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ABSTRACT
This article examines the political crisis in Mali, 2012–2013, to test the impact of violent conflict on public attitudes to democracy. In post-conflict situations, democracy building depends on interim steps to restore trust among citizens and to address national reconciliation and transitional justice. According to the results of a custom-designed opinion survey, recent experiences of violence and displacement in Mali have undermined both interpersonal and interethnic trust as well as public confidence that elected governments can resolve national conflicts. While internal displacement is frequently accompanied by violence against property, violence against persons increases popular demand for a retributive brand of transitional justice. Nonetheless, the Malian experience suggests that citizens in post-conflict societies – including those displaced from their homes – still yearn to live in a peaceful and unified country and have not abandoned a widespread preference for democracy.
Acknowledgment
The author thanks Ben Appel, Massa Coulibaly, Boniface Dulani, Steve Esquith, John Staatz, Jakana Thomas and two anonymous referees for excellent comments on early drafts but bears full responsibility for any remaining errors.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Michael Bratton is University Distinguished Professor of Political Science and African Studies, Michigan State University and co-founder and former executive director of the Afrobarometer.
Notes
1. In practice, IDPs are among the world’s most vulnerable people, whose dislocation creates urgent special needs for shelter, food, healthcare and economic livelihood. Worldwide, IDP numbers exceed those of refugees, amounting to an estimated total of 33.3 million by the end of 2013, with concentrations in sub-Saharan Africa (12.5 million) and the Middle East and North Africa (9.1 million) (IDMC Citation2014; UNHCR Citation2014b).
2. More so than other Malians, IDPs rate political insecurity as the country’s most important problem (Bratton and Penar Citation2014). But in puzzling dissonance, they are less likely than non-IDPs to report feeling insecure in public places. Are they comparing their new situations with old? This speculation is confirmed by a comparison of those who have returned to their homes with those who haven’t: more than half of returnees (55%) ‘always’ feel insecure vs. only one third of those who have not yet returned (33%).
3. The statistics in this paper are based on the national probability sample plus the northern oversample. IDPs are included in the sample for all Malians if they were selected as part of the random national sample or the random oversample in the north. But IDPs from the purposive IDP oversample are not included, except as specifically noted. References to IDPs are based on unweighted data. But the data for all Malians and for non-IDPs are weighted to reflect correct stratum proportions by region, location (urban-rural), sampling unit size and household size. Overall, 62% of interviews took place with IDPs located in urban areas in a context where only 25% of the Malian population is urbanised.
4. Because the survey targeted people of voting age (18 years or older), children were not counted, even though they routinely accompanied IDPs.
5. Food insecurity is based on a question about whether the household ever ‘went without enough food to eat’ during 2013.
6. Given the sensitivity of the subject matter, both figures may be underestimates.
7. It is worth noting that IDPs were purposeful agents as well as passive victims. A significant proportion actively provided comfort to their fellow citizens: some 41% reported that they ‘took care of someone displaced from their home’ (compared to just 5% of non-IDPs).
8. Whereas, on average across 34 countries, only one in five Africans (20%) say ‘most people can be trusted’ in 2012, one in three (34%) does so in Mali in 2013 (Bratton, Coulibaly, and Dulani Citation2014). Because these levels of trust do not vary significantly between IDPs and non-IDPs, the figures on trust cited in this section are for all Malians.
9. For victims of violence r = −.046 (p = .021) and for IDPs r = −.056 (p = .006).
10. A Round 5 Afrobarometer survey was conducted in Mali in December 2012. Caution should be observed in comparing 2012 and 2013 figures, however, since the former sample excluded three northern regions (Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu) due to security considerations.
11. For victims of violence r = −.065 (p = .001) and for IDPs r = −.050 (p = .013).
12. The lack of statistical significance on some coefficients for IDPs should not be taken as a sign of a lack of a relationship. In good part, this result reflects the smaller subsample size of IDPs (n = 396) compared to non-IDPs (n = 2090).
13. A statistically significant difference (p = .025). But much depends on the question asked. Compared to other Malians, IDPs are significantly more likely to opt for direct compensation to individual households rather than collective development projects targeted at Mali’s violence-affected northern zone. And women, who are more numerous among IDPs than the population at large, are more likely than other population groups to prefer a restorative form of justice rather than a retributive one.
14. This result confirms findings from Zimbabwe in which persons personally victimised by violence are most likely to support a retributive form of transitional justice (Bratton Citation2011).
15. The outcome of interest (retributive justice) is a dummy variable (1 = prefer this form of justice). Explanators are dummy variables (1 = an individual’s reported experience with this form of violence). Calculations are made on all cases (N = 2486), unweighted.
16. Admittedly, the relationships are not substantively strong or highly significant. Nor is the model fit especially good. These outcomes are an inevitable artefact of the reality that so many Malians – regardless of their experiences with violence or lack thereof – demand retributive justice.
17. All indicators are binary dummies. Satisfaction signifies persons who elect either ‘fairly’ or ‘very satisfied,’ the top two points on a four-point scale. Extent signifies persons who see ‘a full democracy’ or one ‘with minor problems’ on a four-point scale with ‘not a democracy’ as the lowest point.
18. The indicator for victimisation by any type violence is derived from the last column of . Marginal effects refer to Model 1, where violence is considered independently from displacement.
19. A binary distinction is drawn between those with no or informal (usually Koranic) education on the one hand (65%) and those with at least primary education on the other (35%).
20. The democracy option is drawn from a list of possible responses that includes ‘in some circumstances a non-democratic government can be preferable’ and ‘for someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have’. Rejection of autocracy is measured by a dummy that includes those persons who, with reference to military rule, ‘disapprove’ and ‘disapprove strongly’; it excludes those who ‘approve’ or ‘approve strongly’.