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Abstract
This article argues that parties may view a referendum pledge as a resource to broaden their electoral appeal, especially where controversial ethno-national issues are at stake. The proactive referendum pledge allows a political party to pursue an ethno-national ideal that sets it apart from the incumbent, yet seek the support of wider constituencies. As historical evidence from South Africa suggests, repeated use of the referendum pledge for this purpose makes it difficult for the party to abrogate once in power. Such strategic use of the referendum is distinct from other forms of controlled referendum use identified to date. The existing literature suggests that incumbents employ controlled referenda in response to public pressure or deep internal divisions over controversial issues. The genesis of a referendum may, however, lie in the politics of opposition and incumbency struggles.
Notes
1. The controlled referendum allows the government full discretion as to whether and when to call a referendum. Such votes are more likely in entities without a codified constitution (Smith, Citation1976, pp. 1–16).
2. This approach suggests that past practices inform future behaviour by constraining a decision maker's search for alternatives and defining the situation they are dealing with (March and Olsen, Citation1989, pp. 21–2, 160–61).
3. Malan Collection (Afrikaner Library, Stellenbosch University), File 1/1/646, Statement by the Federal Committee of the National Party of South Africa regarding constitutional relations between the Union and the United Kingdom, 10 December 1920.
4. Hertzog Collection (National Archives, Pretoria), Folder A 32, File 24, J.B.M. Hertzog's address to the National Party Chief Executive, 31 August 1926.
5. Strijdom Collection (National Archives, Pretoria), Folder A 2, File 53, Letter to D.F. Malan from the Directors of Transvaalse Pers, 23 June 1936.
6. Malan Collection, File 1/1/1146, Letter from D.F. Malan to J.G. Strijdom, 8 September 1935.
7. Malan Collection, File 1/1/1148, File 1/1/1148, Letter from Mrs M. Jansen to D.F. Malan, 12 September 1935.
8. Malan Collection, File 1/1/2390, HNP se Verkiesings Manifes. Dr Malan in die Paarl, 21 April 1948.
9. Public Records Office (PRO), DO 35/ 5358, Draft Intel, Johannes Gerhardus Strijdom.
10. PRO, PREM 11/539, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. 12 June 1953. Relations with South Africa. C. (53) 169.
11. The decisiveness of a referendum tends to affect the legitimacy of the decision. In order to prevent a situation in which a close vote undermines the legitimacy of the result, some countries have stipulated special or qualified majority requirements. In Denmark, for example, constitutional amendments need to be passed by at least 40% of the registered votes. In 1979, devolution for Scotland was not accepted after the majority (51.5%) of voters supporting devolution did not represent the majority of eligible voters. Due to a low turnout of 63.6% the Devolution plan secured only 32.9% of the support of registered voters. The so-called Cunningham amendment was introduced by a Labour back-bencher, George Cunningham, who opposed devolution
