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Abstract
Through a case study of Ghana, this article focuses on the relationship between decentralisation and local democracy. The Ghanaian constitution emphasises decentralisation as the key means to ‘making democracy a reality’, reflecting the view common amongst international development agencies that decentralisation enhances local democracy and leads to more responsive government. This article questions such views and investigates whether decentralisation in Ghana has led to increased political participation at the local level and to downwardly accountable local government. Empirical findings are two-fold. On the one hand, relatively high levels of participation in local democratic processes are indicated. On the other, accountability mechanisms have not been strengthened, with a number of limitations and shortcomings identified at local level that undermine citizens’ attempts to hold local government and their elected representatives to account. Yet, in seeking to explain this delinkage between participation and accountability, such local issues do not provide a full explanation. Attention is thus refocused on the national context, where structural obstacles to devolved government are identified in the form of legal, political, administrative and fiscal constraints. Such obstacles are not easily overcome, however, due to the politics of decentralisation, notably central government's reluctance to relinquish control over its powers. Recent proposals for reform in Ghana's decentralisation system are considered, but political change is unlikely given the built-in advantages to the ruling party, whichever is in power. Without such reforms, though, local democracy is likely to remain more appearance than reality.
Acknowledgements
The author acknowledges support received from the Nuffield Foundation in the form of a Social Science Small Grant, enabling fieldwork to be undertaken. He also acknowledges the outstanding research assistance provided by Mr George Nti and consultancy advice from Dr Y. Nsiah-Peprah of the Department of Planning at the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, Ghana. Gratitude is also expressed to the many individuals in the two case-study districts, including local government officials and local community members, who contributed so richly to this research. The names of case-study districts have been changed to protect the anonymity of individuals involved.
Notes
1. Democratic decentralisation entails the transfer of power and resources to sub-national authorities that are representative of local populations, whereas deconcentration involves the transfer of authority to subnational branches of the central state, generally to sector departments of central government ministries.
2. In Blair's (2000, 23) conceptualisation, participation was linked to poverty reduction in a five-stage formula that moved from ‘participation’ to ‘representation’ to ‘empowerment’ to ‘benefits for all’ to ‘poverty reduction’, but without reference to accountability. Somewhat separately, various mechanisms of accountability were identified, especially those relatively external to decentralised structures and processes, such as political parties, civil society and the media.
3. A further 28 districts were created through the subdivision of larger ones in July 2004, giving a total of 138 districts. The generic term district assembly is used here to refer to the layer of metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies (see ). The small number of Assemblies in the major cities and towns are called Metropolitan Assemblies and Municipal Assemblies respectively, while District Assemblies constitute the large majority of Assemblies in the rural areas and smaller towns.
4. The CitationJoint Government of Ghana and Development Partners’ ‘Decentralisation Policy Review’ draft report was published in January 2007, with a ‘Draft Comprehensive Decentralisation Policy Framework’ then prepared by the government in March 2007 and submitted to cabinet. It is evident that this policy review has been driven largely by international donor agencies. It followed the inclusion in 2006 of the ‘formulation of a comprehensive decentralisation policy’ as a ‘trigger’ (i.e. a condition) in the multi-donor budget support provided to the government under the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (Joint Government of Ghana and Development Partners 2007: Annexure 1). Sector-wide support from donors to decentralisation is also conditional on this review being undertaken.
5. Somewhat paradoxically, multipartyism was reintroduced by the 1992 Constitution for the presidential and parliamentary elections but not for local elections. District elections were held initially in 1988/89 and subsequently in 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006, roughly midway through the national government cycle.
6. Article 16 of the Local Government Act 1993 states that elected Assembly members are required to: ‘meet his [sic] electorate before each meeting of the District Assembly’; ‘maintain close contact with his electoral area, consult his people on issues to be discussed in the District Assembly and collate their views, opinions and proposals … and present [these] to the District Assembly’ ‘report to his electorate the general decisions of the District Assembly and its Executive Committee and the actions he has taken to solve problems raised by residents in his electoral area’.
7. Local Government Act 1993, Article 17.
8. Local Government Act 1993, Article 19(2).
9. There are five statutory subcommittees (Finance and Administration; Development Planning; Social Services; Works; Justice and Security), and each DA has the power to create others as appropriate.
10. Formally the DCE is nominated by the President and approved by at least two-thirds of the Assembly members present (Local Government Act 1993, Article 20(3)).
11. Only 12 (8.8%) of the current 136 DCEs are women (Vieta Citation2006, 3). Only 10 (7.4%) of the current DCEs do not come from the district in which they serve (Vieta Citation2006, 10).
12. Crook and Manor (1998, 235) describe the DCE's powers as ‘virtually unassailable’.
13. Ayee (2004, 129) categorises the 86 functions into deconcentrated, delegated and devolved functions, with only relatively minor services being classified as devolved, for instance the maintenance of feeder roads, streets, parks and cemeteries.
14. PNDC Law 207 (1988) states that the 22 central government departments and agencies would be converted into departments of the DAs, while the Local Government Act (1993) states: ‘There shall be established by Act of Parliament a Local Government Service’ (Article 37(1)), and that DAs would establish the departments listed in schedule one (Article 38(1)). These include health, education and agriculture.
15. The DACF is then allocated between DAs on the basis of a revenue sharing formula approved annually by parliament.
16. One community was selected for each of the four categories of ‘more developed’, ‘less deprived, ‘deprived’ and ‘most deprived’. The term ‘more developed’ is used as a relative concept and refers here to the two small town district capitals.
17. The household questionnaires were administered by two local enumerators in each of the eight communities, mostly teachers. Enumerators undertook a random sample of households, stratified to include different geographical zones, and thus income groups, within the community. One further requirement was to include at least one and preferably two female-headed households in each batch of five questionnaires.
18. Focus groups were conducted in the local language, with translation of responses into English by two note-takers. Discussions were organised with the assistance of the relevant Area Council secretary, with the following opinion leaders invited: DA member (1); area council representative (1); UC representative (1); traditional authority (1); religious leaders (1 Christian, 1 Muslim); women's associations (2); youth association (1); community-based organisation (1).
19. Interviews were conducted with a wide range of individuals involved in the DA system, including Assembly members, administrative officials and directors of the sector departments. Interviewees included female Assembly members in what is a very male-dominated system. Electoral statistics were obtained from the district offices of the National Electoral Commission.
20. These findings affirm those of a larger study by Thomi that assessed people's perceptions of DAs in eight districts in Ghana through a survey of 3482 households. The overall picture drawn from the survey was a positive one in which the DA was appreciated as an institution (Thomi Citation2000, 121).
21. Translations of statements made in local languages at focus group discussions.
22. These three means of assessing levels of political participation are similar to those used by Crook and Manor (1998, 7): voting, election campaigning and contacting or pressurising political representatives through individual or group activity.
23. Voter turnout in the two selected districts was higher than both the regional averages (36.1% in Brong Ahafo and 35.1% in Ashanti) and the national average (33.1%) at the 2002 DA elections (Ayee Citation2003, 35). The decline in voter turnout in the two districts between 1998 and 2002 reflected national trends, with national average turnout declining from 46.1% in 1998 to 33.1% in 2002 (Ayee Citation2003, 35).
24. Figures for Bofano were not so high. Here, 47 out of 106 units were contested in 2002, down from 57 in 1998. This remains not unimpressive, however, given that one candidate was required on average from every 41 registered voters just for an election to take place.
25. Other studies do not report so positively about the enthusiasm for UC elections. For instance, Ayee and Amponsah (Citation2003, 70–1) report that only 33.8% of respondents voted in UC elections in a survey conducted in three districts in August 2002. This could be partly due, however, to many elections being uncontested rather than electoral apathy towards the UCs.
26. This was 100% of respondents in Asanama and 92.5% in Bofano.
27. These findings are remarkably similar to those of the eight-district survey, where 48% of households said that the Assembly member had never met with constituents (Thomi Citation2000, 201).
28. Blair (2000) also examines various mechanisms of accountability, such as political parties, civil society and the media, ones that are mainly external to decentralised government. Somewhat distinctly, this study focuses on direct accountability mechanisms between citizen and local state, ones that are more integral to structures and processes of decentralisation.
29. Educational qualifications ranged from basic education certificates (indicating schooling up to junior secondary school level) to teaching certificates and degrees. Assembly members were farmers and teachers, some came from other public sector occupations (people such as health workers) and the private sector (such as cocoa-buying companies, sawmills), with traditional rulers commonly as appointed members.
30. This breakdown was most evident in Asanama, where only four out of 13 Unit committees remained functional.
31. Ayee and Amponsah (Citation2003, 70) also cite the nonpayment of anticipated allowances as a key reason for the ‘disenchantment and frustration’ of UC members.
32. For example, one AC in Bofano had been inaugurated in September 2002 after the district-level elections, but had met only once up to June 2004, while another had not met for over two years. Of the two town councils (in the district capitals), one was not functional at all, with the secretary having ‘stopped working’ due to nonpayment of salary, while the other was described as ‘hardly meeting’.
33. One AC chair gave this reason as explaining his reluctance to convene meetings.
34. The recent decentralisation policy framework (Government of Ghana 2007, 16) includes an intent to reduce the number of UCs and of their membership, with UCs and ACs composed of elected members only. Though welcome, this does not address the fundamental funding problems.
35. See, for instance: Ballington and Karam (Citation2005); Phillips (Citation1991); Rai (Citation2003).
36. It is also noted that women appointees rarely exceeded this minimum (Ofei-Aboagye Citation2000, 4), which effectively also acts as a ceiling.
37. Interview with presiding member, Bofano DA, 17 June 2004.
38. For example, Asanama's Medium Term Development Plan 2002–04 indicates substantial expenditure on the construction and refurbishment of Assembly buildings and an executive guest house (costing almost a quarter of a billion cedis), while district accounts (trial balances for 2002–2004) show considerable financial outlay for (the DCE's) ‘residency’ and ‘entertainment/protocol’.
39. The exception was one small town from where the current DCE originated.
40. Such findings confirmed those of research undertaken by the Brong-Ahafo District Support Project (Citation2004). This found that the subcommittees in Asanama had not held regular meetings over the period June 2002 to April 2004, excepting ‘Finance and Administration’.
41. Interview with subcommittee convener, 9 June 2004.
42. Interview with subcommittee convener, 9 June 2004.
43. The picture was somewhat better in Bofano, with more regular meetings held and expenses paid. Interviews with conveners of seven subcommittees indicated that all had met at least twice in 2003 and at least once by mid-2004. Meetings were still not frequent, however.
44. Crook (2003, 84) refers to similar processes as the ‘politics of local–central relations’, indicating that the pro-poor outcomes of decentralisation reforms are partly dependent on the relationships between central and local elites and the political goals of decentralisation reforms themselves.
45. Frempong (2003, 193) also gives various examples of the closeness of the DCEs to the ruling party, for instance, standing as candidates in parliamentary elections for the party that appointed them.
46. When in opposition, the NPP pledged to introduce an elected DCE, but to date have not introduced the required constitutional amendment despite being at the end of their second term of office.
47. Frempong (2003, 192) also notes that ‘appointments have gone to reward the party faithful’.
48. Interviews with: district director of the Ghana Education Service, Asanama District, 7 June 2004; district director of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Asanama district, 8 June 2004; district director of the Ghana Health Service, Bofano District, 21 June 2004; district director of Ghana Education Services, Bofano district, 21 June 2004.
49. Interview with the district director of the Ghana Education Service, Asanama district, 7 June 2004.
50. Interview with the district director of the Ghana Health Service, Bofano district, 21 June 2004.
51. The district director of the Ghana Education Service in Asanama stated that they had not been involved in the MTDP planning process and that the education objectives listed in the MTDP were at variance with their own objectives (interview, 7 June 2004). Similarly, the district director of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture in Asanama was unaware of the agricultural objectives within the MTDP and stated that they were not being pursued in conjunction with his department, which had its own district agricultural plan (interview 8 June 2004).
52. Legislation was passed in the 1990s, notably the Education Service Act and the Health Service Act, that contradicted the intentions of a local government service and kept these sectoral services under the control of their ministries in Accra (Ayee Citation2004, 140–1).
53. It is particularly low when compared to the proportions of government revenue transferred to local level in Uganda (30%) and in Ethiopia (over 40%) (Smoke Citation2001, 20).
54. Interview with the administrator of the District Assembly Common Fund, 30 June 2004.
55. It is estimated that 85% of government funds at district level are not controlled by the DAs (interview with official of the Decentralisation Secretariat, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, 3 April 2006).
56. Although the pros and cons of a partisan or nonpartisan electoral system at local level is a subject of debate in Ghana (see Frempong Citation2003), Blair (Citation2000) and Manor (Citation1999, 75) have both argued in other contexts that accountability mechanisms are enhanced by the existence of competitive party politics. It is interesting to note that the government of Ghana's (2007) ‘decentralisation policy framework’ has opted to retain the current nonpartisan system despite widespread recognition of covert political party involvement in local elections as well as the partisan manipulation of the appointment system by the ruling party.
57. The complexities of a quota system under a ‘first past the post’ (FTPT) electoral system must be acknowledged, however. It is easier to apply quotas under a ‘list proportional representation’ electoral system, whereas a FTPT system requires women-only candidates in certain electoral areas, itself controversial. For more discussion see Larserud and Taphorn (Citation2007). Ofei-Aboagye (Citation2000) suggests two approaches to cultural change, one aiming to enhance women's capacity to participate in the DA system, and the other at changing the relatively hostile environment for women in local government institutions. The issue of how to increase women's participation in local government has given rise to a keen debate among women's rights advocates in Ghana: some favour the retention of appointed members, inclusive of the 30% quota; while others favour the abolition of the appointment system on democratic grounds and focus on campaigns to support women candidates in electoral processes.
