Putting Somali piracy in context

Abstract

While it is not necessarily the gravest threat to international security emanating from Somalia, maritime piracy has received the most attention among the disorders resulting from that country's two decades of state collapse. The phenomenon is best understood in its proper context in relation to the national politics – or, rather, the failure thereof – among the Somali. Thus the successful strategy will be one that is adapted to the reality of Somali life.

Keywords:

• Somalia
• maritime piracy
• state failure
• international law
• Puntland
• Somaliland

Notes

1. The author concurs with Robert I. Rotberg's distinction between a ‘failed state’, deeply conflicted and bitterly contested by warring factions, and its extreme version, the ‘collapsed state’, characterised by a complete vacuum of authority and reduced to ‘a mere geographical expression, a black hole into which a failed polity has fallen’ (Rotberg 2003, 9). He has argued elsewhere that the one-time Somali Democratic Republic is the example par excellence of the latter phenomenon (Pham 2010a).

2. Elsewhere in this collection, Brian J. Hesse argues that ‘Somalia’ is a highly contested concept, indeed a ‘myth’.

3. Apuuli Phillip Kasaija's contribution to this collection describes the ‘Djibouti Process’ as well as its shortcomings.

4. One of the most hotly debated issues among analysts is the nature of the relationship between Somali pirates and Somali Islamist insurgents. Opinions range from those who believe there is close collaboration, including claims of Shabaab training and financing of particular pirates groups (Schiemsky 2009), to those who are sceptical of any such connections (Stevenson 2010). The truth probably lies somewhere in between with clear evidence of opportunistic instances of co-operation between the two. For example, when the Greek-owned, Maltese-flagged bulk carrier MV Centauri was seized in September 2008, its hijackers took it to the southern Somali port of Kismayo where it was guarded by the same al-Shabaab militiamen who controlled the town until its release two months later. Presumably the pirates shared a part of the ransom they won with the local al-Shabaab commanders who certainly did not secure the vessel without some compensation.

5. It is worth noting that while the TFG, like its predecessor entities, has been the subject of diverse expressions of generic support from members of the international community, there has nonetheless been a reluctance on the part of most states actually to accord it de jure recognition. While the United States, for example, never formally severed relations with Somalia after the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, neither has it officially recognised any of the 15 transitional governments, including the current TFG. The State Department website merely states: ‘The United States maintains regular dialogue with the TFG and other key stakeholders in Somalia through the US Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya’. In fact, the lack of affirmative legal recognition for the TFG is presumed by the introduction in October 2009 of a Congressional Resolution by the chairman of the Africa Subcommittee of the US House of Representatives urging ‘the Obama Administration to recognise the TFG and allow the opening of an official Somali Embassy in Washington’. The clear implication is that the United States Government accords the TFG something less than normal diplomatic recognition as a sovereign. In fact, this point was formally conceded in early 2010 by the Obama administration when, in a brief filed with the US Supreme Court, the Solicitor-General of the United States, Elena Kagan, and the Legal Advisor of the State Department, Harold Hongju Koh, acknowledged that ‘since the fall of that government, the United States has not recognised any entity as the government of Somalia’. The brief went on to argue that since ‘United States does not recognise the TFG as the government of Somalia, and absent contrary guidance from the Executive Branch, the TFG is not in a position to assume that role in United States courts’. The government moreover advised the court that it ‘should not attach significance to the statements of the TFG unless the Executive Branch advises it to do so’. See Mohamed Ali Samantar v. Bashe Abdi Yusuf, et al., No. 08-1555, Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, January 2010, accessed at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/09-10/08-1555_AffirmanceAmCuUSA.pdf. While perhaps more explicitly articulated than that of other nations, the US position is nonetheless consistent with the actual practice of the majority of other states, both African and non-African. See Mohamed Ali Samantar v. Bashe Abdi Yusuf, et al., No. 08-1555, Brief of Amici Curiae Academic Experts in Somali History and Current Affairs in Support of the Respondents, 27 January 2010, accessed at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/09-10/08-1555_RespondentAmCuSomaliExperts.pdf. The experts’ brief was filed by the author along with Professors Lee Cassanelli, Ioan M. Lewis, Gérard Prunier, and Hussein Bulhan.

6. The UN Secretary-General's March 2009 report to the Security Council specifically indicated that the ‘mother ships’ used by Somali pirates were operating out of the Yemeni ports of Al Mukallah and Al Shishr, presumably with at least the tacit consent of the local authorities, if not their outright complicity (UNSC 2009). Port officials in Mogadishu, who are theoretically answerable to the TFG, have also been accused of facilitating several pirate attacks, including assaults on vessels carrying relief supplies to the Somali population (Iglesias Baniela 2010, 196).