The UN-led Djibouti peace process for Somalia 2008–2009: Results and problems

Abstract

The UN-led Djibouti peace process for Somalia came to a climax at the end of January 2009 with the election of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as the president of the new unity government. The negotiations took place outside Somalia and excluded some of the most important players in Somali politics. The Djibouti process was protracted and resulted in ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, among the former being Sheikh Sharif and Sheikh Madobe, and the latter former President Abdullahi Yusuf and Prime Minister Nur Hussein ‘Adde’. Ultimately, this UN initiative continues to run into difficulties because it excluded important Somali groups who continue to wreak havoc on the ground in Somalia by violent means.

Keywords:

• Somalia
• Djibouti peace process
• Djibouti I
• Djibouti II
• the Sodere Process
• the Arta Process
• the Nairobi Process
• the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM)
• Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
• the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia
• al-Shabaab
• Hizbul Islam
• Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed
• conflict resolution

Notes

1. Al-Shabaab means ‘The Youth’. It was the militia of the Islamic Courts Union in the early 2000s, and mostly made up of young combatants.

2. Hizbul Islam brings together four factions namely: the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS)-Eritrea faction led by Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys’, the Ras Kambooni group (led by Hassan Abdullah Hersi ‘al Turki’); the Jabhatul Islamiya (Islamic Front) and the Muaska Anole (Anole Group). All these groups have one thing in common – they fought against Ethiopia's occupation of Somalia between December 2006 and January 2009.

3. Garowe Online, Somalia: 11 killed in southern region battles, 30 March 2009 at http://allafrica.com/stories/200903310237.html (accessed on 30 March 2009).

4. I am highlighting these not because they are more important than the others, but because I want to posit that every Somalia national reconciliation conference has been characterised by two common facts: non- inclusivity/perceived non-inclusivity, and external initiation.

5. The declaration of independence was made on 17 May 1991.

6. For full details of this agreement, see Abraham (2002, 132–39).

7. The other reasons which have been cited for the failure of the TNG include: the Arta process ignored the interests of regional stakeholders such as Ethiopia and Kenya; that the Arta process was predicated on the 1960 Somali Constitution, which thus failed to take into consideration the fact that the awareness levels had radically changed and that the clans were more informed than they were in terms of political representation.

8. Also Ethiopia's Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, attended the inauguration of the TNG.

9. In addition to helping in the formation of the SRRC, Ethiopia also supplied groups opposed to the TNG operating in Mogadishu, Lower Juba, Bay, Bakool, Gedo and Hiran with ammunition, weapons and landmines; it strengthened the regional state of Puntland; and after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the USA, it attempted to label TNG leaders as pro Bin-Laden extremists.

10. For a detailed discussion of the negotiations, see Ochieng Kamudhayi (2004, 107–23).

11. According to Menkhaus (2007, 368), the APRCT was formed in February 2006 by a group of nine Hawiye clan-militia leaders and businessmen, including figures such as Bashir Raghe, Musa Suude and Mohamed Qanyare. Without a functioning central government to work with in Somalia, the United States opted to forge a partnership with non-state actors on counter-terrorism monitoring and rendition.

12. In addition Menkhaus has noted that UIC popularity was due to other factors, including, for some Somalis, the appeal of Islamism as an attractive alternative to clanism; the UIC's conflation of Islamic rhetoric with pan-Somali nationalism and anti-Ethiopianism. Somalis from the Habr Gedir clan were especially supportive of the UIC as a vehicle which advanced their clan's political interests, albeit under the guise of Islam; the UIC's dramatic success as a military and political movement also attracted many supporters seeking to ensure that they were on the winning side; and the ability of the UIC to present itself as a ‘big tent’ movement encompassing a range of moderate and hardliner Islamists also helped it win supporters especially among more secular Somalis.

13. Menkhaus (2007, 378) has argued that the conflict between Ethiopia and the UIC became inevitable when the hardliners of the UIC embarked on an increasingly strident and systematic campaign seemingly designed to provoke tensions with Ethiopia. This included: repeated calls for jihad against Ethiopia; irredentist claims on Somali-inhabited territories of Ethiopia; appeals to the people of Ethiopia to rise up against the Meles government; the forging of close links (including receipt of arms and military advisors) with Eritrea; and the provision of logistical support and bases to two armed insurgencies opposing the Ethiopian government, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF).

14. See Report of the 24 ^th Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers, Nairobi, Kenya, 17–18 March 2005.

15. See Report of the 24 ^th Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers, Nairobi, Kenya, 17–18 March 2005.

16. See Decision of the 24 ^th Meeting of the PSC, PSC/PR/Comm. (XXIV), 7 February 2005.

17. Swiss Peace, Fast update: Somalia-Semi Annual Risk Assessment, February to July 2006, p. 6.

18. Swiss Peace, Fast update: Somalia-Semi Annual Risk Assessment, February to July 2006, p. 6.

19. Swiss Peace, Fast update: Somalia-Semi Annual Risk Assessment, February to July 2006, p. 6.

20. UN Security Council Resolution 1725 (2006), S/RES/1725 (2006), 6 December 2006, para. 3.

21. UN Security Council Resolution 1725 (2006), S/RES/1725 (2006), 6 December 2006, para. 5.

22. Peace and Security Council, Communiqué of the 69^th Meeting, PSC/PR/Comm (LXIX), 19 January 2007, para. 8. The Council noted that AMISOM shall be ‘adequately equipped to project the appropriate posture and shall undertake the following tasks: to support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders; to provide, as appropriate, protection to the TFIs and their key infrastructure, to enable them carry out their functions; to assist in the implementation of the National Security and Stabilisation Plan for Somalia, particularly the effective re-establishment and training of all inclusive Somalia security forces, bearing in mind the programs already being implemented by some of Somalia's bilateral and multilateral partners; to provide, within capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support to the disarmament and stabilisation efforts; to monitor, in areas of deployment of its forces, the security situation; to facilitate, as may be required and within capabilities, humanitarian operations, including the repatriation and re-integration of refugees and the resettlement of IDPs, and to protect its personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of self defence’. The council further decided that ‘AMISOM shall comprise 9 infantry battalions of 850 personnel each supported by maritime coastal and air components, as well as an appropriate civilian component, including a police training team; the initial deployment shall involve at least 3 infantry battalions, with adequate arrangements for additional battalions to follow quickly; AMISOM shall be deployed for a period of 6 months, aimed essentially at contributing to the initial stabilisation phase in Somalia, with a clear understanding that the mission will evolve to a United Nations operation that will; support the long term stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction of Somalia; the concept of logic support for AMISOM shall be based on self-sustenance by the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), based on the model of the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB)’.

23. UN Security Council Resolution 1744 (2007), S/RES/1744 (2007), 20 February 2007.

24. The breakdown was as follows: Uganda 1860 and Burundi 850 troops.

25. See Uganda Parliament Report of the Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs on the Deployment of Troops in Somalia (undated), (on file with the current author).

26. Address by General Germane Niyoyonkana at the Consultation Meeting of African Union member states on support to Somalia TFG organised by the IGAD, AU and UN, Serena Hotel, Nairobi, 6 June 2009. (On file with the current author).

27. Interview with Francis Matsanga, UN Humanitarian Planner, AMISOM, Nairobi, 6 November 2009.

28. Annette Weber (2008), 17).

29. In addition, there was the former speaker of parliament of the TFG Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, and former TFG Deputy Prime Minister, Hussein Mohammed Farah.

30. According to Menkhaus (2007), 371), the UIC was unquestionably a very broad, loose coalition – ranging from traditional Sufi figures like Sheikh Sharif to hard-line Salafists (a term connoting identification with the Wahhabi branch of Islam) like Hassan Aweys to committed jihadists in the al-Shabaab militia).

31. The hard-line minority of about 15 persons led by Hassan Aweys remained in Asmara up to late 2009. Aweys returned to Somalia that year.

32. It should be noted that Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), women and business community groups, among others, have now joined the process. In order not to confuse the reader I will throughout use ARS-Djibouti to mean the faction of ARS that has joined the TFG.

33. Agreement between the Transitional Federal Government and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), 9 June 2008 (hereafter: The 9 June Agreement), para. 3. It should be noted that while the agreement is dated 9 June 2008, it was finally signed on 19 August 2008.

34. Agreement between the Transitional Federal Government and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), 9 June 2008 (hereafter: The 9 June Agreement), para. 3. It should be noted that while the agreement is dated 9 June 2008, it was finally signed on 19 August 2008., para. 6.

35. Agreement between the Transitional Federal Government and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), 9 June 2008 (hereafter: The 9 June Agreement), para. 3. It should be noted that while the agreement is dated 9 June 2008, it was finally signed on 19 August 2008., para. 7.

36. R. Cornwell, Hopes for a settlement in Somalia fade, Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, 1 August 2008. http://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=22&slink_id=6410&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3 (accessed on 23 February 2009).

37. The 9 June Agreement, para. 8 (c).

38. The 9 June Agreement, para. 9.

39. The JSC was set up to implement the Transitional Security Arrangements (TSA) with 15 TFG and 15 ARS members, co-chaired by the UN and AU. Its specific responsibilities are: to make recommendations on the modalities of the phased withdrawal of Ethiopian forces (completed); implement the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities between the TFG and ARS; establish a TFG-ARS force to act jointly to observe, verify and monitor compliance with the agreement, facilitate unimpeded humanitarian access and assistance including the protection of humanitarian workers, and investigate reported breaches in the agreement and bring findings of those investigations before the committee for decision; finding appropriate, peaceful solutions in the event of the breach of the agreement; and preparing recommendations for the restructuring and reform of the Somali armed forces.

40. In the context of its work, the HLC is specifically tasked with the bringing on board of those groups outside the Djibouti process; address constitutional development, transitional justice and impunity, monitor the implementation of political co-operation and assist in managing disputes.

41. Decisions of the High Level Committee Djibouti Agreement, 25 November 2008, para. 4.

42. Decisions of the High Level Committee Djibouti Agreement, 25 November 2008, para. 5.

43. This was another cause of friction between President Yusuf and Prime Minister Adde. On 30 July 2008, Nur Adde dismissed the governor of the Banadir region and mayor of Mogadishu, Mohammed Dheere. President Yusuf reversed this decision by declaring the PM's action ‘un-procedural’. The Attorney General declared the PM's action ‘unconstitutional’. Subsequently, on 9 September 2008, President Yusuf issued a decree appointing a 10-person temporary administration (for 15 days) of the Banadir region headed by Ibrahim Sheikh Muhiyadin replacing the one composed of seven persons that had been appointed by Prime Minister Nur and headed by Mohamed Omar Habeb. See Presidential Decree JS/XM/227/09/08, Mogadishu 9 September 2008 (on file with the author).

44. Declaration of the 13^th Extra-ordinary Session of the IGAD Heads of State and Government, Nairobi Kenya, 29 October 2008, para. 3.

45. Declaration of the 13^th Extra-ordinary Session of the IGAD Heads of State and Government, Nairobi Kenya, 29 October 2008, para. 4.

46. Communiqué of the 30^th Extra-ordinary Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers on the Prevailing Political and Security Situation in Somalia, Addis Ababa Ethiopia, 18 November 2008, para. 11. As one of the drafters of the communiqué, I suggested this language.

47. AU Peace and Security Council, Communiqué, PSC/MIN/Comm.4 (CLXIII), 22 December 2008, para. 10. The PSC went further and requested the chairperson of the AU Commission to establish a committee of experts to work out the modalities of the implementation of the sanctions, including elaborating and updating on a regular basis the list of targeted individuals and entities, as well as monitoring their implementation, and to submit the envisaged list to the council for endorsement. The AU PSC again reiterated this position in its communiqué issued at the end of its 177^th meeting on 11 March 2009 where it recalled its decision endorsing targeted sanctions imposed by the 30^th Extra-ordinary Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers held at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 18 November 2008 against all those hindering the on-going efforts towards reconciliation, peace and stability in Somalia. The council requested the AU Commission to work with all relevant stakeholders, including the UN to establish a list of individuals and entities on whom the sanctions are to be imposed and on the modalities for the implementation of the sanctions. See PSC, Communiqué, PSC/PR/COMM. (CLXXVII), 11 March 2009, para. 12.

48. Communiqué of the 31^st Extra-ordinary Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers on the Prevailing Political and Security Situation in Somalia, Addis Ababa Ethiopia, 18 November 2008, paras 3 and 4. The appointment of Mohammed Mahmud a.k.a. Ga'madheere as ‘Prime Minister’ was also rejected by Nur Adde and many members of parliament. Having been threatened with sanctions, Ga'madheere had no alternative but to ‘resign’.

49. Communiqué of the 31^st Extra-ordinary Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers on the Prevailing Political and Security Situation in Somalia, Addis Ababa Ethiopia, 18 November 2008, paras 3 and 4. The appointment of Mohammed Mahmud a.k.a. Ga'madheere as ‘Prime Minister’ was also rejected by Nur Adde and many members of parliament. Having been threatened with sanctions, Ga'madheere had no alternative but to ‘resign’., para. 4. IGAD's position was supported by the AU PRC in its communiqué of 22 December 2008 where it affirmed its full support to Prime Minister Nur Adde and his new cabinet. The council condemned President Yusuf for violating the TFC by appointing a new ‘prime minister’. The council requested all member states and the larger international community not to recognise the ‘prime minister’ appointed by President Yusuf and any other individual associated with that appointment.

50. President Yusuf was always lukewarm about the Djibouti process. He viewed the process as aimed at eroding presidential control. In late November 2008, he visited Libya and it is reported that he wanted to shift the process away from Djibouti so that he could gain control of it. For a discussion on this see International Crisis Group (2008, 24).

51. The amended articles include: 29, 30, 32 and 45.

52. In the corridors of the election hall it was said that MPs allied to former President Abdullahi Yusuf and former Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi were under instructions to vote against Nur Adde.

53. For example, at the opening of the Djibouti talks on 24 January 2009, a section of the TFP openly heckled him as he made his remarks.

54. I have discussed the interventions of Ethiopia and Djibouti, supra.

55. In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 794, 3 December 1992, S/RES/794 (1992).

56. See supra.

57. See generally Harris and Reilly (1998).

58. As a consequence, the United States has labelled al-Shabaab a ‘terrorist organisation’. See United States Department of State, Designation of al-Shabaab, Press Release, 18 March 2008.