The fourth point: An examination of the influence of Kenyan Somalis in Somalia

Abstract

The consequences of insecurity in Somalia to the government of Kenya and its citizens is well documented: massive flows of refugees since the collapse of the Siyad Barre regime in 1991; cross-border violence including poaching, cattle-rustling, kidnappings, and trafficking of illegal goods; and, lately, threats of attacks and jihad from al-Shabaab, the terrorist group which is aligned with Osama bin Laden and, therefore, al-Qaeda. The lack of security and a viable government in Somalia continue to threaten the sovereignty and security of Kenya. As policymakers, military officials, and academics attempt to find solutions to the failed state of Somalia, another dimension of the problem (but also a potential avenue for useful exploration) warrants academic attention and insight – namely, examination of the ethnic Somali populations outside of Somalia and their influence on the politics (and lack thereof) within Somalia itself. This article offers an initial analysis of one subset of the Somali people outside Somalia, Kenyan Somalis.

Keywords:

• Kenya
• Somalia
• Somali diaspora
• history
• politics
• security
• Kenyan Somalis
• Kenya census

Notes

1. For a foundational understanding both pan-Somalism and Greater Somalia, read Lewis (1963) and Lewis (2002).

2. There are a number of well-documented reports on Somali refugees in Kenya and their plight, for example Human Rights Watch (2009a) and Human Rights Watch (2009b). For a first-person account of the plight, see Hyndman (1999).

3. According to some scholars, the flag serves to remind Somalis, wherever they might be, that they have ‘a duty to unite and form one nation state’ (Makinda 1983, 306).

4. Scholarly assessments vary, from the tenth through the fourteenth centuries for the initial wave of Somalis of the Darod and Isaq clans. Additional movements took place possibly in the seventeenth century.

5. I attempt to analyse the distinctness of the Somali people, specifically vis-à-vis Kenyans, in Chau (2010a).

6. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this necessary clarification.

7. The British East Africa Protectorate became officially known as the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya until 1963, when Kenya gained independence.

8. The most detailed account, at least up until the Second World War, of British colonial administration policy toward Somalis in Kenya is Thompson (1995).

9. For an ethno-linguistic analysis par excellence, see Schlee (1989).

10. The SYL was originally the Somali Youth Club, established in May 1943 in Mogadishu. In addition to the NFD, the SYL established branches in Ethiopia's Ogaden and British Somaliland.

11. Other secessionist Somali political parties included the Northern Province Democratic Party, the People's National League, and the National Political Movement, which was based in Nairobi.

12. The NFD was split between the districts of Garissa, Mandera, and Wajir which formed Northeastern Region and Isiolo and Moyale districts, which formed Eastern Region.

13. I write ‘apparently’ because the NFD Commission Report included in its findings the phrase ‘on the premise that there can be no question of secession before Kenya gets independence’. The report is cited in Lewis (2002), 191-2).

14. For an analysis of the strategic dimensions of the shifta insurgency, see Chau (2010b). The only full-length treatment of the shifta insurgency is Nene (2005).

15. For a critique of the screening procedure, see Human Rights Watch (1990).

16. For more on the attacks in the context of US-Kenya strategic relations, see Chau (2010b).

17. Some analyses refer only to Kenyan Muslims and do not differentiate Somalian Muslims, see for example Terdman (2007).

18. Thus, this article will not explore the sub-clan differentiation between Isaq and non-Isaq (principally Darod) in Kenya.

19. Somali and Oromo groups, both from the Cushitic language family, will be treated as Kenyan Somalis. Somali sub-groups include Degodia, Gurreh, Ogaden, Ajuran, Hawiyah, and Gosha; Oromo sub-groups include Boran, Orma, Gabbra, and Sakuye. Other minor ethnic groups that merge with Somali-Oromos to form Kenyan Somalis include, among others, the Rendille and Boni-Sanye. Supporting this claim that certain non-Somalis see themselves as Somali, see Schlee (1985).

20. For example, by 1989 no Kenyan cattle were being sold in Kismayo (Little 1992, 102).

21. Petroleum is supplied from Kenya to Somalia through Indian-Kenyan agents (Webersik 2006, 1469)

22. For a more detailed examination of the latter, see Chau (2010b).

23. Both the US Central Intelligence Agency and the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office do not have precise breakdowns of Kenyan Somalis in their country reports (Central Intelligence Agency 2010 and Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2010).

24. The Central Bureau of Statistics is now the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics.

25. The total number of Kenyan Somalis comprised 382,917 Somalis and 133,468 Oromos.

26. The total number of Kenyan Somalis comprised 419,259 Somalis and 161,448 Oromos.

27. The reported total population corresponds with the US Census Bureau's 39 million estimate (US Census Bureau 2010).

28. Indeed, Western intelligence traced a large cache of weapons in Somalia under Morgan's control with serial numbers of small and light weapons which had been purchased by the Kenya Army (Sloyan 1992, 15).

29. The list of prominent Kenyan Somalis included: Provincial Commissioner Mohamud Saleh, Assistant Ministers Yusuf Haji (Office of the President), Mohamed Abdi (Trade and Industry), Adan Mohamed Noor (Environment and Natural Resources), Mohamed Affey (Foreign Affairs) and members of parliament, Dr Ali Abdi (Wajir North), Mohamed Weyrah (Ijara), and Adan Keynan (Wajir West) (Sunday Nation 2002). Affey was later Kenyan special envoy to Somalia (International Crisis Group 2004, 10). Keynan chaired the Parliament's Committee on Defence.

30. For an exception, read an account of the radicalisation of Kenyan Somali Tawakal Ahmed from Isiolo, who was killed in November 2008 fighting for al-Shabaab (Aly 2009, 10).

31. Religious centres in Kenya known for their ties to militant Islamic groups in Somalia include: the Abubakar as-Saddique mosque on 6th street, the Al-Hidaya mosque, Beit-ul-Mal Madrassa and the Masjid-ul-Axmar in Nairobi (UN Monitoring Group on Somalia 2010, 25).

32. Further support to this assertion is the example of Kenyan Somali Liban Elmi from Nairobi, who joined al-Shabaab in 2009, was trained in Ras Kamboni, wounded in combat in Mogadishu, and subsequently returned to Northeastern Province – with an amputated right leg (Baldauf and Mohamed 2010).

33. One account described how Garissa resident Siad Dhaqane unknowingly volunteered for the training but was later told to return home (Ryu 2009).

34. The dispute is between deployment to the Kenya-Somali border area or to Mogadishu (Ryu 2010).