported that in 1994 it gave South Africa’s GNU R556 million for the RDP: Own Correspondent, ‘Chinese Political, Economic Clout Forced SA to Forge Ties’, Cape Times, 28 November 1996.
126 SABC Television News Broadcast, 7 December 1995, SABC Media Libraries, Johannesburg.
127 For a good example of the type of arguments put forth by ROC Ambassador Loh see M. Morris, ‘SA Must Solve China Conundrum’, Weekend Argus, 1–2 June 1996.
128 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, Letter from President N. Mandela to President Z. Jiang, 18 November 1995.
129 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, Letter from President Z. Jiang to President N. Mandela, 30 November 1995.
130 Botha interview. Botha recalls that Ji made clear ‘there was a lot of pressure from Beijing’ to effect a change in South Africa’s stance. Rather than pass this pressure on, Ji adopted a collaborative approach with Botha that emphasised how the two diplomats could work together.
131 Botha interview.
132 PJ Botha, ‘“Red China”: Supping with Long Chopsticks’, in Wolvaardt, Wheeler, and Scholtz, From Verwoerd to Mandela, 184.
133 J. Lengane, ‘ANC Calls for Mission to be Sent to Beijing’, The City Press, 10 December 1995.
134 Jordan interview.
135 Basson email exchange. South Korea switched on 24 August 1992, and Saudi Arabia switched on 21 July 1990.
136 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, ‘Discussion strategy’ (n.d.).
137 Jordan interview.
138 Suttner, ‘Dilemmas of South African Foreign Policy’, 4–9; Jordan and Pahad (interviews);
The DFA members of the delegation included Tutu Mazibuko (now Skweyiya), Pieter Swanepoel, Neuma Grobbelaar and Thami Ngwevela. See Hansard, National Assembly, Interpellations, Questions and Replies, 21 February–7 November 1996. Vol. 11, 750–752.
139 Sisulu interview.
140 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, Report on Visit to the People’s Republic of China by a Presidential Delegation Under the Leadership of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. A. B. Nzo: 24–26 March 1996’, n.d.
141 Sisulu interview.
142 Qian, Ten Episodes, 221.
143 For a more thorough understanding of the cross-strait relationship between the PRC and the ROC during this period see N. Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States–Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009).
144 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, Report on Visit to the People’s Republic of China by a Presidential Delegation Under the Leadership of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. A. B. Nzo: 24–26 March 1996’, n.d.; Davis, ‘Nzo’s Visit to China ‘didn’t reflect GNU’.
145 Ibid. See also Qian, Ten Episodes, 22; C. Alden and Y. Wu, ‘South African Foreign Policy and China: Converging Visions, Competing Interests, Contested Identities’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 54, 2 (2016), 206.
146 Qian, Ten Episodes, 222.
147 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, Report on Visit to the People’s Republic of China by a Presidential Delegation Under the Leadership of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. A.B. Nzo: 24–26 March 1996’, n.d. Wu Yi also emphasised the potentially lucrative trade that could develop between the PRC and RSA.
148 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, T. Mazibuko, ‘Proposed Ministerial Visit to China and Taiwan: Current Status of the visit’, 12 March 1996.
149 D. Lautenbach, ‘Madame Wu Steeps China’s Trade Carrot in the Political Dressing of Diplomatic Recognition’, The Sunday Independent, 5 May 1996.
150 Human interview.
151 Qian, Ten Episodes, 223–224.
152 Human interview; Human typed notes. Although Lin cites minutes of this meeting to argue that ‘Mandela gave assurances to her [Madame Wu …] that as “dual recognition” was not possible, South Africa would downscale its relations with Taiwan (the ROC) in order to establish diplomatic relations with China (the PRC)’, (see Lin, ‘The Relations between the Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa’, 316–317) neither Human nor Pahad (who were at the meeting) recall this. Furthermore, Sisulu (interview) stressed that no decision was taken until visits to both the PRC and ROC by the Nzo delegation were completed and reports drafted summarizing and assessing those trips. The report of the two trips was not finished until July, more than two months after Wu's trip to South Africa.
153 A. Fine, ‘Mainland China, SA in Trade Status Accord’, Business Day, 3 May 1996.
154 Loh, Valiant but Fruitless Endeavors, 422.
155 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, A. Nzo letter to N. Mandela, 7 May 1996.
156 Sapa-AP-DPA-Reuter, ‘SA Under Pressure over ROC Links, Says Modise’, The Citizen, 25 May 1996.
157 J. Dludlu, ‘ANC MP Calls for Sino–SA “Diplomatic Relationship”’, Business Day, 30 May 1996.
158 Reuter, ‘Taiwan Plans SA Industrial Zone: Report’, The Argus, 28 May 1996, and Sapa-AFP, ‘SA to Decide Soon on “Two Chinas”’, The Citizen, 8 June 1996.
159 Sapa-Reuter-DPA, ‘ROC Considering Industrial Zone in South Africa’, The Citizen, 29 May 1996; J.-J. Cornish, ‘Taipei Harps on SA Connections as Nzo takes a Diplomatic Step towards Beijing’, The Sunday Independent, 31 March 1996; J. Dludlu, ‘China Gets Tough with SA on Links’, Business Day, 29 May 1996; Dludlu, ‘ANC MP Calls for Sino–SA “Diplomatic Relationship”’.
160 Sapa-AFP, ‘ROC offers to Boost Trade, Investments in South Africa’, The Citizen, 2 July 1996; Reuters, ‘Taiwan Anxious to Retain links with SA’, The Star, 3 July 1994; Sapa-AFP, ‘Taiwan offer to Boost SA Trade’, The Star, 2 June 1996.
161 Quoted in Sapa-AFP, ‘Taiwan Connection: Still Firm Friends’, The Daily News, 4 July 1996.
162 UFH, NAHECS, NMP, Box 186, Folder 354, Report and Recommendations of the ANC Component of the Presidential Delegation to People’s Republic of China and Taiwan’, n.d.
163 Reuter, ‘SA is Undecided on Two Chinas’, The Citizen, 4 July 1996.
164 Quoted in Sapa-CNA, ‘Commitment from Mandela Welcome says ROC’, The Citizen, 20 July 1996.
165 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, L. Labuschange to T. Mazibuko, ‘Notes: Meeting Between Foreign Minister Skweyiya and Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Qian, Diaoyutai State Guest House, Beijing, 22 August 1996’, 23 August 1996.
166 Ibid.
167 John Siko also notes that the China question ‘provoked robust debate’ within the ANC : see J. Siko, Inside South Africa’s Foreign Policy (London: IB Tauris, 2014), 194.
168 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, L. Labuschange to T. Mazibuko, ‘Notes: Meeting Between Foreign Minister Skweyiya and Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Qian, Diaoyutai State Guest House, Beijing, 22 August 1996’, 23 August 1996.
169 M. Edwards, ‘55,000 Families for Chinese “City”’, Mail &Guardian, 4 November 1996; Sapa, ‘R55bn Plan for North West “no pipedream”’, The Citizen, 30 August 1996; K. O’Grady, ‘Chinese “to build a mini city in SA”’, Business Day, 27 August 1996.
170 After the trip Li-teh Hsu wrote a letter of appreciation for the trip to Cyril Ramaphosa in which he said ‘In the future, the ROC will make every effort to promote all manner of investment projects and forward the development of ties between our two countries’: UFH, NAHECS, Papers of the Secretary General’s Office, Box 22, Folder 186, 25 September 1996.
171 Sapa-Reuter, ‘Cutting ROC Ties would be Immoral: Pres’, The Citizen, 27 August 1996; Sapa-AFP, ‘Taiwan Gratified by SA’s Stance’, The Citizen, 28 August 1996; Sapa-AP, ‘Beijing Insists that South Africa Can’t Have It Both Ways’, The Star, 28 August 1996; A. Hadland, ‘Taiwanese Trade Mission’s Visit to South Africa Provokes Chinese Rage’, The Sunday Independent, 1 September 1996.
172 S. Guofang (Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson). Comments quoted in DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, L. Labuschange, ‘Diplomatic Relations with Taiwan: Reaction by the PRC to Statement by President Mandela’, 3 September 1996.
173 ‘“Dual Recognition” Unacceptable says People’s Daily’, Xinhua News Agency, 5 September 1996.
174 There were at least two separate (but similar) articles emanating from official Chinese news sources that were critical of Mandela’s comments with ROC officials. One article was by G. Ping and appeared in the People’s Daily in early September 1996. The authors could not find the original source of that article and so quote from a summary of the article carried by Xinhua News Agency. The second article was by R. Yingjie and was carried by Xinhua on 6 September 1996. It was the text of his article that was transmitted to C. Basson at the DFA.
175 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, R. Yingjie, ‘South Africa Should Discard Illusion’, Xinhua News Agency, 6 September 1996.
176 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, C. Basson, ‘PRC Reaction to President Mandela’s Recent Statement on Continued Diplomatic Relations with the Republic of China’, 18 September 1996. Concern over the looming Hong Kong deadline had long dominated the thinking of DFA officials and was increasingly voiced in public. See ‘Deadline and Delay’, Financial Mail, 13 September 1996.
177 Pahad interview.
178 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, N.K. Human, ‘President Nelson Mandela’s Statement with Regard to the Greater China Region: Diplomatic Relations with Taiwan’, 11 September 1996; DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, C. Basson, ‘PRC Reaction to President Mandela’s Recent Statement on Continued Diplomatic Relations with the Republic of China’, 18 September 1996; DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3; L. Labuschange, ‘Diplomatic Relations with Taiwan: Reaction by the PRC to Statement by President Mandela’, 3 September 1996.
179 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, Nzo to N. Mandela, ‘Reaction by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to Continued diplomatic Relations with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan’, 16 October 1996.
180 Ibid.
181 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, A. Nzo to N. Mandela, ‘Greater China Region: Important Political Developments’, 4 November 1996.
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
184 Evans interview, 23 February 2015.
185 Ibid.
186 Pahad was not informed of the decision beforehand and he believes Nzo was similarly caught unaware: Pahad interview.
187 Quoted in M. Makhanya, ‘Shock as Sa Dumps Taiwan for China’, The Star, 28 November 1996.
188 Jordan interview.
189 P. Fabricius, ‘Timing of Taiwan Decision a Surprise’, The Star, 28 November 1996.
190 Skweyiya interview.
191 Pahad interview; Evans interview, 2 March 2017.
192 The ANC relocated its party headquarters from Shell House to Luthuli House in 1997.
193 Evans interview, 2 March 2017.
194 Sisulu interview. For a confirmation of this view see ANC MP Mnguni’s contribution to parliamentary discussion on the issue in 1997: ‘I would like to indicate that Comrade Mandela is part of a broad collective, the people of South Africa. And he is open to the views of other leaders in the ANC and is prepared to change, in terms of those views, if he finds that they are beneficial to the people’: Debates of the National Assembly (Hansard), First session second parliament, Vol. 13, 24 April 1997, 1924.
195 Sisulu, interview. Sisulu’s description of Mandela’s fealty to party decisions (after a period of open debate) supports Siko’s (Inside South Africa’s Foreign Policy, 196) claim that party discussions ‘were open to all viewpoints, [but] once a decision was reached, members were expected to adhere to it without question’. It also gels with Evans’ recollection that ‘Mandela was a, I suppose he would put it as a “disciplined cadre”, and in his time he would often say well, the decision has been taken within the ANC, at national policy-making level, in a certain direction and his hands are tied’: Evans interview, 2 March 2017.
196 D. Geldenhuys, ‘The Politics of South Africa’s “China Switch”’, Issues and Studies, 33, 7 (July 1997), 93–131.
197 R. Suttner, ‘(Mis) Understanding Nelson Mandela’, African Historical Review, 29, 2 (2007), 109–110.
198 Siko (Inside South Africa’s Foreign Policy, 181–199) identifies the important role the ANC can sometimes play in foreign policy decision-making, but because his study is general, he does not fully illustrate the manner in which party influence is exercised. Leslie Masters argues that ‘decision-making traditions within the country’s governing party further shore up the role of a predominant president at the centre of the concentric circles of foreign policy decision making’. However, she fails to note, as in the case of the two Chinas issue, how these same decision-making traditions can also curtail presidential power: L. Masters ‘Opening the “Black Box”: South African Foreign Policy-making’ in C. Landsberg and J.-A. van Wyk, eds, South African Foreign Policy Review: Vol. 1 (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa and Institute for Global Dialogue, 2012), 26.
199 F. de Lange, ‘Strong Note to S Africa’, The Citizen, 29 November 1996.
200 Sapa, ‘ANC Bowing to Red Pressure, Says de Klerk’, The Citizen, 29 November 1996.
201 C. Nqakula, The People’s War (Johannesburg: Mutloatse Heritage Trust, 2017), 319.
202 Dietrichsen interview; Human interview.
203 G. le Pere and A. van Nieuwkerk, ‘South Africa and Crafting Foreign Policy in a Complex Global Order: Continuity and Change’, in P. McGowan, S. Cornelissen and P. Nel, eds, Power Wealth and Global Equity, 3d ed. (Cape Town: UCT Press, 2006), 286.
204 Evans interview, 2 March 2017.
205 Alden implies the China case illustrates the DFA’s marginal role in foreign policymaking partly because it was not consulted about Mandela’s decision to make the switch to the PRC: Alden, ‘Solving South Africa’s Chinese Puzzle’, 133–134. This reasoning is flawed. It does not follow that because a bureaucracy was not informed about a decision, its work did not contribute to that decision. As this research has shown, DFA officials played a key role in informing and influencing the China choice.
206 Sapa-AFP, ‘No Reason for SA to Cut ROC Ties: Nzo’, The Citizen, 1 February 1995.
207 For one of the few commentaries that appreciates this factor see Singh, ‘Sino–South African Relations’, 53.
208 Pahad interview.
209 Evans interview, 2 March 2017.
210 Sisulu interview: ‘Mandela had good personal relations with the Ambassador from Taiwan, he was a very good guy, he invited us to his house, with my dad, gave us very good food. But that didn’t change our minds about China, Mainland China’. While it did not change the view of Max or his father Walter, Mandela’s positive rapport with Loh seems to have impacted his view on the China debate.
211 Cornish, ‘Taipei Harps on SA Connections’.
212 Evans interview, 2 March 2017.
213 This is indicated in the November 1996 Nzo letter. For the only secondary source that comments on this see Singh, ‘Sino–South African Relations’, 54–55. Aziz Pahad (interview) recalled that South Africa was planning to decline the ROC’s request for the high level visits because it would be high profile and cause further problems with Beijing.
214 Singh, ‘Sino–South African Relations’, 54–55.
215 As the possibility of his re-election faded, Ghali himself invited other candidates to come forward, one being Kofi Annan, who went on to become the seventh UN Secretary-General, in January 1997.
216 Loh, Valiant but Fruitless Endeavors, 425.
217 For several reports on the ‘UN factor’ see J.J. Cornish, ‘New South Africa and China’, South African Yearbook of International Affairs: 1997 (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1997); J.J. Cornish, ‘Mandela Seeks a Batsman for Africa to Head UN’, Business Day, 12 December 1996; R. Hartley, ‘Mandela Chooses his China’, Sunday Times, 1 December 1996; T. Cohen, ‘UN Scuffles Influenced Taiwan Decision’, Business Day, 12 December 1996.
218 C. Su, ‘Cross Strait Relations and the Republic of China’s Foreign Policy’, The Taiwan Experience, 149–156; Daniel, ‘One China or two? South Africa’s Foreign Policy Dilemma’, The Taiwan Experience, 157–174; Evans interview, 2 March 2017; Human interview; Botha interview.
219 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, n.a. ‘Discussion strategy’, n.d.
220 Botha interview.
221 Evans interview, 2 March 2017.
222 N. Mandela interviewed by T. Modise on the SABC programme, Focus. SABC Media Libraries, Johannesburg, 10 February 1997.
223 SABC, ‘Mandela Meets John Chang’, 71940MT. SABC Media Libraries, Johannesburg, 4 December 1996. During this meeting Mandela described the switch as ‘a decision which hurts very close friends’.