Balancing (re)distribution: Franco-Mauritians landownership in the maintenance of an elite position

Abstract

Sugarcane, once a vital component of the Mauritian economy, now makes up less than 10% of GDP. The land on which it grows (and grew), however, remains essential to the island's politico-economic power balance. Large tracts of land are still owned by Franco-Mauritians, the island's white former colonial elite, thus leading to an ambiguous relationship between landowners and the government in postcolonial Mauritius. This article argues that both resentment and collaboration contribute to the consolidation of the Franco-Mauritian elite position. Pressure from the state may have compelled Franco-Mauritians to redistribute some of their land, but this ‘pay-off’ hardly jeopardised their elite position. Their striking a balance between opposing redistribution and giving in to government demands is key to explaining how landed (white) elites are, in the absence of (state) violence, able to maintain their position long after the end of colonialism.

Keywords:

• power
• landownership
• colonial elite
• Mauritius
• postcolonial

Notes

1. This article is based on historical data and ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Mauritius, South Africa and France in the period 2005–2007. Over 125 interviews were conducted with Franco-Mauritians in Mauritius, South Africa and France, while 30 official interviews were conducted with other Mauritians. The research also relies on informal conversations, participant observation, a questionnaire I conducted, and media research, both archival and from contemporary sources.

2. The total population of Mauritius is about 1.3 million. Apart from Europe, Mauritians have their origins in distant locations such as China, India and Africa. The largest group are Hindus (52%) and there is a minority group of Muslims (16%). Both groups originate in India and most came as indentured labourers when slavery was abolished in 1835. Creoles, largely of slave descent, constitute about 27% (including a small group of gens de couleur). Then there are the Sino-Mauritians, who make up 3% of the population (Eriksen 1998, 15).

3. Notwithstanding that Mauritius did not witness the displacement of people like elsewhere in Africa, there are certainly cases of Franco-Mauritians applying cunning ways to repossess the land of other Mauritians. A shared Franco-Mauritian background was not necessarily an insurance to be safe, though, because there are also stories of disputed appropriation among Franco-Mauritians – and even within families. One of the main recommendations of the Truth and Justice Commission (2011), in this light, is to set up a land monitoring and research unit in order to investigate and settle (historical) disputes regarding land transactions and title deeds.

4. The black population the Franco-Mauritians wanted to distinguish themselves from was a mixed group of slaves and free(d) persons originating from numerous locations in, predominantly, Africa and India.

5. Pointing to the remarkable life story of Marie Rozette – a freedwoman of Indian origin – who accumulated wealth, land and slaves in Mauritius in the late 1700s, during the French period, Allen (2011) observes this dominance was not comprehensive – equally there are examples during the British period of non-whites owning large tracts of land and slaves.

6. The role of the then prime minister, the Franco-Mauritian Paul Bérenger, was especially illustrative to this. Initially, Bérenger was not associated with the Franco-Mauritians, because when he started his political career in the first decade after independence, he strongly criticised Franco-Mauritian domination in the private sector. This helped him to gain wide support among Mauritians of all backgrounds. In 2003, Bérenger became the first non-Hindu prime minister of Mauritius due to a pre-electoral agreement between his party and the party of Anerood Jugnauth, the prime minister who preceded Bérenger. That a non-Hindu became prime minister was thought to represent a break with the past and it was considered a sign that Mauritius was ready for decreased influence of ethnicity on politics. However, once in government Bérenger found himself obliged to cooperate with Franco-Mauritian businessmen, which made him an easy prey for political opponents. Now his skin-colour suddenly became ‘visible’: he was a ‘white’ favouring other ‘whites’. His background clearly constrained him in dealing with private sector matters. In reality, Bérenger does not appear to have favoured the Franco-Mauritians or showed any ‘racial’ preferences. Yet, his white skin-colour was a liability. As a consequence of Bérenger's position as prime minister, in the ensuing 2005 election campaign there was a strong focus on the Franco-Mauritians. As many ordinary Mauritians are of the cynical viewpoint that government, in general, represents the interests of the Franco-Mauritians (Hempel 2009, 468), they easily accepted the political rhetoric that Franco-Mauritians hold all the economic power and, through the political figure of Bérenger, were becoming hegemonic again. This put the Franco-Mauritian community in a position of blame. Subsequently, Bérenger lost the 2005 elections; although it may be too simplistic to say that Bérenger cum suis only lost because of his white skin-colour.

7. See: http://www.gov.mu/portal/goc/cso/report/natacc/agri06/sumtab.pdf (accessed 7 December 2009).

8. http://www.acpsugar.org/Sugar%20Protocol.html (accessed: 7 December 2007).