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ABSTRACT
This article examines how the European Union (EU) Strategy for security and development in the Sahel has been used as a ‘laboratory of experimentation’ for the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach. In this context, it looks at how power struggles at the discursive and praxis levels are performing the international agency of the EU. These struggles are played out by EU officials based in different institutions who are seeking to assert their role in the EU foreign policy process and to promote their vision for the EU in the world. The attempt to re-define the EU as a strategic actor which lies at the heart of the Comprehensive Approach is also transforming the EU’s relations with West Africa (WA) and raises some issues that concern the political agency of West African partners. The last section shows that the Sahel Strategy has undermined local ownership and has the potential to cripple the process of regional integration in WA.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. Our interest in this article lies in how and for which purpose the actors use these discursive categories more than in their emergence. See Rogers (Citation2009) for an analysis of the evolution of conflicting and overlapping discourses shaping the EU foreign policy.
2. The geographical services of DG DEV included ACP countries while DG RELEX was in charge of the rest of the world.
3. Up until the Lisbon Treaty, the delegations dealt with economic cooperation and development aid.
4. In 2013, the GIT was created to carry out a reflection on possible security approaches towards the Sahel and the Maghreb. It includes officials from the EEAS, the Commission and the Council of the EU and is coordinated by the EEAS.
5. Multiple kidnappings of European citizens by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the killing of a French national led a group of eight member states to send a letter to the HR/VP requesting further European engagement in the region.
6. The IfS is a financial instrument which objectives are to respond to crisis situation (short term), to deal with nuclear proliferation, trans-borders threats and provide for capacity-building in the security field (long-term).
7. Military expenses are not considered Official Development Assistance by the DAC criteria.
8. In July 2016, this process of change led to a European Commission proposal for a Regulation amending the IcSP Regulation in order to enable the use of the IcSP to support military capacity-building in third countries (European Commission Citation2016).
9. Whereas the Comprehensive Approach was scarcely mentioned in the first round of interviews in 2012, all EEAS officials interviewed in 2014 mentioned it (e.g. EEAS official Citation2014b, Citation2014c, Citation2014f).
10. According to Simon, Mattelaer, and Hadfield (Citation2012, 5) ‘the interinstitutional lack of transparency over how EU funds are spent is disconcerting.’
11. The lack of interest of the Malian government also played a role as the EEAS services were not able to use Mali’s proactivity as an argument.
12. With the exception of Algeria.
13. It should be noted that the funding provided to the Sahel Strategy through the EDF is still submitted to the Cotonou procedures.
14. The other African strategies are: The Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa; and the Strategy for the Gulf of Guinea.
15. The C4 (or ‘pays du champ’), launched by Algeria together with Mauritania, Niger and Mali, has established the CEMOC (Comité d’état-major opérationnel conjoint) in 2010, an operational military structure to improve the fight against terrorism. So far the CEMOC has remained inactive.
16. The G5 is a forum launched in 2014 by the Heads of State of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger to address security and development challenges in the Sahel.