Politeia: The cultural and philosophical underpinnings of the ancient Greek idea of the state

Abstract

From the perspective of contemporary Western societies an awareness of democratic practices almost seems self-evident. Yet contemplating the nature of human society and of the state not only took shape in a different era of Western civilization since the initial conceptions found in ancient Greece did not really succeed in transcending a totalitarian idea of the Politeia. The cultural–historical setting of ancient Greece provides the indispensable elements for an understanding of the ideal of the ‘good life’ as it took shape in the political theories of the Greeks. In order to analyze the complexities present in their views the genesis of the first philosophical views are related to societal developments and subsequently brought to bear upon the accompanying theoretical views. It will turn out that from the nominalistic assumptions present in the stance taken by Callicles up to the realistic position represented by Plato and Aristotle, Greek thought did not arrive at an acknowledgement of any societal sphere transcending the boundaries of the state. The city-state (polis) evinced the guiding role of the basic motive of form and harmony—supposedly providing state citizens the opportunity to come to ethical fulfilment and perfection (anticipating the medieval idea of the societas perfecta). Although Plato did speak about the two crucial structural features of a genuine state he did not escape from an underlying totalitarian conception. In a formal sense both Plato and Aristotle advanced a particular understanding of the just state, but in a material sense their views collapsed into a totalitarian understanding, which elevated the state to the level of the all-encompassing societal collectivity.

Notes

1. Although Bos questions the way in which Dooyeweerd accounts for the genesis of the motive of form and matter and also prefers the speak of the titanic meaning-perspective, he believes that the extensive analysis of the development of this motive found in Dooyeweerd (2003) still contains a valid perspective on the inherent dialectic of Greek thought (see Bos, 1994, p. 220).

2. Subsequent references to fragments of pre-Socratic philosophers will omit Diels-Kranz as editors of these fragments.

3. Heraclitus, although thinking under the primacy of the matter motive, attempted a dialectical synthesis between matter and form because the world logos (reason) reveals itself both as Anankè and Dikè (justice). Anaximander views the taking on of a limited form as an encroachment against the formless apeiron (the formless-infinite), which is therefore doomed—by virtue of a law of justice (dikè)—to suffer from punishment and penance and to return to its formless origin according to the order of time (B Fr.1).

4. Provisionally we can describe individualism (atomism) as the view that wants to explain society and societal institutions purely in terms of the interaction between individuals. Universalism (holism), by contrast, postulates some or other all-encompassing societal whole or totality.

5. The term ‘material’ is here used to refer to the inner nature or the inner structural principle of the state. It is usually distinguished from a ‘formal’ view. The latter does not intend to account for structural differences or inherently limited spheres of competence. Rousseau advocated a just state in a formal sense, but materially fell back into a totalitarian and absolutistic theory of the state. Hobbes defended a totalitarian and absolutistic theory in both a formal and a material sense.

6. The Nobel prize winner, Walter Gilbert (lecturer in biochemistry at Harvard University), claims that the instruction ‘know thyself’ actually refers to (biological) knowledge of the human ‘genome’! (Cf. Gilbert, 1987, pp. 87 ff.). The project of unravelling the genetic structure (code) of the genome was recently completed. Yet Gierer remarks: ‘Generally, cloning genes has been almost an obsession in recent years; young scientists were encouraged to extend all sorts of biological studies to include sequence analysis of the genes directly involved wherever possible. However, the realization is now increasingly emerging that there are many interesting questions that cannot be resolved in this manner. Development and evolution, the formation and the function of the neural networks in the-brain are processes that are not easily broken down into elements corresponding to effects of individual genes, individual biochemical components, or even individual cells. A systems approach seems to be required, and this is a challenge for theoretical as well as molecular biologists: in particular, if development as such is to be understood, we need to uncover the—presumably combinatorial—patterns of the activation of different sets of genes in its course’ (Gierer, 2001, p. 26).

7. According to him these ideas are foundational to the transient sensorially perceivable things as invisible, unchanging essential forms.

8. Namely the logistikon, thumoeides and epithumétikon, i.e. thought, fervour and desire.

9. Of course justice was still seen as an ethical virtue.

10. Compare Metaphysics 1031 b 18 ff.

11. The Greek of this claim reads: (Metaph. 1035 b 34–1036 a 1). Compare also Metaph. 1036 a 8.

12. ‘Dadurch das Aristoteles seinen Gott nicht nur als geistiges, also immaterielles Wesen verstanden, sondern in einen radikalen Gegensatz, in Widerspruch zur Materie gebracht, mit welcher er nichts, aber schon gar nichts und in keiner Weize zu tun haben konnte’ (Pötscher, 1970, p. 51)

13. Aristotle, Politica, 1253 a 19–20.

14. Within medieval reflection this view survived in the form of the idea of the perfect society (societas perfecta).